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 1 1  Introduction 
1  Introduction 
 
Affective disorders are critically characterized by altered emotionality, from excessive 
negative emotions and mood during depression, to peaks in positive emotions during 
mania. Understanding the neural correlates of these alterations is highly relevant for 
the development of etiological models, which could in the future yield earlier 
diagnosis and novel treatment approaches. The last years have already seen a surge in 
studies targeting the neural mechanisms underlying emotional processing in general 
and in patients with affective disorders in particular (Bourke, Douglas, & Porter, 2010; 
Phillips, Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008). Relatively little is known, however, about the 
reciprocal influence of emotional and cognitive processes in these disorders, even 
though their essential connectedness has clearly been demonstrated in healthy 
populations (Kanske, 2012; Pessoa, 2008).  
Emotional responses do not unfold uniformly, but are subject to change through 
cognitive regulation mechanisms, for example appraisal and reappraisal processes or 
attentional control mechanisms (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). As impairments in cognitive 
control abilities have been consistently observed in depression and bipolar disorder 
(Arts, Jabben, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2008; Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001), 
their regulatory influence on emotion may be impaired as well, which could 
potentially explain part of the affective alterations. In turn, cognitive impairments may 
also partially result from excessive emotional responses whose regulation draws on 
shared resources, thereby yielding enlarged distraction effects. Lastly, predominance 
of negative or positive emotions can bias cognitive processes. Such, more negative or 
positive interpretations of ambiguous situations have been reported to be essential for 
the onset and maintenance of affective disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
However, experimental paradigms to study biases implicitly are still missing. 
A crucial question is what role emotional and emotional-cognitive impairments play 
in the development and course of affective disorders. They may represent markers of 
increased vulnerability if they are already present before the onset of depression or 
bipolar disorder (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Leboyer et al., 1998). Studies in healthy 
relatives of patients with an affective disorder, who have in increased genetic risk to 
develop a disorder themselves, but are still unaffected by the illness, have indeed 
shown abnormal processing of affective stimuli and cognitive impairments (Arts et al., 
2008; Surguladze et al., 2010). There is little evidence, however, on the interactions of 
emotion and cognition. On the other hand, impairments may also represent 
consequences of an affective disorder, rather than a vulnerability, and only show after 
illness onset. If they persist into remission, these impairments could be a reason for 
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the high relapse rates (Keck et al., 1998; Tohen et al., 2003), which would make them 
a special target of treatments. 
The studies included in this thesis aimed at extending our knowledge of the neural 
correlates of emotional processing in affective disorders, in particular of the 
interactions of emotional and cognitive processes. Section 5.1 presents studies that 
investigated two different types of cognitive control over emotions in healthy 
volunteers and patients with remitted depression and euthymic bipolar patients. To 
further elucidate if emotion regulation impairments represent a vulnerability marker, 
unaffected relatives of bipolar patients were also tested. Section 5.2, in contrast, 
includes two studies that tested how emotional stimuli affect cognitive processing in a 
mental arithmetic task. Here, euthymic bipolar patients, unaffected relatives of bipolar 
patients and healthy individuals with hypomanic personality were tested in addition to 
healthy control participants. Lastly, a study on a paradigm that allows indirect 
investigation of biases in cognitive processing is presented in Section 5.3. Here, 
healthy individuals were tested and it was probed how biases are associated to inter-
individual variations in depression related traits. 
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2  Theoretical and empirical background 
The present chapter aims at giving the theoretical and empirical background for the 
research questions that were addressed in the presented studies. It first introduces the 
concept of emotions including its neural underpinnings and then discusses how 
emotional and cognitive processes are reciprocally influencing each other. It 
concludes with a section on our current understanding of alterations in these 
mechanisms in patients with affective disorders and leads over to the research 
questions, which are raised in the next chapter. 
 
2.1  Neural bases of emotional processing 
There is a multitude of definitions for what emotions are, the most critical components 
being that they are episodic in nature and form psycho-physiological reaction patterns, 
that is, they always incorporate multiple levels from peripheral physiological to 
central nervous and subjective responses (Gall, Kerschreiter, & Mojzisch, 2002). 
Emotions result from the evaluation of a stimulus regarding its relevance for the goals 
and needs of an organism (Clore & Ortony, 2000; Keltner & Gross, 1999). If judged 
as relevant, an emotion is elicited, including an action tendency, which is energized by 
the accompanying physiological changes (Frijda, 1994). Therefore, emotions are 
highly adaptive mechanisms, which allow more flexible behavior than simple reflexes, 
but are still faster than elaborate cognitive information processing (Scherer, 1994). If 
aberrant, however, emotions may cause inadequate responses, due to the dysfunctional 
evaluation of the relevance of a stimulus, as is seen in patients with affective disorders 
(see Section 2.3). The definition also highlights the importance of appraisal processes 
for the development of an emotion, since it is the evaluation of a stimulus with regard 
to goals and needs that elicits an emotional response, thus foreshadowing potential 
interactions of emotional with cognitive processes (see Section 2.2). 
Regarding the neural underpinnings of emotional processing, the most recent models 
shift more and more to networks of regions that interact to detect emotional stimuli 
and generate an emotional response (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). Nevertheless, one of 
the most important hubs seems to be the amygdala, a group of nuclei in medial 
temporal cortex (LeDoux, 2007). Lesions of the amygdala lead to a loss in emotional 
reactivity, for example in showing fear of dangerous objects, and disrupt social 
behavior in animals (Kluver & Bucy, 1937; Meunier, Bachevalier, Murray, Malkova, 
& Mishkin, 1999; Weiskrantz, 1956) and humans (Aggleton, 1992; Terzian & Ore, 
1955). Also, recognizing emotions in faces and social stimuli is impaired, when the 
amygdala is not intact (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994). Similarly, 
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direct recordings from the amygdala show its sensitivity to social and emotional 
stimuli in different sensory modalities (Leonard, Rolls, Wilson, & Baylis, 1985). The 
vast neuroimaging literature corroborates this. Meta-analyses of amygdala function 
demonstrate its involvement in the processing of positive as well as negative 
emotional stimuli (Sergerie, Chochol, & Armony, 2008).  
The amygdala is well connected and receives input from sensory cortices as well as 
through direct subcortical thalamic projections (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1972; 
LeDoux, 1995; Tamietto, Pullens, de Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Goebel, 2012), which 
enables it to very rapidly detect basic emotional features in stimuli. This feature 
selection seems to be highly plastic as shown in cortical blindness with complete loss 
of visual evoked event-related electroencephalographic responses (Hamm et al., 2003; 
Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999). Fear conditioning to visual stimuli is still possible in 
these patients and results in a potentiated startle response, an amygdala mediated 
mechanism (Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & Davis, 1991). Projections from 
the amygdala are to sensory areas, where they can amplify processing of emotional 
over non-emotional stimuli, and also prefrontal cortex, including orbitofrontal and 
anterior cingulate cortex (Whalen & Phelps, 2009).  
A critical structure for processing of positive emotion and reward in particular is the 
nucleus accumbens (or ventral striatum) (Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006; Haber, 2011; 
Haber & Knutson, 2010). It is sensitive to errors of reward prediction (Pagnoni, Zink, 
Montague, & Berns, 2002), even if the omissions of expected reward were not 
consciously perceived (Berns, Cohen, & Mintun, 1997). There is also evidence for a 
subcortical route to the nucleus accumbens (McHaffie, Stanford, Stein, Coizet, & 
Redgrave, 2005), which has led to the suggestion that amygdala and nucleus 
accumbens are the main processors of non-conscious emotion detection (Tamietto & 
de Gelder, 2010). Their input is essential for conscious processing of emotions, which 
requires involvement of cortical regions such as orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortex.  
The anterior cingulate cortex is very consistently activated in experimental tasks with 
emotional stimuli (Dalgleish, 2004). It has been hypothesized to be functionally 
segregated into a ventral portion that is mainly involved in emotional processing and a 
dorsal cognitive portion that is more engaged in executive attentional control (Bush, 
Luu, & Posner, 2000). More recent views, however, discuss both portions as relevant 
for emotion processing (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011). While the ventral portion is 
supposed to mainly underlie implicit regulatory processes of emotion generating 
limbic regions (Etkin et al., 2011), the dorsal portion is engaged in conscious appraisal 
processes (Kalisch, Wiech, Critchley, & Dolan, 2006) and the expression of emotion 
(Gentil, Eskandar, Marci, Evans, & Dougherty, 2009).  
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Other regions that are involved in emotional processing are the anterior insular, 
orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortices (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 
2002). The anterior insula, in particular, is a center for interoceptive re-represention 
and as such discussed as critical for the generation of subjective feeling (Craig, 2009). 
It is also crucial for understanding and sharing the emotions of others (Singer, 2012).  
The time-course of processing emotional stimuli has been extensively studies using 
event-related potentials of the electroencephalogram (Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 
2010). This research shows that emotions are recognized very early on with amplitude 
differences already approximately 200 ms after presentation onset of a stimulus 
(Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). Interestingly, this has been shown across different 
types of stimulus categories, such as faces, pictures or words (Ashley, Vuilleumier, & 
Swick, 2004; Kanske & Kotz, 2007; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008) and 
across different modalities, including visual and auditory (Citron, 2012; Schirmer & 
Kotz, 2006). Indexing the sustained effects of emotion on stimulus processing, a late 
positive potential is also consistently observed to be increased for emotional over 
neutral material (Olofsson et al., 2008). It typically starts around 300 ms after stimulus 
onset and peaks between 500 and 800 ms. Even when controlling arousal levels, the 
late positive potential is sensitive to emotion in stimuli (Kaestner & Polich, 2011; 
Rozenkrants & Polich, 2008) and also differentiates between positively and negatively 
valenced material (Schacht, Adler, Chen, Guo, & Sommer, 2012). Some evidence also 
relates it to the subjective intensity ratings of emotion (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, 
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000). 
 
2.2  Emotion-cognition interactions 
Emotional responses do not evolve uniformly, but are subject to influence through 
cognition (Gross, 2002). Conversely, emotions also influence cognitive processing 
(Pessoa, 2008). This Section discusses these reciprocally interactive processes.  
 
2.2.1  Cognitive regulation of emotion 
Emotion regulation is not a coherent concept and the term refers to a number of 
different strategies that can be applied to regulate emotion. A largely accepted 
definition  includes  all  of  “the  ways  individuals   influence  which  emotions   they  have,  
when  they  have  them,  and  how  they  experience  and  express  these  emotions”   (Gross, 
1999). The variations in how successfully individuals achieve regulation of their 
emotions are highly significant, also in a subclinical range, as they predict well-being, 
income, and socio-economic status (Cote, Gyurak, & Levenson, 2010). Among 
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adolescents, emotion regulation is related to the amount of victimization among peers, 
friendship support, and family cohesion (Adrian et al., 2009). Even enhanced physical 
health is reported by individuals with better emotion regulation skills (Consedine, 
Magai, & Horton, 2005). The strategies that people apply to regulate emotions vary in 
their degree of functionality, for example, several studies have shown that modulating 
the expression of an emotion through suppression does not change the emotion itself, 
or rather has detrimental effects leading to increased physiological responding 
(Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 2009; Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & 
Schwerdtfeger, 2006). Other, more adaptive regulation strategies have been 
thoroughly investigated as well, the most prominent example being reappraisal. It is a 
strategy of cognitive change, referring to the reinterpretation of the meaning of a 
situation, which yields an altered emotional response (Kalisch, 2009). This includes 
subjective emotionality as well as physiological measures such as facial muscle 
activity or the startle reflex (Ray, McRae, Ochsner, & Gross, 2010). A strategy 
drawing more on attentional control is distraction from the emotional aspects of a 
scene. For example, performing a demanding memory task or mental arithmetic will 
reduce the emotional response, even if the emotional stimulus is constantly present 
(Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009). Interestingly, some mechanisms have 
emotion regulatory effects, even though they do not primarily aim at modulating the 
emotional experience. Affect labeling, for example, which refers to using words to 
characterize feelings or the emotional aspects of an event, reduces the subjective and 
physiological intensity of emotional responses (Lieberman et al., 2007). Similarly, the 
paradoxical effect of acceptance of an emotion is a reduction of subjective current 
emotion intensity (Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004) and physiological 
responding (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006). While these 
strategies rely on very different psychological mechanisms, their modulating effects 
on emotional processing are very similar. This also seems to be the case for the neural 
mechanisms underlying emotion regulation. 
Regarding its neural underpinnings, the concept of emotion regulation translates into 
inhibitory and facilitatory interactions of control and regulated networks that are 
relatively well understood. As discussed in the previous section, some brain regions 
are crucially involved in the generation of emotion; the most prominent example is the 
amygdala. Using the regulation strategies described above, participants in 
experimental settings can modulate activity in the amygdala (Ochsner & Gross, 2005), 
for example, activation is reduced for the same sensory input when reappraising a 
stimulus as less threatening compared to simply viewing it (Eippert et al., 2007). This 
effect is driven by a network of brain regions, critically including dorsolateral and 
medial prefrontal cortices. Examining the connectivity between the regulating control 
network and amygdala shows a negative coupling during regulation, that is, stronger 
increase in control activity is accompanied by larger reductions in amygdala activation 
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(Walter et al., 2009). These connections from control regions to the amygdala may be 
direct, but seem to be partly indirect with intermediate brain areas (Wager, Davidson, 
Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). There is some evidence showing the 
commonalities of this principle functioning across different regulation strategies, even 
though studies directly comparing strategies are still rare (Goldin & Gross, 2010; 
McRae et al., 2009). Such investigations, however, would be of great clinical 
importance to identify those strategies that patients can not apply adequately as 
treatment targets and those techniques that patients are not impaired in as resources. 
 
2.2.2  Emotional influence on cognitive processing 
Emotion can have both a facilitatory, but also an interfering influence on cognitive 
processing (Kanske, 2012; Pessoa, 2008). If task-relevant, an emotional stimulus can 
induce better performance, for example regarding memory (Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 
2004; Hamann, 2001) or cognitive control tasks (Kanske & Kotz, 2011b, 2011c), 
independently of the valence of the stimulus (Kanske & Kotz, 2010, 2011a, 2011d). In 
contrast, if an emotional stimulus is task-irrelevant and presented, for example, shortly 
before a cognitive control task (Hart, Green, Casp, & Belger, 2010; Padmala & Pessoa, 
2011) or during the encoding period in a working memory task (Dolcos, Kragel, 
Wang, & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006), performance in that task is 
impaired.  
The neural mechanisms underlying facilitatory influences are partly separate for 
different functions, because they involve the networks that are specific to the 
cognitive task at hand. For memory enhancement, this includes structures in the 
medial temporal lobe, the hippocampus and associated parahippocampal regions 
(Dolcos et al., 2004), while it is mainly the anterior cingulate cortex for cognitive 
control improvements (Kanske & Kotz, 2011c). The amygdala, which is involved 
across different types of tasks, seems to be crucially triggering modified processing in 
these networks, for example, through increased connectivity to the ventral portion of 
the anterior cingulate cortex when emotion is detected in a cognitive control task 
(Kanske & Kotz, 2011b) or to the hippocampus when emotional stimuli are to be 
remembered (Dolcos et al., 2004). With regard to interfering effects of emotion, they 
also involve the particular neural networks involved in the specific function that is 
impaired. However, the evidence regarding the nature of this influence is inconsistent. 
Some studies reported an increase in activation of task-relevant brain regions, 
potentially indicating compensatory activation to preserve goal-directed behavior 
(Blair et al., 2007; Hart et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010). Several other studies, 
however, found reduced activation in task-related regions, which was interpreted as 
emotion   taking   the   cognitive   system   ‘off-line’   (Anticevic, Repovs, & Barch, 2010; 
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Dolcos et al., 2006; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2008). A shortcoming 
of these studies is that they did not directly test if the hyper- and hypo-activations 
were really located in the neural networks that are essential and specific to the 
processing of a certain cognitive task. Therefore, the activation changes due to 
emotion in these studies may not be directly related to the task, but to another 
concurrent process. Sophisticated functional localization of specific networks, before 
testing the influence of emotion on them would allow better delineation of the 
mechanisms underlying emotional distractibility. The clinical relevance lies mainly in 
the fact that patients with affective disorders are often characterized by cognitive 
deficits, which might be partially explained by inadequate emotion-cognition 
interactions. 
 
2.2.3  Biased information processing 
Another mechanism of emotion-cognition interactions is a biasing influence that 
emotion exerts on cognitive information processing. Typically this has been 
investigated through interindividual differences in emotional state, for example in the 
presence of dysphoric mood, or through the induction of an emotional state, for 
example with the help of affective pictures, music or mental imagery. Such biased 
processing has been demonstrated for a range of different cognitive functions. 
Dysphoric individuals attend longer to the spatial locations of negative emotional cue 
stimuli in Posner type cueing paradigms (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & 
Crombez, 2005) and also show memory biases for negative emotional words (Gilboa 
& Gotlib, 1997). Inducing emotion also affects attentional mechanisms, for example 
positive emotion induction yields attentional broadening as measured in viewing time 
and saccades to positive stimuli (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006), and memory for 
mood congruent items (Chepenik, Cornew, & Farah, 2007). Furthermore, emotion 
induction increases the interference effects of emotional stimuli on cognitive 
processing (Isaac et al., 2012) and also biases socio-affective processing, such that the 
recognition of emotion in faces is influenced (Chepenik et al., 2007), as are the 
judgments about other people based on short person descriptions (Forgas & Bower, 
1987). The effects of emotion induction are even measurable in an individual’s  plans  
for future negotiations with others and in the subsequent bargaining outcomes that are 
attained (Forgas, 1998). Interestingly, these studies also clearly dissociate the effects 
of positive and negative emotion induction (Forgas, 1998; Forgas & Bower, 1987). 
The investigations listed above show mood-congruent biasing of valenced stimuli, 
however, biased information processing may have its most critical impact in the 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. Such decision making under uncertainty also has 
a particular potential to reveal the biasing influence that emotion can have on 
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cognition, as ambiguous stimuli are free of affordances and, thus, any response to 
them is entirely driven by internal factors. An experimental approach to studying 
decision making under ambiguity has recently been tested in animals (Harding, Paul, 
& Mendl, 2004). Rats were given food when they pressed a lever after hearing one 
specific tone; another tone was paired with aversive white noise, if the rat failed to 
press a separate lever. After learning these responses, tones that were intermediate in 
frequency compared to the other two tones were presented additionally and responses 
to these ambiguous stimuli were taken as an indicator for a positive bias if the rats 
pressed the lever associated with food more often or as a negative bias if the lever 
associated with the white noise was pressed more often. Most interestingly, this study 
also tested animals kept in unpredictable housing, which induces symptoms of a mild 
depression-like state (Willner, 1997; Zurita, Martijena, Cuadra, Brandao, & Molina, 
2000). These animals showed a negative bias in this scenario. Similarly, congenitally 
helpless rats, that also constitute an animal model of depression, also show a negative 
bias (Enkel et al., 2010). In this study, a pharmacological stressor also had an effect on 
normal rats and biased rats away from positive responding.  
The only study in humans that utilized a similar paradigm reported a correlation of the 
size of a negative bias with trait anxiety measures assessed in questionnaires 
(Anderson, Hardcastle, Munafo, & Robinson, 2012). However, in this study the 
intermediate tones were also reinforced, which renders them non-ambiguous. The 
study, therefore, did not allow for the detection of an inherent interpretation bias. 
Fully adopting this paradigm for research in humans would have the advantage that it 
enables translational investigation of biased information processing and, thus, testing 
the neural underpinnings of these mechanisms on multiple levels including the cellular 
and molecular levels (Enkel et al., 2010).  
 
2.3  Emotional processing and interactions with cognition in affective disorders 
Changes in emotional processes are defining characteristics of affective disorders. The 
most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) lists abnormally and persistently 
elevated, expansive or irritable mood or depressed mood for most of the day as the A-
criteria for manic and depressive episodes, respectively. These alterations are 
measurable in self-reports (Altman, Hedeker, Peterson, & Davis, 1997; Beck, Steer, & 
Carbin, 19888; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007) and 
observer ratings (Hamilton, 1960; Williams, 2001; Young, Biggs, Ziegler, & Meyer, 
1978), but also in experimental investigations. For example, currently and previously 
depressed patients show greater reactivity to negative mood induction (Ingram, Bernet, 
& McLaughlin, 1994; Segal et al., 2006; Timbremont & Braet, 2004) and bipolar 
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patients report more positive emotion even after neutral mood induction (M'Bailara et 
al., 2009). Similarly, responses to brief emotional stimulation are altered in depression 
(Dichter & Tomarken, 2008; Dichter, Tomarken, Shelton, & Sutton, 2004) and bipolar 
disorder (Giakoumaki et al., 2010).  
These changes are mirrored by generally increased amygdala activity in depression 
(Drevets et al., 1992) and bipolar disorder (Drevets et al., 2002). Such alterations 
could also be specified for responding to emotional stimuli, for example, using 
emotional faces that were masked by subsequently presented neutral faces increased 
activity in the amygdala to all faces, but in particular to fearful ones was found 
(Sheline et al., 2001). Thus, even if the stimuli are not perceived consciously, 
hyperactivity in emotion generating regions can be observed. This result of elevated 
amygdala responding to emotional stimuli could be replicated with emotional words 
on which participants performed personal relevance ratings (Siegle, Thompson, Carter, 
Steinhauer, & Thase, 2007) or with consciously perceived emotional faces on which 
participants performed gender decisions (Surguladze et al., 2005). However, there are 
also studies that did not observe differences in amygdala activity for emotional vs. 
neutral video stimuli (Beauregard et al., 1998) or static face stimuli (Frodl et al., 2009) 
when comparing currently depressed patients with healthy controls. Also, recent meta-
analyses differ in their results regarding amygdala hyperactivation in depression 
(Delvecchio et al., 2012; Diener et al., 2012). Similarly, there are a number of 
investigations on bipolar disorder that show increased reactivity of the amygdala to 
emotional faces when currently depressed (Almeida, Versace, Hassel, Kupfer, & 
Phillips, 2010; Altshuler et al., 2008) or manic (Altshuler et al., 2005). Also other 
stimulus categories such as images with emotion-evocative captions elicit elevated 
amygdala responses in bipolar patients (Malhi et al., 2004). As for depression, 
however, there are also reports of normal amygdala responding to emotional stimuli in 
bipolar disorder (Foland-Ross et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012). Meta-analyses seem to 
yield more support for amygdala hyperactivation in bipolar disorder (Delvecchio et al., 
2012; Houenou et al., 2011), but unilateral hypoactivation has also been shown (Chen, 
Suckling, Lennox, Ooi, & Bullmore, 2011).  
A specific of the described studies is that none of them explicitly instructed 
participants to directly regulate their emotional responses. This may in part explain 
the variance in the results, as there are differences in the habitual use of emotion 
regulation between patients with affective disorders and healthy individuals. 
Questionnaire studies show that depressed and bipolar patients report to use adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies less frequently and maladaptive ones more frequently 
than healthy participants (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Green et al., 
2011). Without explicit regulation instructions, patients and healthy controls may, thus, 
have dealt differently with arising emotions in the experimental settings. In depression 
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there are a few studies that tested the influence of explicit emotion regulation 
instructions on emotional responses. They showed that down-regulation of the 
amygdala through a reappraisal strategy is impaired in currently depressed patients 
(Beauregard, Paquette, & Levesque, 2006) and that the connectivity of the amygdala 
to prefrontal regions during reappraisal is altered (Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone, van 
Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007). Interestingly, none of these studies found 
amygdala hyperactivity to emotional stimuli in the simple viewing condition, but only 
in the regulation conditions, which is in line with the suggestion that the diverse 
results regarding amygdala activity may be explained by different implicit application 
of emotion regulation. With regard to unipolar depression, the previous studies raised 
several questions. First, it is unclear if the observed deficit in amygdala regulation 
through reappraisal generalizes to other regulation strategies or is specific. Second, all 
previous studies tested acutely depressed patients. Therefore, it is open, if the deficit is 
state-dependant or has characteristics of a trait-marker and is still present in remitted 
patients. Third, the relation of the observed deficits in amygdala regulation and the 
self-reports of infrequent use of habitual reappraisal use is unclear. And fourth, since 
previous studies tested the regulation of negative emotion only, it is unclear if the 
deficits are also present for positive emotional stimuli. At the time the present studies 
were conducted, there were no published reports on the neural correlates of emotion 
regulation deficits in bipolar disorder. Thus the raised questions also apply to bipolar 
disorder, in addition to the more fundamental question if there are impairments at all 
in experimental settings. 
Cognitive deficits have been described in depression (Levin, Heller, Mohanty, 
Herrington, & Miller, 2007; Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005) and bipolar 
disorder (Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Malhi et al., 2007), but seem to be more 
pronounced and severe in patients with bipolar disorder (Gualtieri & Morgan, 2008; 
Sweeney, Kmiec, & Kupfer, 2000). As it has been consistently shown that emotional 
distracters have a particularly strong impact on cognitive processing when compared 
to neutral distracters (Dolcos et al., 2006; Hart et al., 2010) and given the emotional 
perturbations in bipolar disorder described above, the question arises whether the 
cognitive deficits are, at least in part, due to these changes in emotional processing 
(Henin et al., 2009; Strakowski, Delbello, & Adler, 2005). Several studies investigated 
cognitive task performance in the presence of emotional distracters. Two studies using 
emotional Stroop tasks found abnormally increased frontal and limbic activity in 
bipolar patients during color naming of emotional compared with neutral words 
(Lagopoulos & Malhi, 2007; Malhi, Lagopoulos, Sachdev, Ivanovski, & Shnier, 2005). 
In these studies, emotion did not affect color naming reaction times in patients and in 
comparison subjects, suggesting that task processing was not directly influenced. 
Similarly, a study with an emotional go/no-go task yielded behavioral distraction 
effects in the emotional compared with the neutral condition, but no differences 
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between bipolar disorder and controls, although activation was increased in frontal 
and limbic regions (Wessa et al., 2007). Activation increases without behavioral 
effects were also found in working memory tasks with sad mood induction 
(Deckersbach et al., 2008) and face distracter stimuli (Bertocci et al., 2012). In 
addition to the lack of behavioral differences between patients and controls, these 
studies could also not clarify whether the observed hyperactivations reflect altered 
processing of the cognitive tasks (e.g. as a compensatory effect) or simply aberrant 
emotional processing. Addressing this issue would require the independent definition 
of the relevant task network before studying the influence of emotion on this network. 
Better understanding of the nature and causes of cognitive deficits in bipolar disorder 
is of great importance, as the number of deficits in executive function, attention and 
memory in these patients is correlated with the level of psychosocial functioning 
(Martinez-Aran, Vieta, Colom, et al., 2004; Martinez-Aran, Vieta, Reinares, et al., 
2004) and only 24% of the patients achieve functional recovery in the first year after 
recovery (Keck et al., 1998), a rate that rises to only 43% after two years (Tohen et al., 
2003). 
Biased information processing has also been discussed as highly relevant for the 
development and maintenance of affective disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
While healthy individuals typically show a positive bias in attention, memory and 
particularly in the interpretation of ambiguous situations (Cummins & Nistico, 2002), 
cognitive theory of depression, for example, proposes that negative schemata (i.e. 
dysfunctional mental representations about the self, the world and the future) trigger 
mood-congruent interpretations of ambiguous situations, which in turn influences the 
emotional state (Beck, 2008). The resulting interplay of negative interpretations and 
emotions may be a cause for the development of affective disorders (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994). Previous investigations regarding this question, however, yielded 
partly inconsistent results. A study using ambiguous scenarios, for example, could 
demonstrate a negative bias in depression (Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011). 
The  study  presented  putatively  ambiguous  sentences  such  as  “You  wake  up,  get  out  of  
bed,  stretch  and  really  notice  how  you  feel  today”  and  participants  were  asked  to  fully  
imagine the situation and then rate how pleasant or unpleasant they felt. These ratings 
were significantly related to depression scores. Also, when participants were asked to 
describe what outcome they had imagined, these outcomes were evaluated as more 
negative in the group scoring higher in depression by independent raters. A critical 
point may be that the scenarios used in this study were preselected from a larger pool 
of items on the basis of their ability to separate a high from a low depression group. 
Thus, it is not clear whether the results would generalize to other situations. Making 
use of the potentiation of the startle reflex by negative emotion, another study also 
found evidence for a negative bias in depression (Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 
2002).   Neutral   and   negative   words,   for   example   “dress”   and   “stress”,   were  
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acoustically merged to create ambiguous stimuli. Participants were instructed to 
imagine a situation triggered by their interpretation of the ambiguous stimulus and 
startle probes were presented in that time-window. Startle blink reflexes to the 
ambiguous words were larger in participants high in depression, suggesting that they 
interpreted the words more negatively. Conversely, another study found a slight 
positive bias in high depression participants (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999). Here, the 
latencies to read aloud neutral or negative target words that followed target-valence-
congruent or ambiguous prime sentences were measured. The group high in 
depression scores did not show naming facilitation for the negative target words, but 
rather a pattern that results from an attenuated tendency to impose the more negative 
interpretations. The variance in the results of these studies may be due to stimulation 
and design differences. It seems, therefore particularly promising to try assessing the 
bias with an indirect measure that does not build on previously established 
associations, as is the case with affective prime sentences or valenced words. The 
alternative experimental approach described in Section 2.2.3 would allow for this and 
has been shown to relate the measured bias to animal models of depression such as 
congenital helplessness or unpredictable housing (Enkel et al., 2010; Harding et al., 
2004). Beyond the advantage that adopting this paradigm for human research would 
have in enabling translational investigation of biased information processing, it is also 
a design that measures the bias indirectly and without making use of stimuli with pre-
established positive or negative associations. In contrast, these associations are 
experimentally created and fully controlled. Transferring this paradigm to human 
research is, therefore, an important next step for improving our understanding of 
biased information processing and its relevance for affective disorders. 
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The described theoretical and empirical background raises several research questions 
that were addressed in the present thesis. They entwine around the central topic of 
reciprocal interactions of emotion and cognitive control, their neural correlates and, in 
particular, their potential alterations in unipolar depression and bipolar disorder. 
Furthermore, their role as a vulnerability marker for or as a consequence of bipolar 
disorder is investigated.  
The three major topics are, first, how cognitive control can influence emotion. In 
contrast to implicit or automatic regulation of emotion (Phillips, Ladouceur, et al., 
2008), cognitive regulation of emotion refers to using attentional control or cognitive 
change strategies to directly modulate the impact of emotionally evocative stimuli 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). This question is only little investigated in affective 
disorders, with more studies being done on depression (Beauregard et al., 2006; Erk et 
al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007) or only on a questionnaire, not an experimental level 
(Green et al., 2011). Second, increased emotional reactivity in bipolar disorder 
(Almeida et al., 2010; Altshuler et al., 2005) might have an influence on cognitive 
functioning. Cognitive impairments are a widely observed symptom in bipolar 
disorder (Henin et al., 2009), but their direct relation to altered processing efficiency 
in task-related neural networks under emotional distraction could not yet be 
demonstrated (Malhi et al., 2005; Wessa et al., 2007). Third, a negative bias in 
information processing leading to more negative interpretations of ambiguous 
situations and, thus, increasing negative emotion has been discussed as one of the 
mechanisms leading to the development and maintenance of depression and biases 
may also play a role for bipolar disorder (Beck, 2008; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 
2005). Because previous investigations yielded partly inconsistent results, new 
paradigms to address this questions, which also allow for translational investigations, 
should be developed and validated (Enkel et al., 2010; Harding et al., 2004). 
1. Do euthymic bipolar disorder patients and patients with remitted depression show 
impairments in voluntary emotion regulation through reappraisal and distraction 
and what are the neural correlates of such impairments?  
Hypothesis: Euthymic patients with bipolar disorder and patients with remitted 
depression show deficits in regulating their emotions through reappraisal as well 
as distraction. This should be reflected in a smaller reduction of their ratings of 
subjective emotional experience compared to the healthy control participants. 
Furthermore, it should show in reduced down-regulation of emotion generating 
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regions, in particular the amygdala, when the regulation strategies are applied 
compared to the healthy control participants. Activity in the regulating control 
network should also be altered and show either increases or decreases compared 
to healthy control participants. Inverse functional coupling between emotion 
generating and regulating regions is expected in the healthy control participants, 
but not in the patient groups. 
2. Are potential emotion regulation deficits in bipolar disorder a vulnerability marker 
for the disorder and present in a population at high-risk to develop bipolar 
disorder, that is, unaffected first-degree relatives of bipolar disorder patients? 
Hypothesis: Unaffected first-degree relatives of bipolar disorder patients show 
similar deficits in emotion regulation as patients with bipolar disorder when 
compared to matched healthy control participants, which is reflected in subjective 
ratings, neural activity in emotion generating and regulating regions, as well as 
connectivity between the latter two.  
3. Do euthymic bipolar disorder patients show increased emotional distractibility 
when performing a cognitive task? And are such distraction affects accompanied 
by changes in the neural correlates of processing the task at hand? 
Hypothesis: Euthymic patients with bipolar disorder show enlarged impairment in 
cognitive task processing when emotional distracters are presented simultaneously 
when compared to neutral distracters and compared to healthy control participants. 
This should be reflected in increased response times and error rates in the 
emotional distraction condition and altered activity in the neural network 
underlying processing of the task. Hyperactivation could indicate compensatory 
effects, while hypoactivation could reflect a breakdown of task-related activity.  
4. Is the potentially increased emotional distractibility in bipolar disorder a 
vulnerability marker or a consequence of the disorder, that is, is it present in high-
risk populations as well or can it only be observed in patients with at least one 
episode of the illness? 
Hypothesis: Unaffected first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder and 
healthy individuals with hypomanic personality show the same increased 
emotional distractibility as patients with bipolar disorder, when compared to their 
healthy matched control participants, which is reflected in behavioral performance 
and neural activation patterns. 
5. Is biased information processing measurable indirectly with a paradigm adapted 
from animal research and is a negative bias associated with depression related 
traits?  
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Hypothesis: Ambiguity with regard to a decision that is to be made shows in 
increased response times to these ambiguous, compared to non-ambiguous stimuli. 
Healthy individuals show a small positive bias in that they interpret ambiguous 
stimuli more often as having negative rather than positive consequences. However, 
the higher a person scores on depression-related traits, the more negative the bias 
will be. Ambiguity and the particular interpretation of a certain stimulus are also 
reflected in specific alterations of event-related potentials of the 
electroencephalogram. Ambiguous stimuli are expected to yield increased 
amplitudes of the N200 and of the late positive potential, while the interpretation 
of a stimulus as negative or positive should also affect the late positive potential 
amplitude. 
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To address the questions raised in Chapter 3, six different studies were conducted, 
three testing for neural correlates of emotion regulation processes in affective 
disorders (see Section 5.1), two studies looked at the influence of emotion on 
cognitive processing in bipolar disorder (see Section 5.2) and one study investigated 
biased information processing (see Section 5.3). 
Different populations were tested to investigate the neural correlates of emotional 
processing in depression and bipolar disorder and to specify potential impairments as 
vulnerability marker or consequence of bipolar disorder. The populations included 
healthy individuals to establish the respective paradigms and to serve as gender-, age- 
and education matched controls for the clinical groups and the groups at risk to 
develop bipolar disorder. Currently remitted patients with unipolar depression and 
euthymic patients with bipolar disorder type I were tested, as well as two populations 
at high risk to develop bipolar disorder. These were unaffected first-degree relatives of 
patients with bipolar disorder type I, who were unrelated, however, to the patients who 
participated in the studies, and healthy individuals with hypomanic personality. While 
relatives of bipolar patients are at risk because of their genetic heritage, individuals 
with hypomanic personality were identified by their scores in the Hypomanic 
Personality Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). In a 13 year longitudinal study 
participants scoring high in the Hypomanic Personality Scale showed greatly 
increased occurrence of bipolar disorder at follow-up (25% compared to 0% in the 
control group) (Kwapil et al., 2000). Thus, it is a method to psychometrically define 
increased risk for developing bipolar disorder. The two approaches to defining high 
risk to develop bipolar disorder therefore complement each other. 
The outcome measures of the included studies were on the one hand behavioral 
responses to obtain indicators of performance speed and accuracy as well as subjective 
reports of experienced emotion and on the other hand functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and event-related potentials (ERP) of the electroencephalogram to 
allow conclusions about the neural correlates and timing of neural processes, 
respectively.  
Functional MRI is a noninvasive method that is being used increasingly since its first 
description (Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & Glynn, 1990; Turner, von Kienlin, Moonen, & 
van Zijl, 1990) because of its relatively high spatial resolution in the range of 
millimeters. It builds on neurovascular coupling, that is, neuronal activity in a certain 
region leads to increased flow of oxygenated blood into that region. Because 
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deoxyhemoglobin leads to greater signal loss in T2*-weighted MRI contrasts than 
oxygenated hemoglobin, currently active regions can be separated from currently 
inactive region, which is referred to as the blood oxygen level dependant response 
(BOLD). In comparison to the neural activity that causes it, BOLD is relatively slow 
and peaks around 6-8 seconds after the neural activity (this is also greatly variable 
depending, for example, on the specific region). Even though a number of studies 
showed a positive correlation of BOLD and neural activity (Lippert, Steudel, Ohl, 
Logothetis, & Kayser, 2010; Nair, 2005), fMRI results need to be interpreted with 
some care as fMRI does not measure neural activity directly and, furthermore, because 
all relations between neural activity and cognitive processes are purely correlational, 
not causal. 
In the present work, two experimental strategies were used in fMRI. First an emotion 
regulation paradigm was developed, which combined previously applied emotion 
regulation tests by including a condition of cognitive change through reappraisal 
(Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002) and an attentional control condition (Van 
Dillen et al., 2009). In the reappraisal condition, participants were instructed to re-
evaluate a presented emotional image in order to reduce the elicited emotion. For 
example, when presented with an image of a crying child one could think that the 
child will be comforted soon and, in the long run, everything is going to be fine (Gross, 
2002). In the attentional control condition, participants were also presented with 
emotional images, but solved arithmetic equations simultaneously (Van Dillen et al., 
2009). Since the two emotion regulation strategies are psychologically very different, 
their joint investigation allows a better understanding of emotion regulation in 
affective disorders. The experimental details are described in the methods sections of 
the respective publications in Chapter 5 (Kanske, Heissler, Schonfelder, Bongers, & 
Wessa, 2011; Kanske, Heissler, Schonfelder, & Wessa, 2012; Kanske, Schonfelder, 
Forneck, & Wessa, in press). 
Second, a two-step fMRI experiment was used to investigate the effects of emotion on 
cognitive processing. In a first step, the neural network involved in a specific 
cognitive task, a mental arithmetic task, was identified using an established procedure 
as a functional localizer (Rickard et al., 2000). In a second step, activity in this 
network was tested again with a mental arithmetic task, now with emotional and 
neutral distracters presented simultaneously. Thus, the effect of emotion on this 
network could be directly specified. Previous studies on emotional distraction effects 
did not include a functional localizer and could, therefore, not specify whether the 
observed effects were essential and specific to the task at hand, which may be the 
reason for the partly inconsistent findings of increased activity (Blair et al., 2007; Hart 
et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010) or decreased activity (Anticevic et al., 2010; Dolcos 
et al., 2006; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2008). Methodological details 
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are described in the methods sections of the publications in Chapter 5 (Kanske, 
Heissler, Schonfelder, Forneck, & Wessa, 2013; Wessa, Heissler, Schonfelder, & 
Kanske, 2013). 
In contrast to fMRI, electroencephalography is an already old technique (Berger, 1929; 
Caton, 1875). It registers electrical fields from the scalp that are elicited by ionic 
currents in the brain (Gall et al., 2002). It is, therefore, a direct measure of neural 
activity and offers superior temporal resolution compared to fMRI. ERPs are voltage 
fluctuations of the electroencephalogram that are directly related to sensory, motor, 
affective, or higher cognitive events or processes and result from averaging time-
locked epochs of the electroencephalogram, which cancels out noise and shows the 
activity that is due to such a specific event. Amplitude and latency differences of the 
components in the ERP are informative about the differences in the underlying 
processes and were used in the present work to study biased information processing in 
ambiguous situations.  
The specific paradigm used in the ERP study was an adaptation of a task used in 
animals (Enkel et al., 2010; Harding et al., 2004). It presents two different tones, one 
always associated with a reward and the other with punishment. Participants need to 
press a button in order to actually obtain the reward or to avoid the punishment. After 
these associations are learned, additional tones are presented which are intermediate in 
frequency and, thus, ambiguous with regard to the potential consequence. Button 
presses to these ambiguous stimuli are taken as an indicator of a positive bias if the 
button to obtain reward is pressed more often and of a negative bias if the button to 
avoid punishment is pressed more often. In animals it had been shown that normal rats 
show a slight positive bias, while congenitally helpless rats, which were used as an 
animal model for depression, show a negative bias (Enkel et al., 2010). After 
enrichment, the negative bias of helpless rats shows a decrease, suggesting that the 
procedure might serve as a treatment outcome measure in depression as well (Richter 
et al., 2012). Beyond the potential for translational investigations of biased 
information processing, probing this particular paradigm also has the advantage that it 
is an indirect measure and does not build on previously established associations like 
previous investigations with affective prime sentences, naming latencies of valenced 
words, or sentence completions, which yielded overall incoherent results (Berna et al., 
2011; Butler & Mathews, 1983; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Lawson et al., 2002). To 
establish this paradigm for use in affective disorder research we tested a group of 
healthy individuals and related the effects to inter-individual differences in depression 
related traits, such as rumination. For details of the experimental procedures see the 
methods section of the respective publication presented in Chapter 5 (Schick, Wessa, 
Vollmayr, Kuehner, & Kanske, 2013).  
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5.1  Neural correlates of emotion regulation in healthy participants, remitted 
patients with depression, euthymic bipolar patients and unaffected relatives of 
bipolar patients 
 
The section includes two published studies and a currently submitted study. The first 
study established a novel paradigm in healthy individuals that allows testing two 
different types of cognitive regulation of emotion, reappraisal (i.e. cognitively 
changing the emotional meaning of an event) and distraction (i.e. diverting attention 
away from an emotional event). The second and third study applied this paradigm to 
patients with remitted depression and euthymic bipolar patients and two groups at 
high risk to develop bipolar disorder.  
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The regulation of emotion is vital for adaptive behavior in a social
environment. Different strategies may be adopted to achieve
successful emotion regulation, ranging from attentional control
(e.g., distraction) to cognitive change (e.g., reappraisal). However,
there is only scarce evidence comparing the different regulation
strategies with respect to their neural mechanisms and their
effects on emotional experience. We, therefore, directly compared
reappraisal and distraction in a functional magnetic resonance
imaging study with emotional pictures. In the distraction condition
participants performed an arithmetic task, while they reinterpreted
the emotional situation during reappraisal to downregulate
emotional intensity. Both strategies were successful in reducing
subjective emotional state ratings and lowered activity in the
bilateral amygdala. Direct contrasts, however, showed a stronger
decrease in amygdala activity for distraction when compared with
reappraisal. While both strategies relied on common control areas
in the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal
cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex was selectively activated for
reappraisal. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate and large
clusters in the parietal cortex were active in the distraction
condition. Functional connectivity patterns of the amygdala
activation confirmed the roles of these specific activations for the
2 emotion regulation strategies.
Keywords: affect, amygdala, fMRI, mental arithmetic, PPI
Introduction
Cognitively influencing emotional experience is highly relevant
for adaptive social behavior and mental and physical health
(Eftekhari et al. 2009). Different strategies can be applied to
regulate emotional responses ranging from attentional control
to cognitive change (Ochsner and Gross 2005). While
attentional control enables the individual to focus away from
an emotional stimulus (distraction), cognitive change yields an
altered interpretation of an emotional situation (reappraisal).
Both strategies have been shown to successfully modulate the
subjective emotional state and activation in brain areas relevant
for emotional processing including the amygdala (Kim and
Hamann 2007; Van Dillen et al. 2009). However, we know little
as to whether distraction and reappraisal differ in their effects
on emotional experience and in the neural networks un-
derlying the different regulation strategies (McRae et al. 2010).
We, therefore, directly compared distraction and reappraisal
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Reappraisal is typically examined by instructing participants
to alter their emotional response to images or other types
of stimuli by reinterpreting their meaning (Ochsner et al. 2002;
Eippert et al. 2007). It has been shown to reliably downregulate
subjective emotional experience, psychophysiological
indicators of emotion such as electrodermal activity and heart
rate (Kalisch et al. 2005), and brain responses related to
emotion as measured with electroencephalography (Hajcak
et al. 2010) or fMRI (Urry et al. 2006; Kim and Hamann 2007;
Kalisch 2009). Specifically, activation of the amygdala is
reduced during reappraisal. Functional connectivity analyses
showed that this reduction in amygdala activation during
reappraisal is negatively related to activity in a neural network
of control areas (Banks et al. 2007; Walter et al. 2009). A recent
meta-analysis identified the dorsolateral and dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (dlPFC and dmPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), and the parietal cortex (Kalisch 2009) as the most
important nodes of this network.
Distraction, in contrast, relies on attentional control to focus
on a concurrent task, thereby reducing emotional responding.
A number of studies showed its efficiency in attenuating
subjective emotional experience and amygdala activity (Pessoa
et al. 2002; Blair et al. 2007; Erk et al. 2007; Van Dillen and
Koole 2007). A recent study by Van Dillen et al. (2009) clearly
demonstrated that amygdala downregulation is related to the
difficulty of the concurrent task. More difficult tasks also
engage areas in the dlPFC and superior parietal cortex that
typically respond to task demands (de Fockert et al. 2001). The
study provides some indication that activity in these control
areas covaries with amygdala activation, but clear evidence for
the connectivity of the amygdala during distraction is still
lacking.
To data, the only study that aimed at comparing reappraisal
and distraction combined reappraisal with a working memory
task (McRae et al. 2010). They presented emotional pictures,
and participants reinterpreted the images during reappraisal or
kept a 6-letter string in memory during distraction. The authors
reported activation of the dmPFC, dlPFC, and inferior parietal
cortex for both tasks. Reappraisal yielded additional activations
in the dmPFC and dlPFC, while distraction additionally acti-
vated the superior parietal cortex but also dlPFC. Interestingly,
amygdala downregulation was stronger during distraction than
reappraisal.
The present study aimed at further probing the 2 emotion
regulation strategies to elucidate which parts of an emotion
regulation network are common to reappraisal and distraction
and which mechanisms are distinct to each strategy. Also, the
reported data suggest similar, but not identical, effects of both
strategies on emotional responses that we will test by
contrasting reappraisal and distraction. A number of more
specific questions remain: First, do the effects described by
McRae et al. (2010) generalize to other distracting tasks? Here,
it is also clinically relevant to show that easy, potentially self-
generated tasks can regulate emotions. We, therefore, chose to
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present arithmetic tasks in the distraction condition. Second,
McRae et al. (2010) presented the regulation instructions prior
to the emotional images. Thus, it is unclear if the effects differ
for already elicited emotions. Again, this is clinically highly
relevant as it is mainly fully developed emotional responses that
need to be regulated in real-life situations. To address this, we
included an emotion induction phase before the regulation
instructions were presented. Third, in contrast to McRae et al.,
we included not only negative stimuli but also positive stimuli,
as little is known about the effect of different emotion
regulation strategies on emotional responses to negative and
positive stimuli. And fourth, while we know that the amygdala
is negatively coupled with prefrontal control regions during
reappraisal (Urry et al. 2006; Banks et al. 2007), there is little
evidence for the connectivity pattern during distraction and
none directly comparing connectivity during the 2 regulation
strategies. Therefore, we also compared functional connectiv-
ity of the amygdala during reappraisal and distraction.
To address these questions, we conducted an emotion
regulation task where individuals were presented with neutral
or emotional (negative and positive) images and, after a short
emotion induction phase, passively viewed the images,
reappraised their emotional meaning, or performed a simulta-
neously presented arithmetic task (distraction). We hypothe-
sized that both active task conditions downregulate amygdala
activity but that the neural networks subserving this regulation
differ for reappraisal and distraction. Common network nodes
should include regions in the dlPFC and dmPFC, as well as
inferior parietal sites (McRae et al. 2010). In contrast, OFC
activation should be observed for reappraisal only (Kalisch
2009), whereas distraction should yield activation specific to
attentional control (e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate) and task-
related activity in mainly superior parietal sites (Dehaene et al.
2004). Contrasting the connectivity patterns of the amygdala




Thirty healthy volunteers (17 females, aged 18--27 years, mean age 21.8 ±
2.1 years) participated in the study. Twenty-six participants were right-
handed, and 4 participants were left-handed according to the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield 1971). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were medically healthy, reported no
history of mental disorders as verified by the Structured Clinical
Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV
(SCID-I and -II, First et al. 1997; German version, Wittchen et al. 1997), no
history of serious head injury, or neurological disorder. The study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Heidelberg, and
all participants gave written informed consent prior to participation.
Experimental Paradigm and Procedure
The paradigm (Fig. 1) modifies and combines previous designs to study
emotion regulation (Eippert et al. 2007; Van Dillen et al. 2009). Three
task conditions were presented. In the view condition, participants
attended the content of the picture but did not manipulate the
emotional response to it. The distraction condition required partici-
pants to solve an arithmetic problem and to decide whether the
displayed solution was correct or incorrect. The main focus of the
reappraisal condition was to decrease any emotional response by
reinterpreting the displayed situation, for example, as produced by
actors and therefore not real, as meaning something else, or having
a different outcome than initially suggested by the picture. Participants
were also instructed to distance themselves from the image by
reinterpreting the entire situation, for example, by reminding yourself
that it is a photograph you are viewing, you are lying in a magnetic
resonance scanner and are safe. To ensure that different results for
reappraisal and distraction are not due to differences in task difficulty,
a separate sample of 13 healthy volunteers performed the experimental
task and rated the difficulty and effort required for each condition.
These ratings were not significantly different (reappraisal M = 5.1, SD =
1.9; distraction M = 4.6, SD = 1.3; F1,12 = 0.8, P > 0.35).
Each trial started with a fixation cross presented with a jitter of
3000--5025 ms and followed by 1) an emotion induction phase, 2) the
instruction and regulation phase (i.e., view, reappraisal, or distraction),
and 3) a rating phase. During the induction phase (1000 ms),
participants passively viewed a picture to elicit an initial emotional
response. One of 3 instructions (view, decrease, or an arithmetic
problem) was then presented for 1000 ms as a transparent overlay on
the picture. The picture was presented for another 5000 ms. The
arithmetic problem was continuously presented to allow for a solution
of the problem. As soon as participants pressed a button to indicate
whether the presented equation was correct or incorrect, a thin white
frame line was presented around the arithmetic problem overlay. After
picture presentation, participants rated their current emotional state
on a 9-point scale using the Self-Assessment Manikins (SAM) ranging
from unpleasant to pleasant (4000 ms).
Each picture was presented in the view, distraction, and reappraisal
condition, except for the neutral images that were not presented for
reappraisal. The experiment consisted of 128 trials, which were
presented in a pseudorandomized order and lasted about 35 min.
Participants received 6 training trials prior to the experiment, to
familiarize them with the procedure and practice the emotion
regulation strategies.
Stimuli
Pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS) based on normative ratings in valence and arousal (Lang et al.
2005). Sets of 16 negative, 16 neutral, and 16 positive stimuli were
created (see Supplementary data 1 for a complete list of stimuli).
Negative and positive stimuli were highly arousing, and neutral stimuli
were rated low in arousal (see Table 1 for mean ratings). An analysis of
variance (ANOVA) confirmed the selection, showing significant effects
of picture category on valence and arousal ratings (F2,45 = 1332.84, P <
0.001 and F2,45 = 176.65, P < 0.001, respectively). Differences in valence
ratings were observed for each category (all P < 0.001), while arousal
ratings did not differ for positive versus negative but for emotional
versus neutral stimuli (P < 0.001). The pictures were controlled for
contents with all pictures (also neutral) displaying humans and for sex
differences in valence and arousal ratings. Furthermore, differences in
luminance and complexity were kept minimal. After the main
experiment, all pictures were rated by the study participants on a 9-
point scale using the Self-Assessment Manikins (see Table 1). The
results were comparable to the normative IAPS ratings but differed in
arousal ratings for the positive pictures, which were rated less arousing
than negative pictures (P < 0.001).
All arithmetic problems were formed with 3 operands including
a subtraction and an addition (e.g., 4 + 9 – 6 = 7). Participants were
asked to solve the problems and decide whether the displayed solution
was correct or incorrect. Initially, 130 arithmetic problems were tested
in an independent sample of 10 healthy participants. From these, 48
equations were selected such that they were correctly solved by at
least 75% of the sample. These selected equations were randomly
assigned to the background picture condition (negative, neutral, or
positive) such that there were no differences in reaction times or
number of errors (all P > 0.25).
MRI Data Acquisition
MRI data were collected on a 3-T scanner (Magnetom TIM Trio;
Siemens Medical Solutions) at the Central Institute of Mental Health,
Mannheim, Germany. A high-resolution T1-weighted 3D image was
acquired (slice thickness = 1.1 mm, field of view (FOV) = 256 3 256 3
256 mm, matrix = 256 3 256 3 256). Functional images were obtained
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from 40 gradient-echo T2*-weighted slices (slice thickness = 2.3 mm)
per volume. A single-shot echo planar sequence with parallel imaging
GRAPPA technique (acceleration factor 2) was used with a time
repetition of 2700 ms, a flip angle of 90", time echo = 27 ms, FOV =
220 3 220 mm, matrix = 96 3 96, and a slice gap of 0.7 mm.
fMRI Data Analysis
Image processing and statistical analysis was done with SPM5 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/). Functional images were realigned, slice-time
corrected, and spatially normalized using the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template. For normalization, images were resampled
every 3 mm using sinc interpolation. Images were smoothed using a 9 3
9 3 9-mm Gaussian kernel.
Analysis of Regional Brain Activations
Individual participants’ data were analyzed using a General Linear
Model for blood oxygen level--dependent (BOLD) signal changes due to
the experimental conditions. Movement parameters calculated during
realignment were included as parameters of no interest to control for
movement artifacts. Individual statistical parametric maps were
calculated for the following contrasts of interest in order to investigate
BOLD signal changes: 1) for the initial emotional response during the
induction phase (emotional vs. neutral pictures), 2) for the emotional
response in the view condition (view emotional vs. view neutral
conditions in the instruction phase), 3) for distraction (distraction
emotional vs. view emotional in the instruction phase), and 4) for
reappraisal (reappraisal emotional vs. view emotional in the instruction
phase), and (5) to evaluate distinct neural correlates of distraction and
reappraisal, we directly contrasted these 2 conditions (reappraisal
emotional vs. distraction emotional in the instruction phase). In the first
step, all analyses were done for positive and negative emotional stimuli
separately, which yielded largely comparable results. Also, directly
comparing the 2 emotional categories only yielded stronger activation
for negative stimuli in the occipital cortex (see Supplementary data 2),
which is not part of the emotion regulation networks. To enhance
statistical power, we thus, pooled positive and negative stimuli, creating
1 emotional condition for the analyses reported here.
Two types of second-level random-effects analyses were conducted.
First, 1-sample t-tests were calculated on the above-mentioned
individual contrast images. Here, activations were thresholded at
a whole-brain false discovery rate (FDR)-corrected P < 0.01 with an
extent threshold of 20 voxels in order to protect against false-positive
activations. Anatomically defined regions of interest (ROIs) from the
automated anatomical labeling atlas in WFU PickAtlas v2.0 (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al. 2002) were used to examine amygdala activation (P-FDR
< 0.05). Amygdala activations that were significant in the ROI analysis,
but not in the whole-brain statistic, are marked in the results tables.
Second, in order to evaluate common effects of distraction and
reappraisal, we used the respective contrasts as inclusive masks and
thresholded both contrasts at P = 0.01, yielding voxels whose
probability of being activated randomly in both contrasts was P <
0.001 (according to the Fisher method for combining P values, see also
Kampe et al. 2003).
Analysis of Functional Connectivity
To assess functional connectivity of the amygdala activation under
reappraisal and distraction, we performed a psychophysiological
Table 1
Mean valence and arousal ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the picture
selection
Normative IAPS ratings Sample ratings
Valence Arousal Valence Arousal
Negative 1.87 (0.21) 6.28 (0.64) 2.48 (0.49) 6.00 (1.00)
Neutral 4.92 (0.28) 2.98 (0.34) 5.19 (0.42) 1.77 (0.35)
Positive 7.38 (0.39) 6.29 (0.68) 7.21 (0.35) 5.16 (0.60)
Note: Normative IAPS ratings and the ratings of the present sample are displayed.
Figure 1. Sequence of events in a trial. The example pictures resemble those in the experiment but are not part of the IAPS.
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interaction (PPI) analysis as implemented in SPM5 (Friston et al. 1997).
Our goal was to identify brain regions that have a downregulating effect
on the amygdala, that is, regions showing an activation increase
accompanied by an activation decrease in the amygdala. In the first
step, a 5-mm spherical seed region around the peak activation in the
anatomically defined amygdala ROI was identified for each participant
when contrasting the combined reappraisal and distraction conditions
with the view condition (reappraisal + distraction emotional vs. view
emotional). Then, the deconvolved time series in the seed region (left
amygdala) was extracted for each participant as the first regressor in
the PPI analysis (physiological variable). The second regressor
represented the experimental condition (reappraisal emotional vs.
distraction emotional; psychological variable). The regressor of interest
was the interaction between the time series of the seed region and the
experimental condition (PPI). A negative correlation of this interaction
term with activity in other brain regions indicates that an activation
increase in these brain regions is related to a decrease in amygdala
activity under reappraisal. In contrast, a positive correlation indicates
that an activation increase in certain brain regions is associated with
a decrease in amygdala activity under distraction. In the last step, the
individual contrast images were entered into a second-level random-
effects analysis, and 1-sample t-tests with a whole-brain FDR-corrected
P < 0.05 were calculated.
For graphical display of the fMRI data, MRIcroN (http://www
.cabiatl.com/mricro/index.html) was used with the MNI template brain.
Statistical Analyses of Behavioral Data
The emotional state ratings were analyzed with SPSS (version 15.0; SPSS
Inc.). The first 1-way ANOVA was conducted to analyze the effect of the
emotional picture presentation (negative, neutral, or positive) on
emotional state in the viewing condition. A second 2 3 3 repeated-
measures ANOVA including the factors emotion (negative or positive)
and task (distraction, view, and reappraisal) was calculated to elucidate
the effects of regulation on emotional state. The neutral condition was
neglected for the second analysis as there were no neutral pictures in





Analysis of the emotional state ratings after each trial (see
Fig. 2) revealed a significant main effect of emotion in the
viewing condition (F2,58 = 165.3, P < 0.001). Planned
comparisons showed that negative and positive trials differed
from neutral trials (negative vs. neutral: F1,29 = 184.6, P < 0.001;
positive vs. neutral: F1,29 = 95.4, P < 0.001).
The second analysis regarding the regulation effects showed
a significant main effect of emotion (F1,29 = 113.8, P < 0.001)
and an interaction of emotion and task (F2,58 = 105.5, P < 0.001).
Repeated contrasts regarding the interaction yielded significant
effects (emotion 3 distraction-view: F1,29 = 104.0, P < 0.001;
emotion 3 reappraisal-view: F1,29 = 163.6, P < 0.001), indicating
that the emotional pictures were rated less negative or positive
during distraction and reappraisal compared with the view
condition. There was no main task effect (F2,58 = 1.5, P > 0.20).
fMRI Data
Induction Phase
To identify the regions involved in mere emotional processing
of the stimuli, we analyzed, in the first step, activity for
emotional versus neutral images in the preinstruction/emotion
induction phase (see Table 2). Here, we observed activity
bilaterally in the amygdala, insula, and in a large cluster in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), including the sub-
genual anterior cingulate (sgACC). Furthermore, extensive
activation in the occipital and more ventral temporal cortices
and in the precuneus was observed for emotional pictures.
Main Effect of Emotion
In the second step, to identify the regions involved in
emotional processing, we contrasted emotional and neutral
pictures in the simple viewing condition (see Table 2). This
analysis also yielded activation in the left amygdala, the left
insula, and the vmPFC bilaterally, including the sgACC. Also,
there was extensive activation in the occipital and ventral
temporal cortices and in the posterior cingulate cortex.
Figure 2. Emotional state ratings during the experiment. The means of SAM valence
rating (1 5 negative to 9 5 positive) are displayed.
Table 2
Activations for emotional versus neutral pictures in the view condition
H BA MNI coordinates CS Cl T
x y z
Induction phase: emotional--neutral
Precuneus 7 0 !60 36 a 7.54
Temporal/occipital L 37/19/18/17 48 !63 !6 10 604 a 9.91
R 37/19/18/17 !51 !72 !3 a 8.59
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
25/10/11 0 24 !6 a 6.66
Insula L 48 !48 9 0 a 3.83
R 48 42 9 !6 a 4.01
Amygdala L !18 !3 !12 a 5.08
R 18 !3 !15 a 3.44
Thalamus R 6 !18 12 a 4.94
View emotional--view neutral
Precuneus L 19 !18 !81 48 26 a 3.95
R 19 24 !81 48 b 5.08
Temporal/occipital L 37/19/18/17 !48 !69 9 b 9.34
R 37/19/18/17 48 !63 !3 3314 b 10.52
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
L 25/10/11 !3 27 !6 179 c 6.53
Posterior cingulate L 31 !9 !51 27 240 d 6.15
Insula L 48 !30 15 !15 32 e 6.41
Amygdalaa L !18 !3 !12 14 f 2.98
Thalamus L !6 !18 6 134 g 4.88
R 3 !9 6 g 4.45
Note: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI,
cluster index; L, left; R, right; T-values for each peak are given: All peaks of 1 activation cluster
are identified by the same letter; the cluster peaks are displayed in bold letters.
aROI analysis.
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Activation in the bilateral amygdala and the vmPFC/sgACC was
increased when comparing emotional pictures in the viewing
condition to the reappraisal condition (see Table 3 and Fig. 3),
indicating a reduction of activation in these areas through
reappraisal. In contrast, reappraisal elicited enhanced activation
in the OFC, the dlPFC, and the dmPFC. Other regions involved
in reappraisal included the inferior parietal cortex, left middle
temporal gyrus, and bilateral precuneus (see Fig. 4).
Effects of Distraction
Similarly to reappraisal, activation in the bilateral amygdala and
the vmPFC/sgACC was increased when comparing emotional
pictures in the viewing condition to the distraction condition
(see Table 3), here reflecting a reduction of activation in these
areas through distraction. Distraction yielded enhanced activity
in the dlPFC and the dmPFC, which included the dorsal ACC
(dACC). Additionally, large clusters bilaterally in the parietal
cortex, overlapping with and superior to the activation for
reappraisal, were activated in the distraction condition. Further
activity was observed in the bilateral insula (see Fig. 4). As the
distraction condition differed from view and reappraisal in the
continuous display of the overlay on the images, we compared
emotional and neutral pictures in the distraction and view
conditions to exclude the possibility that the overlay prevented
perception and processing of the pictures. This analysis yielded
conjunct activity in a number of areas including the insula (for
details, see Supplementary data 3).
Common Effects of Reappraisal and Distraction
The analyses revealed 2 common effects of reappraisal and
distraction: first, a downregulation of the amygdala and the
vmPFC/sgACC for both regulation conditions as indicated by
increased activity in these regions for the view condition
as compared with distraction and reappraisal (see Fig. 3 and
Table 4); second, overlapping activation increases for the 2
regulation strategies in the dmPFC and dlPFC, as well as in the
precuneus and in the inferior parietal cortex (see Table 4).
Distinct Effects of Reappraisal and Distraction
To identify regions that were strongly engaged in one of the
regulation strategies, we directly contrasted reappraisal and
distraction, using inclusive masks of the respective main effects
of each strategy (e.g., reappraisal-distraction was masked with
reappraisal-view). This analysis showed that OFC activity was
enhanced for reappraisal, while the dACC/dmPFC, large
clusters in the parietal cortex, and the insula showed stronger
activation for distraction (see Table 4). When repeating this
analysis without the masks, we found the same pattern of
activations and additionally a stronger reduction in activity in
the bilateral amygdala and vmPFC/sgACC for distraction over
reappraisal (see Table 4).
Functional Connectivity Analysis
To confirm the identified control networks for reappraisal
and distraction, functional connectivity of the amygdala was
calculated. To this end, amygdala connectivity in the 2 regulation
conditions was directly contrasted (see Table 5). During
reappraisal, an activation increase in a number of frontal areas
including the OFC, as well as inferior parietal and middle
temporal cortex was related to a decrease in amygdala activity. In
contrast, an activation increase in the dACC/dmPFC, large
clusters in the parietal cortex, as well as the right insula was
associated with a decrease in amygdala activation in the
distraction condition.
Discussion
The present study yielded several new insights into the neural
correlates of emotion regulation. First, we could demonstrate
Table 3
Activations for reappraisal and distraction versus emotional pictures in the view condition
H BA MNI coordinates CS Cl T
x y z
View emotional--reappraisal
Postcentral L 2/3 !39 !27 57 105 a 4.01
R 2/3 51 !24 36 138 b 5.41
Temporal/occipital L 37/19/18/17 !45 !78 !3 c 7.77
R 37/19/18/17 48 !63 !6 4564 c 8.81
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
L 25/10/11 !3 30 !12 440 d 5.57
Posterior cingulate R 30 12 !51 12 49 e 4.64
Insula L 48 !42 !9 18 155 f 5.28
Amygdala L !21 !6 !18 69 g 4.65
R 24 !3 !21 c 4.37
Caudate L !6 15 15 h 4.52
R 3 18 12 49 h 5.02
Thalamus L !3 !15 6 51 i 4.29
L !21 !27 !3 33 j 4.22
Reappraisal--view emotional
Superior/medial frontal L 6/8 !12 12 63 270 a 6.23
R 6/8 12 15 66 a 5.87
Middle frontal L 6/9/46 !45 12 45 213 b 5.77
R 6/9/46 39 36 42 128 c 6.5
L 46 !30 45 12 28 d 4.87
R 46 36 45 27 44 e 4.17
Orbitofrontal L 47 !36 45 !3 119 f 5.42
R 47 39 45 !9 84 g 7.94
Inferior parietal L 39/40 !60 !51 33 416 h 7.86
R 39/40 60 !54 39 343 i 8.19
Precuneus L 7 !6 !69 36 90 j 5.58
R 7 9 !66 36 i 3.89
Middle temporal L 22 !54 !39 !3 214 k 6.32
Inferior temporal L 20 !48 !3 !36 20 l 6.12
Middle cingulate L 23 !6 !21 27 31 m 4.71
R 23 6 !21 30 m 4.04
View emotional--distraction
Superior medial frontal L 8/9/10 !6 54 39 1046 a 10.39
Temporal/occipital L 37/19 !51 !72 12 587 b 10.49
R 37/19/18/17 45 !69 0 13 343 c 12.35
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
L 25/10/11 !3 48 !9 702 d 13.35
Insula L 48 !33 !15 6 c 6.44
Amygdala L !21 !6 !21 c 9.72




L 6/8/32 !12 12 48 a 7.39
R 6/8/32 12 21 45 a 6.63
Middle frontal L 6/44/45/46 !39 3 33 a 8.68
R 9/44/45/46 45 33 27 342 b 7.53
Superior frontal L 6/8 !21 6 57 a 7.02
R 6/8 27 6 54 a 6.46
Superior parietal L 7 !27 !63 45 6098 a 11.26
R 7 33 !66 57 a 6.94
Inferior parietal L 39/40 !45 !39 45 a 10.97
R 39/40 45 !45 48 a 8.22
Precuneus L 7 !12 !63 48 a 9.15
R 7 9 !63 48 a 8.17
Inferior temporal L 20/37 !54 !57 !12 85 c 5.68
Middle cingulate L 23 !6 !24 27 a 8.09
R 23 6 !24 27 a 7.62
Insula L 48 !33 18 18 a 7.43
R 48 33 21 0 97 d 7.83
Cerebellum R 12 !78 !21 28 e 4.99
Note: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI,
cluster index; L, left; R, right; T-values for each peak are given: All peaks of 1 activation cluster
are identified by the same letter; the cluster peaks are displayed in bold letters.
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that 2 different regulation strategies, attentional control
(distraction), and cognitive change (reappraisal) are effective
in downregulating ongoing emotional responses to positive and
negative stimuli on a neural and behavioral level. Second, this
downregulation is subserved by a common network of control
areas, including dlPFC, dmPFC, and parietal cortex. Third, both
regulation strategies involve specific neural networks, which
include the OFC for reappraisal and superior parietal sites, the
dACC/dmPFC, and the insula for distraction. The role of these
regulation networks was confirmed by functional connectivity
of the left amygdala. Thereby the data extend recent findings
from a study comparing reappraisal and a distracting memory
task (McRae et al. 2010) showing that the effects generalize to
different types of distraction, to emotions of different valence,
to already elicited ongoing emotional responses, and to
connectivity patterns of the distinct neural networks for
reappraisal and distraction.
The 2 emotion regulation strategies investigated in the present
study largely differ in their psychological mechanisms. While
distraction relies on attentional control to shift the focus away
from an emotional stimulus, for reappraisal, the focus remains on
the emotional stimulus, but its meaning and personal relevance is
reevaluated. Despite these differences, we found largely over-
lapping activations forming a common neural network un-
derlying distraction and reappraisal including areas in the
dlPFC, dmPFC, and inferior parietal cortex. These brain regions
have been widely discussed for emotion regulation via reappraisal
(Kalisch 2009) but also in the literature on attentional control
(Egner and Hirsch 2005a, 2005b; Luks et al. 2007). Different
types of conflict tasks such as Stroop or flanker paradigms as well
as other executive control tasks reliably activate dlPFC, dmPFC,
and parietal sites. Also the few studies that investigated emotion
regulation through distraction from emotional stimuli yielded
activation in these areas (Van Dillen et al. 2009; McRae et al.
2010). Therefore, both strategies draw on resources of a general
cognitive control network that regulates the activity in brain
areas denoted to the current task demands (e.g., fusiform face
area in a face-word Stroop task, Egner and Hirsch 2005a; limbic
regions in emotional interference tasks, Dillon et al. 2007) and
thereby ensure coherent goal-directed behavior and efficient task
performance.
Despite the described communalities of neural networks
subserving reappraisal and distraction, we also found activity
specific to each emotion regulation strategy. Bilaterally, the
OFC was activated for reappraisal only and was also negatively
coupled with left amygdala activity for reappraisal over
distraction. OFC activation has been consistently reported in
several reappraisal studies, both for down- and upregulation of
an emotional response (e.g., Eippert et al. 2007). This regulating
function of the OFC is in line with its involvement in affective
reversal learning tasks (Kringelbach and Rolls 2003) as
reappraisal can be described as a self-induced change in
emotional responding during constant unchanged stimulation.
Interestingly, patients with lesions in the OFC show deficits in
the actualization of a current context (Schnider and Ptak 1999;
Schnider 2003). In line with these data, the OFC is involved in
distinguishing presently relevant from previously relevant
information (Schnider et al. 2002). Reappraisal shares with
these processes that the momentary relevance and meaning of
a stimulus is changed. While the picture of a threatening event
may be perceived as highly relevant and emotionally negative at
first, its reappraisal as ‘‘just a picture taken in the past and
presently irrelevant to me lying in the MR-Scanner’’ may render
it neutral. The actualization of the present context and the
reversal of the emotional meaning of a stimulus are specific to
reappraisal, distinguish it from emotion regulation through
attentional control, and rely on the OFC.
In contrast, the attentional control condition is character-
ized by orienting attention away from the emotional stimulus
to a cognitive task, by the commitment of resources to the
processing of this task, and by the detection of potential
conflicts between task processing and emotional activation.
Thereby attentional control secures the continuous dedication
of resources to task processing. The dorsal portion of the
anterior cingulate cortex has been widely discussed as a major
node in the attentional control network, in particular for the
monitoring of conflict between opposing activations (e.g.,
opposing response tendencies as in the Stroop task, see
Botvinick et al. 2004). Interestingly, the activation of the
dACC/dmPFC cluster in the present study was stronger in the
distraction than the reappraisal condition. The PPI results also
indicate enhanced negative coupling of the amygdala and the
Figure 3. Reduction in amygdala activity (A) for the conjunction of reappraisal and distraction (in red, inclusive masking with P\ 0.01 for each contrast, yielding a combined
P\ 0.001, see Methods) and the additional effect of distraction (in blue, exclusive masking with same thresholds). There was no additional effect of reappraisal. (B) Time-course
of left amygdala activity for the different task conditions.
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dACC/dmPFC for distraction, supporting the view that
attentional control was particularly and more engaged in the
distraction condition. We also found task-specific activations in
the parietal cortex during distraction that nicely resembled
previous data on mental arithmetic tasks in shape and location
(Rickard et al. 2000; Fehr et al. 2007). Indeed, the processing of
arithmetic problems largely involves different parts of the
parietal cortex (intraparietal sulcus, inferior parietal lobule,
angular gyrus, and superior parietal cortex; Menon et al. 2000;
Dehaene et al. 2004; Grabner et al. 2009). Even though
reappraisal also activated parts of the inferior parietal cortex,
the activation elicited by distraction is larger, comprises
additional areas in the superior parietal cortex, and its specific
role for distraction is confirmed by the respective functional
connectivity data. Distraction also yielded additional activation
in the insula that was not observed for reappraisal. This is an
interesting result as the insula has been mainly viewed as part
of the emotional response network and is activated along with
the amygdala and vmPFC/sgACC for emotional versus neutral
pictures in the present study. However, the insula activation in
the attentional control condition lies anterior to the emotional
insula activity and can be clearly separated from it. This very
anterior part of the insula has already been reported in other
studies investigating mental arithmetics and is associated to
task difficulty (Menon et al. 2000). Overall, the attentional
control condition elicits specific activations additionally to the
common regulation network that have been previously
associated with executive attention (dACC) and that are
Figure 4. Activations for reappraisal (in blue) and distraction (in red) on the superior (A) and inferior (B) surface and on the opened (E) brain (cutting at y 5 !52 and z 5 !5).
Medial effects are displayed for the left (C) and right (D) hemisphere (x 5 !5 and x 5 5, respectively). All images are thresholded at whole-brain FDR-corrected P\ 0.01 with
an extent threshold of 20 voxels.
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specific to the present arithmetic task (broad parietal cluster)
or are related to task difficulty (anterior insula). The functional
role of these regions is corroborated by their increased
negative coupling with the left amygdala for distraction over
reappraisal.
As the neural networks for emotion regulation through
attentional control and reappraisal are similar, so are the effects
on behavioral and neural emotional responding. Emotional
pictures reliably elicited an emotional response as could be
seen in the online emotional state ratings and in activation in
the amygdala, the vmPFC/sgACC, and the insula. These regions
have been described as part of a ventral stream, which is
supposed to be involved in the differentiation of emotional
from nonemotional stimuli (Sabatinelli et al. 2009), emotional
appraisal, and the production of an emotional state (Phillips
et al. 2003; Stein et al. 2007). In line with previous studies,
attentional control as well as cognitive change attenuated
emotional responses (Goldin et al. 2008; Van Dillen et al. 2009).
Subjective emotional state ratings as well as activity in the
amygdala, vmPFC/sgACC, and the insula were lowered after
reappraisal and distraction when compared with passive
picture viewing. This corroborates recent data from McRae
et al. (2010) and extends their findings to the regulation of
both positive and negative emotions. Importantly, as the
present experiment allows a direct comparison of the effects
of reappraisal and distraction, we could also show a stronger
and more extended reduction in amygdala activity in the
distraction condition. This effect has to be interpreted with
some care, as there was a continuous overlay on the images in
the distraction condition, while the instruction overlay
disappeared after 1 s during reappraisal and view. The overlay
did not prevent participants from perceiving the images (see
Supplementary data 3), but part of the reduction in amygdala
activation could be due to the presence of this additional visual
input. Nevertheless, the stronger effect for distraction is in line
with other recent data (McRae et al. 2010). As described above,
distraction differs from reappraisal in that it focuses attention
away from the emotional content of a stimulus, while it is
Table 4
Activations for reappraisal versus distraction and the results of the conjunction analysis
H BA MNI coordinates CS Cl T
x y z
Reappraisal--distraction
Superior medial frontal L 6/8/9/10 !9 54 39 5324 a 9.97
Middle frontal L 9 !39 15 45 76 b 5.22
Orbitofrontal L 47 !48 30 !6 c 8.91
R 47 36 39 !6 126 d 7.74
Inferior parietal L 39/40 !45 !57 30 3195 c 8.94
R 39/40 57 !63 36 a 8.01
Inferior temporal L 20 !45 0 !33 c 8.54
R 21 63 !12 !15 1127 e 8.37
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
L 25/10/11 !6 45 !9 555 f 7.14
Amygdala L !27 !6 !18 c 7.59




L 6/8/32 !12 12 48 a 5.11
R 6/8/32 12 27 30 a 4.03
Superior frontal L 6/8 !30 !3 54 a 5.94
R 6/8 27 6 54 a 5.42
Superior parietal L 7 !27 !60 45 4191 a 12.37
R 7 30 !63 60 b 6.47
Inferior parietal L 39/40 !48 !36 48 a 12.24
R 39/40 45 !36 45 1035 b 8.6
Inferior temporal L 20/37 !48 !60 !9 165 c 6.14
Insula L 48 !30 21 !3 a 4.11
R 48 33 21 0 67 d 5.24
Cerebellum R 18 !54 !24 1183 e 7.64
Conjunction: reappraisal--distraction masked by reappraisal-view
Superior medial frontal L 6/8 !6 18 66 25 a 4.00
Middle frontal L 9 !39 15 48 47 b 4.60
Orbitofrontal L 47 !48 30 !12 61 c 7.58
R 47 45 33 !6 33 d 6.41
Inferior parietal L 39/40 !45 !57 27 193 e 5.69
R 39/40 57 !60 24 235 f 6.26
Middle temporal L 21 !63 !27 !6 186 g 5.22
Inferior temporal L 20 !45 0 !36 23 h 6.90
Conjunction: distraction--reappraisal masked by distraction-view
Anterior cingulate/dorsomedial
frontal
L 6/8/32 !12 12 48 790 a 3.12
R 6/8/32 9 30 33 a 3.02
Superior frontal L 6/8 25 0 53 a 5.41
R 6/8 25 9 54 121 b 4.60
Superior parietal L 7 !28 !63 52 a 4.87
R 7 30 !65 56 b 3.84
Inferior parietal L 40 !42 !39 42 1235 c 7.82
R 40 45 !42 51 609 d 6.53
Inferior temporal L 20/37 !54 !57 !15 52 e 4.46
Insula L 48 !33 18 9 58 f 4.11
R 48 33 21 !5 53 g 3.88
Conjunction: view--reappraisal/distraction
Middle temporal L 37 !48 !72 12 31 a 3.79
R 37 51 !60 6 123 b 7.55
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
L 25/10/11 !3 39 !12 373 c 10.03
Amygdala L !21 !6 !21 35 d 6.94
R 24 !6 !21 223 e 6.07
Conjunction: reappraisal/distraction--view
Dorsomedial frontal L 6 !3 12 57 34 a 3.37
Middle frontal gyrus L 46 !42 24 30 24 b 3.97
L 6/9 !39 3 54 27 c 3.81
R 9/46 39 45 30 61 d 3.7
Inferior parietal L 40 !39 !54 45 114 e 5.44
R 40 51 !45 51 54 f 4.59
Precuneus L 7 !9 !63 45 39 g 6.25
R 7 9 !66 42 27 h 5.07
Middle cingulate R 23 3 !27 24 70 i 4.81
Note: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI,
cluster index; L, left; R, right; T-values for each peak are given: All peaks of 1 activation cluster
are identified by the same letter; the cluster peaks are displayed in bold letters.
Table 5
Results of the PPI analysis
H BA MNI coordinates CS Cl T
x y z
PPI reappraisal
Superior medial frontal L 10 !6 63 15 63 a 3.59
9 0 45 48 144 b 4.02
Superior frontal R 6 21 !12 75 2764 c 4.76
Inferior orbitofrontal L 47 !33 33 !12 20 d 3.83
R 47 33 36 !12 25 e 4.31
Inferior parietal R 39 54 !69 33 117 f 3.55
Middle temporal L 20 !45 !9 !18 349 g 3.88
R 22 63 !15 15 277 h 3.39
Ventromedial frontal/anterior
cingulate
L 25/10/11 !9 27 !6 391 i 4.28




R 6/8/32 6 24 48 169 a 4.72
Middle frontal L 44 !48 27 30 42 b 3.49
L 6 !54 6 36 84 c 3.43
R 44/46 48 30 36 50 d 3.82
Parietal L 7/40 !42 39 45 e 4.68
R 7/45 39 !45 45 79 f 3.63
Precuneus L 7 !24 !60 42 e 3.53
R 7 27 !60 45 99 g 3.51
Occipital L 17/18/19 !24 !99 9 3359 e 7.46
Insula R 47/48 36 24 !3 59 h 3.9
Note: H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; CS, cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI,
cluster index; L, left; R, right; T-values for each peak are given: All peaks of 1 activation cluster
are identified by the same letter; the cluster peaks are displayed in bold letters.
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necessary to focus on the emotional aspects of a stimulus in
order to reappraise their meaning. This potentially leads to
stronger activation in the ventral emotional stream for the
reappraisal as compared with the distraction condition. Thus,
as a short-term strategy for reducing an emotionally stressful
response, distraction may prove to be an efficient intervention.
This could also be relevant for psychotherapy in patients with
difficulties in emotion regulation, for example in Borderline
Personality Disorder or Bipolar Depression (Wessa et al. 2007;
Gratz et al. 2009). Arithmetic tasks are particularly favorable in
this regard as they are easy to implement and can be self-
generated in emotionally stressful situations. It is also clinically
relevant that the present study shows effects of reappraisal and
distraction on ongoing emotional responses that have already
been elicited (in contrast to McRae et al. (2010) who presented
emotional stimuli after the regulation instruction), which is the
primary challenge for patients in everyday situations. The
present study did not address the duration of emotion
regulation effects and future studies should elucidate the
stability of the downregulating effects of reappraisal and
distraction. The impact on long-term emotional responding
may differ from the short-term effects reported here as
memory for emotional stimuli is enhanced by reappraisal and
impaired after distraction (Dillon et al. 2007; Sheppes and
Meiran 2007). Furthermore, in a study comparing a distancing
form of reappraisal to distraction during the recall of a de-
pression experience, Kross and Ayduk (2008) showed that
reappraisal protected against depressive affect 1 and 7 days
after the experiment. Distraction and reappraisal may, there-
fore, differ in their long- and short-term effects, raising the
important clinical question if different emotion regulation
strategies should be taught with respect to specific situations
and goals in psychotherapy (e.g., reduce present anger or long-
term depressive feelings).
Despite the strong and consistent results of BOLD response
changes and subjective emotional state changes during reap-
praisal and distraction, the interpretation of our results are
limited by the lack of additional measures, such as eye move-
ment patterns (van Reekum et al. 2007) as well as physiolog-
ical indicators of emotional responsivity (e.g., electrodermal
activity, heart rate). These indicators are highly correlated to
subjective evaluation of emotional state (Cuthbert et al. 1996)
and to the downregulation of anxiety (Kalisch et al. 2005) but
not necessarily to the emotion regulation per se (Eippert et al.
2007). Whether these measures are sensitive to the different
regulation strategies and which mechanisms of emotion
regulation are reflected by the physiological indicators remain
unclear and should be investigated in future studies.
To conclude, we confirmed and extend recent findings on
neural correlates of reappraisal and distraction (McRae et al.
2010) showing that these different emotion regulation
strategies are effective in downregulating ongoing subjective
and physiological responses to emotional stimuli of different
valence. The combination of 2 emotion-regulation strategies
allowed us to identify a common neural control network in
dlPFC, dmPFC, and inferior parietal cortex and to additionally
show distinct strategy-specific activations in the OFC for
reappraisal and the dACC, parietal cortex, and insula for
attentional control (distraction). Moreover, an important and
new insight from the present study was that these strategy-
specific activations showed increased negative coupling with
the left amygdala when reappraisal and distraction were
compared. Emotional state ratings and downregulation of the
initially elicited amygdala activation indicated robust effects of
both strategies on emotional responding.
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Regions in the occipital cortex activated for negative compared to positive stimuli in the view, 







While the instruction overlay on the images disappeared after 1 s in the reappraisal and view 
conditions, it was continuously presented in the distraction condition. To exclude the 
possibility that the overlay prevented perception and processing of the contents of the images, 
two analyses were performed. First, while the ratings of current emotionality were reduced in 
the distraction (and reappraisal) condition compared to view, they were still significantly 
different in the distraction-emotional compared to the distraction-neutral condition (negative 
vs. neutral: F(1,29) = 80.5, p < .001; positive vs. neutral: F(1,29) = 26.0, p < .001). Second, 
we compared activations for emotional vs. neutral pictures in the distraction and the view 
condition. Here, overlapping activations would also indicate that the emotional content of the 
images was perceived. We found significant overlap between the conditions in several regions 
including the bilateral insula, occipital cortex and ventral temporal areas (see Figure and 
Table). These results were confirmed in a conjunction analysis of the two contrasts (with the 
same thresholds as in the other conjunctions described in the manuscript). These results 
suggest that the continuous display of the overlay in the distraction condition did not prevent 
participants from perceiving and processing the emotional images. 
 
 4 
Table: Activations for emotional vs. neutral pictures in the view condition.  
  H BA MNI coordinates Cs Cl T 
      x y z       
distraction: emotional - neutral         
insula L 48 -30 15 -15 25 a 4.62 
temporal/occipital L 37/19/18/17 9 -75 -3 2977 b 7.64 
 R 37/19/18/17 -42 -81 12  b 7.40 
superior medial frontal L 9 -24 54 24 23 c 4.07 
 R 10 9 63 24 312 c 5.18 
conjunction: distraction emotional - neutral masked by view emotional – neutral 
insula L 48 -40 12 3 350 a 4.16 
 R 48 39 9 -3 67 b 3.53 
temporal/occipital L 37/19/18/17 -9 -90 -6  b 10.01 
 R 37/19/18/17 30 -84 -15 8391 c 10.36 
 
H = Hemisphere; BA = Brodmann Area; CS = Cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI 
= Cluster index: all peaks of one activation cluster are identified by the same letter, the cluster 
peaks are displayed in bold letters. 
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Regulating emotions through reappraisal has been shown to elicit abnormal neural activation patterns in
currently depressed patients. It is, however, unclear if this deficit generalizes to other emotion regulation
strategies, if it persists when patients recover, and if it is related to habitual use of reappraisal strategies.
Therefore, we measured the neural responses to emotional images with functional magnetic resonance
imaging in remitted patients with previous episodes of major depression and healthy controls. While viewing
the images participants regulated the elicited emotions using either a reappraisal or a distraction strategy.
Habitual reappraisal use was measured with the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. Depressed
patients showed a selective deficit in down-regulating amygdala responses to negative emotional stimuli
using reappraisal. This down-regulation of amygdala activity was strongest in participants high in habitual
reappraisal use. Activity in the regulating control-network including anterior cingulate and lateral orbitofron-
tal cortex was increased during both emotion regulation strategies. The findings in remitted patients with
previous episodes of major depression suggest that altered emotion regulation is a trait-marker for
depression. This interpretation is supported by the relation of habitual reappraisal use to amygdala down-
regulation success.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Altered affective processing is one of the defining characteristics of
major depressive disorder (MDD). Its neural signature includes hyperac-
tivity in a number of brain structures involved in emotion detection and
generation (Drevets et al., 2002; Sheline et al., 2001). A critical question
is whether the altered emotional responsivity in MDD is mirrored by im-
paired regulation of emotion. In contrast to a relatively large number of
studies on automatic emotion regulation as assessedwith simple emotion
viewing paradigms (Dannlowski et al., 2009; Ritchey et al., 2011), there is
only little evidence regarding the non-automatic cognitive control of
emotions tested through explicit instructions to regulate current affect.
The few data on cognitive control of emotions suggest a deficit in the ca-
pability to down-regulate amygdala activity to negative emotional stimuli
(Beauregard et al., 2006), and altered connectivity between the amygdala
and prefrontal control regions (Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007).
Four major questions arise from these studies.
First, the specific cognitive regulation strategy that previous studies
applied was reappraisal, which requires participants to reinterpret the
meaning of emotional stimuli yielding them less negative and arousing
(Gross, 2001). It is unclear, however, if the deficit in cognitive emotion
regulation is restricted to reappraisal or generalizes to other emotion
regulation strategies. Recent evidence in healthy participants demon-
strated that reappraisal and an attentional control strategy (distraction)
recruit overlapping, but distinct neural networks. While both strategies
activated dorsolateral prefrontal (dlPFC) and parietal cortices, orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC) activation was specific to using reappraisal, while
distraction yielded more extensive activation in parietal and dorsome-
dial prefrontal/anterior cingulate cortex (dmPFC, ACC; Kanske et al.,
2011; McRae et al., 2010). The tested strategies also differed in their ef-
fectiveness in amygdala down-regulation, with distraction yielding
stronger and more extended down-regulation of the amygdala activity.
The specific networks involved in emotion regulation have been shown
to be differentially affected in depression. Lateral parts of the OFC show
hyperactivation (Drevets, 2007), while for dorsal ACC and dlPFC, hyper-
as well as hypoactivation have been reported (Disner et al., 2011;
Wagner et al., 2006). Increased activation in control regions has been
interpreted as a compensatory mechanism, which might also apply
for emotion regulation in depression (Wagner et al., 2006). Further-
more, a recent meta-analysis showed structural changes in depression
to be located more consistently in the OFC (Arnone et al., 2012). We,
therefore, asked if emotion regulation deficits in depressed patients
might differ between strategies.
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Second, as previous studies investigated emotion regulation in cur-
rently depressed but not remitted patients (Beauregard et al., 2006;
Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007), we do not know if the deficit per-
sists when patients recover. Because of high relapse rates (Hardeveld
et al., 2010), remission is a vulnerable clinical state also characterized
by greater sensitivity to mood challenges that predict recurrence
(Segal et al., 1999) and related changes in orbitofrontal and cingulate ac-
tivation patterns (Liotti et al., 2002). It remains to be investigated if al-
tered regulation of emotion also reflects a trait-marker for depression
and is not necessarily linked to present symptoms.
Third, it has been shown that depression is related to habitual differ-
ences in the use of emotion regulation through reappraisal. A recent
meta-analysis, for example, reported reduced reappraisal use in depres-
sion (Aldao et al., 2010). Interestingly, habitual reappraisal use is also
related to incremented emotional responding in currently remitted pa-
tients (Joormann and Gotlib, 2010). Nevertheless, it still needs to be
tested if these habitual differences are related to impaired amygdala
regulation during reappraisal use in neuroimaging experiments.
Fourth, previous studies concentrated on the down-regulation of
negative emotion (Beauregard et al., 2006; Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone
et al., 2007), whichmay be suggestive because of the excess of negative
emotion in depression. Nevertheless, it is unclear if the deficit is selec-
tive to negative emotion or generalizes to positive emotion as well.
To address these questions, we examined two different cognitive
emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal and distraction, in pa-
tients with previous depressive episodes currently in remission.
While reappraisal is a form of cognitive change of emotion, distrac-
tion requires attentional control to divert attention to the perfor-
mance of a parallel task, reducing the resources available for
emotional processing (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). To differentiate
the control of negative and positive emotion we used pictures of dif-
ferent valence and measured neural responses while patients ap-
plied emotion regulation with functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). We also assessed habitual differences in the use of
reappraisal using a validated questionnaire (Garnefski and Kraaij,
2007). This allowed testing four major hypotheses. First, if the defi-
cits in regulating emotions are specific to the reappraisal strategy,
than application of the distraction strategy should not yield any dif-
ferences between healthy participants and MDD patients. Candidate
regions for alterations include the amygdala as themajor site for reg-
ulation effects, and the OFC and ACC/dmPFC as part of the control
networks for reappraisal and distraction, respectively. In the amyg-
dala we expect impairments to show in reduced down-regulation
of activity in depression. In contrast, in line with the concept of com-
pensatory hyperactivation, patients should show an activation in-
crease in control regions. Second, if emotion regulation deficits are
a trait-marker for depression we expect to also observe this in remit-
tedMDD patients. Third, we expect to find a relation of neural activa-
tion changes during emotion regulation to habitual use of emotion
regulation. Fourth, as depression is mainly characterized by exces-
sive negative emotion, the deficits should be specific to down-
regulating negative, but not positive emotion.
Table 1
Demographic and clinical characteristics for patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) and healthy control participants (HC).
HC MDD Statistics p-value
n=25 n=23
Gender ratio (female/male) 18/7 16/7 Chi2(1)=.034 p=.853
Age. Mean (SD) 43.88 (11.21) 43.65 (10.12) t(46)=−.074 p=.942
Years of education. Mean (SD) 11.40 (1.66) 11.39 (1.85) t(46)=−.017 p=.986
Intelligence score. Mean (SD) 107.92 (15.27) 106.65 (15.32) t(46)=−.287 p=.775
% married lifetime 68 69.6 Chi2(1)=.009 p=.924
% currently employed 96 69.9 Chi2(1)=6.027 p=.014⁎
Handedness: LQ-Scores. mean (SD) 83.03 (25.79) 68.99 (50.19) t(46)=−1.203 p=.238
Current symptoms
HAMD. Mean (SD) .04 (.20) .91 (1.38) t(46)=3.008 p=.006⁎⁎
ADS. Mean (SD) 4.50 (4.10) 12.26 (8.58) t(45)=3.931 pb .001⁎⁎
BDI. Mean (SD) .96 (1.46) 6.26 (6.14) t(46)=4.035 pb .001⁎⁎
BDI. Affective subscale. Mean (SD) .36 (.907) 3.17 (3.97) t(46)=3.318 p=.003⁎⁎
BDI. Somatic subscale. Mean (SD) .60 (1.00) 3.09 (2.84) t(46)=3.975 pb .001⁎⁎
Substances
Current medication [subjects (n); duration (months). mean (SD)]
Antidepressant — SSRI – 3; 61.33 (49.98) – –
Antidepressant — SSNRI – 3; 29.67 (18.01) – –
Antidepressant — tricyclic – 1; 131 – –
Lithium – 4; 88.75 (36.13) – –
Anticonvulsants – 3; 73.5 (44.7) – –
Atypical antipsychotics – 4; 47 (16.75) – –
None 25 14 – –
Medication load. mean (SD) # 0 2.48 (2.26) – –
Persons regularly consuming caffeine. No. (%) 18 (72) 18 (78.3) Chi2(1)=.629 p=.428
Persons regularly consuming nicotine. No. (%) 4 (16) 2 (8.7) Chi2(1)=.584 p=.445
Persons regularly consuming alcohol. No. (%) 7 (28) 7 (30.4) Chi2(1)=.034 p=.853
Clinical characteristics
Age at onset of disease. Mean (SD) age – 32.09 (11.56) – –
Age at first hospitalization. Mean (SD) age + – 34.73 (10.57)+ – –
Number of previous hospitalizations. Mean (SD) – 1.57 (1.83) – –
Number of past depressive episodes. mean (SD) – 3.61 (2.29) – –
Time since last depressive episode (months) – – –
Mean (SD) – 32.83 (28.73) – –
Range – 3–115 – –
# calculated according to Sackeim (2001).
+ calculated with N=15 as 8 patients had not been hospitalized.
⁎ pb .05.
⁎⁎ pb .01.
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Material and methods
Participants
Twenty-six remitted patients with MDD and 26 healthy controls
(HC), matched for age, sex, handedness, and education participated
in the study. Three patients and one control had to be excluded
from the analysis due to technical problems at the time of measure-
ment or excessive movement artifacts in the fMRI data, leaving
N=23 remitted patients with major depression and 25 controls for
data analyses (see Table 1 for demographic and illness-related char-
acteristics of the final sample).
Patients were recruited at the Central Institute of Mental Health
(Mannheim, Germany) and through local psychotherapists, psychia-
trists and patient support groups. DSM-IV diagnoses of major depres-
sion and potential comorbid mental disorders were assessed with the
German version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, SCID-
I and -II (First et al., 1997), conducted by trained psychologists. None
of the patients currently fulfilled the criteria for any othermental disor-
der. Remission from a depressive episode was defined as a score below
5 on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (Hamilton, 1960) for at least
8 weeks. At the time of the scan, 9 patients were taking antidepressant
medication (see Table 1). Medication load was calculated according to
Sackeim (2001) and included as a covariate in all analyses.
Healthy participants were recruited through the registry office of
the city of Mannheim and advertisement in public facilities. They
were free of past or present mental disorder according to DSM-IV.
Exclusion criteria for all participants were any history of neurolog-
ical disorder, head trauma with loss of consciousness, metal implants
or large tattoos with metal containing color, current and lifetime sub-
stance abuse or dependence and age below 18 or above 65 years.
All participants gave informed written consent. The study was ap-
proved by the local ethics committee (Medical Faculty Mannheim,
University of Heidelberg).
Experimental paradigm and procedure
The details of the experimental paradigm (see Fig. 1) have been
described elsewhere (Kanske et al., 2011). In short, participants
were presented with emotional (16 negative, 16 positive, highly
arousing) and neutral (16 low arousing) images (from the In-
ternational Affective Picture System, IAPS; Lang et al., 2005)
and required to simply view the pictures (view condition) or
to down-regulate the emotional response by either reappraising
the meaning of the stimuli (reappraisal condition) or by distraction
from the images by solving an arithmetic task (distraction condi-
tion). Each picture was presented once in each condition (except
for neutral images, which were not presented in the reappraisal
condition) yielding 128 pseudo-randomly presented trials. Instruc-
tions regarding the condition were displayed after an initial emo-
tion induction phase (1 s) as a semi-transparent overlay on the
images. The regulation phase (6 s) was followed by a rating of par-
ticipants' current emotional state on a 9-point scale using the Self-
Assessment Manikins ranging from unpleasant to pleasant (4 s).
Six training trials were presented prior to the experiment, to fa-
miliarize participants with the procedure and practice the emotion
regulation strategies. Before the experiment started, the experi-
menter ensured that reappraisal strategies were employed as
intended by inquiring participants about the strategies they used.
To ensure that patients and controls perceived images similarly
emotional, all participants rated each image in arousal and valence
after the experiment, again using the 9-point scale and the Self-
Assessment Manikins. In addition, participants rated the difficulty and
effort required for each condition, to ensure that different results for
reappraisal and distractionwere not due to differences in task difficulty.
MRI data acquisition
MRI data were collected on a 3 T scanner (Magnetom TIM Trio, Sie-
mens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) at the Central Institute of
Mental Health, Mannheim. A high-resolution T1-weighted 3D image was
acquired (slice thickness=1.1 mm, FOV=256mm×256mm×256mm,
matrix=256×256×256). Functional images were obtained from 40
gradient-echo T2*-weighted slices (slice thickness=2.3 mm)per volume.
A single shot echo planar sequence with parallel imaging GRAPPA-
technique (acceleration factor 2) was used with a TR of 2700 ms, a flip
angle of 90°, TE=27ms, FOV=220×220mm2, matrix=96×96, and a
slice gap of 0.7 mm.
fMRI data analysis
Image processing and statistical analysis was done with SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/). Functional images were realigned,
slice-time corrected, and spatially normalized using the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) template. For normalization images
were resampled every 3 mm using sinc interpolation. Images were
smoothed using a 9×9×9 mm Gaussian kernel.
Individual participants' data were analyzed using a General Linear
Model for blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal changes due
to the experimental conditions. Movement parameters calculated dur-
ing realignment were included as parameters of no interest. Individual
statistical parametric maps were calculated to elucidate: (1) the emo-
tional response per se (view negative vs. view neutral and view positive
vs. viewneutral), (2) the distraction effect (distraction negative vs. view
negative and distraction positive vs. view positive), and (3) the reap-
praisal effect (reappraisal negative vs. view negative and reappraisal
positive vs. view positive).
Two types of second-level random-effects analyses were conducted:
(1) One-sample t-testswere calculated on the abovementioned individ-
ual contrast images for patients and controls separately. (2) To evaluate
differences between patients and controls, two-sample t-tests were
computed for all the contrasts.
For all analyses, anatomically defined regions of interests (ROI)
from the automated anatomical labeling atlas in WFU PickAtlas v2.0
Fig. 1. Sequence of events in a trial. The example pictures resemble those in the exper-
iment, but are not part of the IAPS. Adapted from Kanske et al. (2011), by permission of
Oxford University Press.
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(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) were used to examine activations in
the amygdala and the regulation networks as defined in our previous
investigation of reappraisal and distraction (Kanske et al., 2011).
These included middle and inferior OFC, dlPFC (middle frontal
gyrus), dmPFC (superior medial cortex), ACC, and parietal cortices
(inferior and superior parietal cortex). Activations were thresholded
at FWE-corrected pb .05. Medication load was included as a covariate
of no interest in all analyses including patients.
Statistical analyses of behavioral data
The emotional state ratings during the experiment were analyzed
with PASW (Version 18.0.1, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). A one-way ANOVA
was conducted to analyze the effect of the emotional picture presenta-
tion (negative, neutral, positive) on emotional state in the viewing con-
dition. A 2×3×2 repeated-measures ANOVA including the factors
emotion (negative, positive), task (distraction, view, reappraisal), and
group (MDD, HC) was calculated to elucidate the effects of regulation
on emotional state. The neutral condition was neglected for the second
analysis as there were no neutral pictures in the reappraisal condition.
The arousal and valence ratings of the pictures after the experiment
were analyzed with one-way repeated measures ANOVAs. All effects
with a pb .05 were treated as statistically significant.
Results
Behavioral data
Post-experimental valence and arousal rating
The rating of the images after the regulation experiment yielded the
same pattern as the normative IAPS ratings (see supplemental data
ST1). Negative and positive pictures were rated as more arousing than
neutral pictures (F(1,46)=90.2, pb .001; F(1,46)=125.0, pb .001, re-
spectively). Valencewas also significantly different between the picture
sets (positive>neutral>negative; F(1,46)=293.3, pb .001; F(1,46)=
113.9, pb .001, respectively). There were no differences between MDD
patients and HCs (all p>.45).
Online valence rating
Analysis of the emotional state ratings after each trial (see Fig. 2)
revealed a significant main effect of emotion in the viewing condition
(F(2,90)=125.8, pb0.001). Planned comparisons showed that nega-
tive and positive trials differed from neutral trials indicating success-
ful emotion induction (negative vs. neutral: F(1,45=227.7, pb0.001;
positive vs. neutral: F(1,45)=94.9, pb0.001). There were no differ-
ences between MDD patients and HCs (all p>.46).
The second analysis regarding the regulation effects showed sig-
nificant main effects of emotion (F(1,90)=238.8, pb0.001) and task
(F(1,90)=7.4, pb .01), and an interaction of emotion and task
(F(2,180)=56.4, pb0.001). Repeated contrasts regarding the interac-
tion indicated that emotional pictures were rated less negative or
positive during distraction and reappraisal compared with the view
condition (all pb .001). There were no differences between MDD pa-
tients and HCs (all p>.40).
Effort rating
The ratings of effort and difficulty of the two regulation tasks
yielded no significant differences between conditions and no differ-
ences between MDD patients and HCs (all p>.45)
fMRI data
Within-group analyses
Within-group analyses largely replicated our previous findings in
both groups (see Kanske et al., 2011), for a complete list of activations
see supplemental data ST2). Emotional stimuli elicited increased
amygdala activity in comparison to neutral images, which was re-
duced when participants regulated emotion through either reapprai-
sal or distraction. This reduction was not significant for negative
emotional stimuli in MDD patients. The regulation conditions
recruited fronto-parietal control networks including dlPFC, and parie-
tal cortex, as well as dmPFC and anterior cingulate for distraction and
OFC for reappraisal.
Between-group analyses
Group comparisons yielded no differences for the contrast of
viewing emotional vs. neutral images. However, we found increased
left amygdala activation for negative emotional stimuli in the reap-
praisal contrast when comparing MDD patients to HCs (see Fig. 3),
indicating that patients were less successful in down-regulating
amygdala activity to negative pictures using reappraisal. We did
not find this pattern for positive emotional stimuli or for the dis-
traction condition. We also observed altered activity in the regula-
tory networks. Activation in the right OFC was increased in MDD
Fig. 2. Emotional state ratings during the experiment. The means of SAM-valence-
rating are displayed.
Fig. 3. (A) Increased activation in the left amygdala (x=−15, y=−1, z=−14,
Cs=18, T=3.07, Z=2.91) for MDD patients compared to healthy controls in the reap-
praisal vs. view contrast for negative images and (B) the respective % signal change. (C)
The difference in % signal change between the reappraisal and view conditions corre-
lated negatively with habitual reappraisal use in the CERQ (r=−.30, pb .05), which
(D) was also decreased in MDD patients (t(46)=2.6, pb .05). For graphical display
MRIcroN (http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/index.html) was used with the
MNI template brain.
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patients during reappraisal of negative emotional stimuli and in-
creased activation in the dmPFC/ACC during distraction from nega-
tive stimuli (see Fig. 4).
Correlational analyses
Comparing MDD patients and controls in the Cognitive Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski and Kraaij, 2007) sub-
scales yielded a number of significant differences including the habit-
ual use of positive reappraisal (for a complete list of the scales see
Table 2). As hypothesized, patients reported less reappraisal use
than HCs (see Fig. 3). To test the relation of habitual reappraisal use
to the observed impairment in amygdala regulation in MDD patients,
we correlated individual scores of all participants in positive reap-
praisal to the down-regulation in BOLD activity in the amygdala due
to reappraisal. Here we found a negative correlation, indicating that
participants high in habitual reappraisal show a stronger down-
regulation of amygdala activity to negative images using reappraisal.
A logistic regression confirmed that the correlation was independent
of participants group (p>.80). There were no significant correlations
with activity in the control networks. As an approximation to measur-
ing competencies in distraction, we used the Adult Temperament
Questionnaire (ATQ; Rothbart et al., 2000), including the scale
attentional control, measuring the capacity to focus attention as
well as to shift attention when desired. Here, MDD patients scored
significantly below HCs (see Table 2), but there were no correlations
with brain activity (p>.20).
We found no significant correlations with any of the measures of
current symptoms including BDI, HAMD, and ADS (all p>.10). In
the patient group only, we also tested for correlations with clinical
characteristics. There were no correlations with the number of previ-
ous episodes, time since the last episode, number of hospitalizations
or age at first hospitalization, and age at the onset of the disease (all
p>.20).
Discussion
The present results yield new insights into the crucial role of emo-
tion regulation deficits in depression. We extend previous findings of
impaired down-regulation of amygdala activity in currently symp-
tomatic MDD patients to the remitted state. We also show that this
amygdala effect is specific to reappraisal and not general to all emo-
tion regulation strategies. Interestingly, to achieve amygdala down-
regulation, patients show compensatory hyperactivation in the re-
spective regulatory network for both emotion regulation strategies
tested here, reappraisal and distraction. Furthermore, we find that
these alterations are selectively present for negative, but not positive
emotions, and are related to differences in habitual reappraisal use in
depression. The observed impairment of amygdala regulation in de-
pression did not translate to the subjective emotional state ratings.
Patients reported similar decreases in current emotion as healthy
controls. This underscores the importance of sensitive measures like
fMRI to detect changes in emotion regulation mechanisms that are
not overtly observable during remission.
A number of questionnaire studies have described emotion regu-
lation impairments as crucial factors in the development and mainte-
nance of depression (Aldao et al., 2010; Garnefski and Kraaij, 2007;
Gross and John, 2003). Habitual reappraisal use seems to be negative-
ly related to depressive symptoms, while rumination, catastrophizing,
or suppression are increased in depressed patients (Garnefski and
Kraaij, 2007; Gross and John, 2003). Our questionnaire data replicate
this pattern and further demonstrate, that low habitual use of positive
reappraisal, as present in MDD patients, is also related to less success-
ful down-regulation of amygdala activity when using reappraisal in
the experimental setting. This result bridges the gap between emo-
tion regulation in everyday life and in neuroimaging experiments. It
is in line with data from a simple emotional viewing paradigm that
also observed a negative relation of amygdala activity and habitual
reappraisal (Drabant et al., 2009).
It is interesting that patients do not show increased levels of
amygdala activity during viewing of emotionally negative stimuli, as
some studies reported this effect (Siegle et al., 2007; Surguladze et al.,
2005). Others, however, did not find elevated amygdala responding
to emotional stimuli (Beauregard et al., 1998; Frodl et al., 2009),
including the two studies on emotion regulation in depression that
also presented a neutral reference condition (Beauregard et al.,
2006; Erk et al., 2010). Lee et al. (2007) also found no direct increase
of amygdala activity, but a correlation with symptom severity, which
might explain the discrepancy. A critical difference between these
and the present study is that they investigated patients with a current
episode of major depression, while only remitted patients were
included here. A study by Sheline et al. (2001) could show that the
elevated amygdala responding during an episode is normalized after
treatment, which is in line with the lack of a difference in amygdala
activity in the viewing condition in the present study and suggests
that it is a state-, not a trait-marker of depression.
The finding of deficient regulation of amygdala activity in remitted
MDD patients with no or only mild subclinical symptoms extends the
previous data on impairments in currently depressed patients
Fig. 4. Increased activation in the regulatory control networks in MDD patients com-
pared to healthy controls during (A, C) reappraisal in the right OFC (x=30, y=44,
z=−11, Cs=35, T=3.91, Z=3.6) and (B, D) distraction in the left dmPFC (x=−6,
y=26, z=40, Cs=167, T=3.9, Z=3.6). For graphical display MRIcroN (http://
www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/index.html) was used with the MNI template brain.
Table 2
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the CERQ and ATQ subscales in each
group are displayed. Significant differences are marked with an asterisk.
HC MD p-Value
CERQ Self-blame 8.1 (1.4) 9.7 (2.6) b.05⁎
Blaming others 6.1 (2.0) 7.6 (2.9) b.05⁎
Rumination 8.2 (2.3) 10.8 (3.2) b.05⁎
Catastrophizing 5.6 (1.3) 8.0 (2.7) b.05⁎
Putting into perspective 13.6 (4.0) 11.6 (4.1) b.10
Positive refocusing 10.2 (3.7) 8.9 (2.9) >.10
Positive reappraisal 13.6 (3.4) 11.0 (3.5) b.05⁎
Acceptance 11.0 (3.9) 11.8 (2.7) >.10
Refocus on planning 12.6 (3.3) 11.5 (2.7) > .10
ATQ Effortful control 5.1 (0.8) 4.6 (0.8) b.05⁎
Inhibitory control 5.3 (0.7) 4.8 (0.8) b.10
Activation control 5.0 (1.0) 4.7 (0.8) >.10
Attentional control 5.1 (0.9) 4.4 (1.0) b.05⁎
⁎ pb .05.
690 P. Kanske et al. / NeuroImage 61 (2012) 686–693
(Beauregard et al., 2006; Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007). It
suggests that the difficulties in regulating negative emotions are one
of the critical factors that make remission such a vulnerable state
with relatively high relapse rates (Hardeveld et al., 2010). It is an in-
teresting question that remains to be tested, if the deficits are directly
predictive of subsequent recurrence measures. The independence of
emotion regulation impairments from current MDD symptomatology,
symptom severity, and clinical characteristics identifies them as trait-
rather than state-markers of the disorder. As such, it might also be a
useful vulnerability marker of major depression that allows earlier
detection of MDD diagnosis; however, this has to be tested in unaf-
fected high-risk individuals (e.g., first-degree relatives of MDD
patients).
The present data also show that different emotion regulation
strategies are differentially affected in depression. As suggested by
previous results on emotion regulation in symptomatic MDD patients,
reappraisal is impaired, which is evident in reduced amygdala down-
regulation (Beauregard et al., 2006) and altered activity in the regula-
tory network (Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007). We only found
deficient amygdala down-regulation when patients used reappraisal
to regulate emotions but not when using a distraction strategy. Inter-
estingly, in healthy participants, distraction has been shown to yield a
stronger and more extended down-regulation of the amygdala re-
sponse to emotional stimuli (Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al.,
2010), which also seems to hold true for remitted MDD patients.
However, activation in the control network was enhanced during
both strategies. Here we found hyperactivation in the dmPFC for dis-
traction and the OFC for reappraisal, brain regions that were previ-
ously identified to be selectively engaged in the respective emotion
regulation strategies (Kanske et al., 2011). In line with a number of
studies on cognitive control, this enhanced control-related activation
can be interpreted as a decrease in neural efficiency (e.g. Gray et al.,
2005). Neural inefficiency is typically characterized by enhanced
task-related neural activation, either in the absence of any behavioral
effects, or associated with poorer performance (Callicott et al., 2000;
Wagner et al., 2006). The activation increase is thought to be (partial-
ly) compensatory, thus preventing (further) behavioral deficits. In
addition to the behavioral data, in emotion regulation studies the ac-
tivity of the amygdala also serves as a measure of regulation success
(Kalisch, 2009). Therefore, the results for the two regulation strate-
gies tested here suggest that depressed participants require addition-
al neural resources to perform the regulation tasks. For distraction, a
complete compensation is possible as amygdala activity and emotion-
al state ratings do not differ between patients and controls. For reap-
praisal, in contrast, no amygdala down-regulation was observed.
Unlike the dmPFC hyperactivation during distraction, the OFC activa-
tion increase, thus, seems not to compensate amygdala control under
negative emotional stimulation. As in our previous study, this sug-
gests that the regulatory effects of distraction are more robust than
during reappraisal (Kanske et al., 2011). The psychological differences
between the strategies could give an explanation for this differentia-
tion as distraction involves shifting attention away from the emotion-
al content of the stimuli, while reappraisal requires focusing on these
aspects in order to reinterpret their meaning. This potentially leads to
stronger activation in the ventral emotional stream for the reapprai-
sal as compared with the distraction condition, making it more diffi-
cult to reduce the activity. Furthermore, even though the two
strategies are not perceived as differently difficult, there are more
possible reinterpretation options that could be generated during
reappraisal, than solutions for the arithmetic problems that need to
be generated during distraction, i.e. the reappraisal task is by defini-
tion less strongly specified and also less directive, which might be a
particular challenge for MDD patients. In addition, the respective neu-
ral networks underlying the two strategies might suffer different de-
grees of structural changes in depression, which have been more
consistently reported for the OFC than the dmPFC (for a meta-
analysis see Arnone et al., 2012). Even though MDD patients are
able to down-regulate amygdala activity during distraction, the in-
creased dmPFC activity shows that this strategy can also not be ap-
plied normally. This result corresponds to studies showing impaired
cognitive inhibition in tasks like the Stroop or Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (Gohier et al., 2009), which have been shown to also correlate
with temperamental effortful and attentional control as measured in
the present study (Rueda et al., 2005). In a recent model, Joormann
(2010) suggested that this cognitive deficit might underlie impaired
emotion regulation through unsuccessful prevention of negative
emotion entering and remaining in working memory.
Despite the similarities of the present data and previous results on
emotion regulation through reappraisal in symptomatic MDD patients,
there are also a number of differences. Only one of the three currently
published studies found deficient down-regulation of amygdala activity
that we observed in remitted patients (Beauregard et al., 2006).
Johnstone et al. (2007) reported altered connectivity of amygdala and
vmPFC during reappraisal, but no direct amygdala activity difference
between patients and controls. This is most probably due to differences
in the applied experimental design, as the authors also failed to find
reduced amygdala activity during reappraisal in healthy controls and
in other samples (Urry et al., 2006). In contrast, Erk et al. (2010)
reported amygdala down-regulation in healthy participants, but – as
Johnstone et al. – did not observe alterations in MDD patients. They
found, however, lasting amygdala down-regulation in controls when
confronted with the emotional material again, while patients showed
no lasting regulation effects. A possible reason for the discrepancy to
the present study might lie in the different treatment of medication.
Erk et al. (2010) included medicated patients, but did not control for
medication in the analyses, whereas we included medication load as a
covariate in all analyses. It may, therefore, be that medication
normalizes amygdala activity during reappraisal, a question that should
be directly tested in future studies including large enough subsamples
of unmedicated and medicated patients.
The present data also show a selective deficit in regulating nega-
tive emotions. Regarding positive emotion, neither amygdala activity,
nor activation in the regulatory networks was altered during reap-
praisal or distraction when comparing MDD patients to controls.
This adds to our understanding of emotion regulation in depression
as all previous studies only reported data from negative emotional
stimuli (Beauregard et al., 2006; Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al.,
2007). It is a plausible result given that depression is a disorder dom-
inated by negative affect and related symptoms of low self-esteem
and loss of interest and pleasure in activities. In contrast to the unaf-
fected down-regulation of positive emotion, there is evidence that
MDD patients have problems in enhancing or sustaining positive af-
fect using cognitive emotion regulation (Heller et al., 2009). In future
studies it would be interesting to directly contrast the up- and down-
regulation of emotion in depressed patients, which might yield re-
verse patterns for positive and negative affect.
Regarding the clinical relevance of the present results, they under-
line the importance of addressing emotion regulation deficits in psy-
chotherapeutic interventions. As the deficits are not only present in
currently depressed patients, but persist when patients recover,
they are a continuing vulnerability factor and suitable treatment
may have the potential to reduce relapse rates. Because of the docu-
mented advantageous effects of reappraisal, for instance on well-
being (Gross and John, 2003), and the observed deficit in reappraisal
in particular, this strategy should be a focus of treatment. Neverthe-
less, as patients are well able to use distraction to regulate emotions,
and as distraction has been shown to have strong effect on amygdala
activity (Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2010), this strategy could
proof useful to manage states of immediate intense negative emotion.
Using reappraisal enhances the memory for regulated stimuli, which
is an indicator of its potential for long-term effects (Dillon et al.,
2007). Future studies should specify the long-term emotion
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regulatory effects of both strategies to further guide psychotherapeu-
tic interventions.
There are some limitations to the present study. As described
above, the remitted patients kept receiving optimal antidepressant
medication (9 of 23) to prevent withdrawal or emergence of depres-
sive symptoms. However, this does not allow testing the “pure” dis-
ease effects. We tried to control for this by including a composite
medication load measure as a covariate in all analyses (Sackeim,
2001). Future studies should aim at assembling larger sample sizes
that allow direct contrasts of medicated and unmedicated patients
or even of subgroups with different medication. Larger sample sizes
would also be desirable to validate the correlational results of ques-
tionnaire measures and brain activation. A further point is the speci-
ficity of the observed emotion regulation deficits to depression. A
number of questionnaire studies showed altered emotion regulation
across different diagnoses (Berking et al., 2008) and there is also
some indication that these deficits can be observed on the neural
level in different diagnoses (Modinos et al., 2010; Schulze et al.,
2011). It is a possibility that impaired emotion regulation is a truly
transdiagnostic issue. However, previous studies mainly applied
reappraisal as regulation strategy and often only include negative
emotional stimuli. Therefore, it might also be possible to differentiate
patient groups when testing different emotion regulation strategies,
responses to emotional stimuli of different valence separately, and
complex patterns of hypo- and hyperactivations in limbic and in con-
trol regions.
To conclude, our findings suggest that individuals with major de-
pression suffer from a deficit in down-regulating negative emotions
that extends into remission. These results are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that impaired emotion regulation is a trait-marker for de-
pression, which underscores the importance of addressing emotion
regulation as specific treatment target. The data also show the need
for future studies that assess the success of therapeutic interventions
on a neural basis and specify underlying treatment mechanisms.
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Supplemental data ST1 
Mean valence and arousal ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the picture 
selection. Normative IAPS ratings and the ratings of the present samples are displayed. 
         
     normative IAPS ratings   MD ratings   HC ratings 
 valence arousal  valence arousal  valence arousal 
negative 1.87 (0.21) 6.28 (0.64)   2.47 (1.17) 6.05 (1.51)   2.55 (0.81) 5.99 (1.54) 
neutral 4.92 (0.28) 2.98 (0.34)  5.22 (0.50) 2.10 (1.43)  5.25 (0.37) 2.53 (1.55) 






Supplemental data ST2 
Within-groups analyses for Healthy controls and MD patients. 
                
 H  MNI coordinates Cs T Z 
    x y z       
Healthy controls               
view positive - view neutral        
amygdala L -21 -1 -11 25 3.58 3.17 
 R 24 2 -11 42 3.19 2.88 
view negative - view neutral        
amygdala L -24 -4 -14 59 4.95 4.07 
 R 21 -1 -11 69 4.34 3.69 
temporal/occipital L -30 -79 -14 224 9.09 5.93 
 R 12 -85 4 537 10.7 6.42 
thalamus R 3 -7 1 24 7.7 5.41 
view positive - reappraisal positive        
amygdala L -21 -7 -17 46 3.45 3.08 
 R 30 -4 -20 75 3.58 3.17 
view negative - reappraisal negative        
amygdala L -24 -7 -17 69 4.49 3.78 
 R 27 -4 -20 66 3.08 2.8 
occipital R 24 -61 46 13 7.75 5.43 
view positive - distraction positive        
amygdala L -24 -4 -17 77 7.62 5.38 
 R 30 -4 -20 87 7.68 5.41 
middle temporal L -60 -4 -23 77 9.88 6.19 
 R 54 -67 7 401 12.3 6.85 
        
fusiform gyrus R 39 -43 -20 72 11.4 6.63 
middle occipital L -51 -76 13 152 8.98 5.89 
superior occipital L -12 -97 28 62 7.08 5.16 
 R 15 -95 25 96 6.85 5.05 
ventromedial frontal L/R 0 35 -8 670 8.63 5.77 
view negative - distraction negative        
amygdala L -21 -4 -23 77 4.73 3.94 
 R 33 -1 -26 79 4.8 3.98 
middle temporal L -54 -73 16 58 8.04 5.55 
 R 51 -67 -2 345 9.44 6.05 
superior occipital L -6 -94 28 76 8.44 5.7 
 R 15 -97 19 140 8.25 5.62 
fusiform gyrus R 42 -43 -23 58 7.23 5.22 
ventromedial frontal L/R 0 38 -20 175 10.1 6.26 
reappraisal positive - view positive        
inferior parietal/angular L -57 -52 37 162 4.52 3.8 
 R 60 -55 40 181 4.15 3.57 
middle frontal # L -45 20 49 110 3.81 3.34 
middle orbitofrontal L -42 47 -5 34 3.31 2.97 
reappraisal negative - view negative        
inferior parietal/angular L -48 -67 40 172 4.82 3.99 
 R 51 -64 43 74 3.68 3.25 
distraction positive - view positive        
inferior/superior parietal/angular L -24 -70 46 1046 7.91 5.5 
 R 33 -67 46 749 6.09 4.69 
 3 
superior frontal L -27 -1 64 182 5.78 4.53 
 R 24 8 61 152 4.88 4.03 
middle frontal L -48 29 31 195 6.33 4.81 
 R 36 38 19 389 4.29 3.66 
anterior cingulate/superior medial 
frontal L 3 26 49 79 4.46 3.77 
 R 9 29 28 111 5.04 4.12 
insula L -30 20 1 129 4.8 3.98 
 R 36 20 -5 129 5.48 4.37 
distraction negative - view negative        
inferior/superior parietal/angular L -27 -58 46 1142 7.44 5.31 
 R 36 -46 40 813 5.93 4.61 
superior frontal L -24 -1 46 177 6.64 4.95 
 R 24 53 -2 29 4.5 3.79 
middle frontal L -24 2 46 138 6.25 4.77 
 L -45 32 28 242 6.1 4.7 
 R 39 35 25 721 6.32 4.8 
anterior cingulate/superior medial 
frontal L -9 17 40 51 5.48 4.37 
 R 9 23 43 83 6.21 4.75 
insula L -36 14 13 16 3.99 3.46 
 R 36 17 7 82 5.94 4.62 
MDD patients               
view positive - view neutral        
amygdala # L -18 -1 -11 14 2.74 2.51 
middle occipital L -51 -73 1 102 9.52 5.86 
view negative - view neutral        
amygdala R 33 -4 -20 16 3.23 2.87 
superior occipital L -18 -61 52 19 7.3 5.1 
 R 21 -58 49 97 8.88 5.66 
fusiform gyrus R 27 -61 -5 81 8.23 5.44 
lingual gyrus R 9 -70 -5 74 7.74 5.27 
inferior temporal L -48 -73 -2 34 6.82 4.9 
 R 48 -70 -5 59 7.21 5.06 
view positive - reappraisal positive        
amygdala L -18 -7 -17 35 3.75 3.24 
view negative - reappraisal negative        
- 
        
view positive - distraction positive        
amygdala L -21 -7 -17 62 4.19 3.53 
 R 21 -4 -17 49 3.32 2.94 
middle temporal R 54 -70 7 98 8.79 5.64 
inferior temporal L -42 2 -38 22 7.53 5.19 
superior occipital L -9 -100 16 65 9.17 5.76 
 R 12 -94 22 191 9.18 5.76 
view negative - distraction negative        
amygdala L -27 -4 -20 63 6.2 4.62 
 R 30 -4 -20 69 5.91 4.49 
middle temporal R 51 -70 4 112 10.7 6.2 
superior occipital L -9 -97 19 15 7.29 5.09 
 R 24 -88 40 129 7.77 5.28 
reappraisal positive - view positive        
inferior parietal/angular L -45 -61 43 260 4.12 3.48 
inferior/middle orbitofrontal L -36 44 -8 48 3.92 3.36 
reappraisal negative - view negative        
 4 
inferior orbitofrontal L -39 41 -14 23 4.51 3.73 
inferior/middle orbitofrontal R 36 47 -11 38 3.83 3.3 
distraction positive - view positive        
inferior/superior parietal/angular L -45 -43 52 832 12.8 6.69 
 R 45 -43 49 465 12.8 6.68 
middle frontal L -45 38 22 203 11.4 6.36 
 L -30 2 58 82 7.37 5.13 
 R 39 41 19 282 11.6 6.42 
 R 30 8 55 85 8.38 5.5 
anterior cingulate/superior medial 
frontal R 15 26 25 239 7.82 5.29 
insula L -39 11 1 420 8.3 5.47 
distraction negative - view negative        
inferior/superior parietal/angular L -36 -46 40 1508 17.7 7.56 
 R 39 -46 43  12 6.51 
middle frontal L -45 35 25 751 9.63 5.81 
 R 30 11 55 87 10.4 6.11 
 R 36 38 28 154 11.6 6.43 
anterior cingulate/superior medial 
frontal L/R 9 14 46 401 9.97 5.99 
insula R 33 20 4 65 8.16 5.42 
 
H. hemisphere; CS. cluster size in number of activated voxels; L. left; R. right; T- and Z-values for each peak are 
given. # p < .10 
 5 
Supplemental data ST3 
 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the CERQ and ATQ subscales in each 
group are displayed. Significant differences are marked with an asterisk. 
    HC MD p 
CERQ Self-blame 8.1 (1.4) 9.7 (2.6) < .05* 
 
Blaming Others 6.1 (2.0) 7.6 (2.9) < .05* 
 
Rumination 8.2 (2.3) 10.8 (3.2) < .05* 
 
Catastrophizing 5.6 (1.3) 8.0 (2.7) < .05* 
 
Putting into Perspective 13.6 (4.0) 11.6 (4.1) < .10 
 
Positive Refocusing 10.2 (3.7) 8.9 (2.9) > .10 
 
Positive Reappraisal 13.6 (3.4) 11.0 (3.5) < .05* 
 
Acceptance 11.0 (3.9) 11.8 (2.7) > .10 
  Refocus on Planning 12.6 (3.3) 11.5 (2.7) > .10 
ATQ Effortful Control 5.1 (0.8) 4.6 (0.8) < .05* 
 
Inhibitory Control 5.3 (0.7) 4.8 (0.8) < .10 
 
Activation Control 5.0 (1.0) 4.7 (0.8) > .10 
  Attentional Control 5.1 (0.9) 4.4 (1.0) < .05* 
 










Impaired regulation of emotion: Neural correlates of reappraisal and 
distraction in bipolar disorder and unaffected relatives  Philipp Kanske, PhD1, Sandra Schönfelder2, Johanna Forneck3, Michèle Wessa, PhD2 
1Department of Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany 
2Department of Clinical Psychology and Neuropsychology, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany 





Abstract Deficient emotion regulation has been proposed as a crucial pathological mechanism in bipolar disorder (BD). We therefore investigated emotion regulation impairments in BD, the related neural underpinnings and their etiological relevance for the disorder. Twenty-two euthymic patients with bipolar-I disorder and 17 unaffected first-degree relatives of BD-I patients, as well as two groups of healthy gender-, age-, and education-matched controls (N = 22/17, respectively) were included. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while applying two different emotion regulation techniques, reappraisal and distraction, when presented with emotional images. BD patients and relatives showed impaired down-regulation of amygdala activity during reappraisal, but not during distraction, when compared to controls. This deficit was correlated with the habitual use of reappraisal. The negative connectivity of amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex observed during reappraisal in controls was reversed in BD patients and relatives. There were no significant differences between BD patients and relatives. As being observed in BD patients and unaffected relatives, deficits in emotion regulation through reappraisal may represent heritable neurobiological abnormalities underlying BD. The neural mechanisms include impaired control of amygdala reactivity to emotional stimuli and dysfunctional connectivity of the amygdala to regulatory control regions in the orbitofrontal cortex. These are, thus, important aspects of the neurobiological basis of increased vulnerability for bipolar disorder.  




















Materials and Methods 
Participants and Diagnostic Assessment All participants underwent the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I/-II35-38) and screening for exclusion criteria (neurological disorders, head trauma with loss of consciousness, metal implants, tattoos, substance abuse or dependence, age <18 or >65 years). Interviews and observer rating scales for mania (Young Mania Rating Scale; YMRS39) and depression (Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; HAMD40) were conducted by senior clinical psychologists. Participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI41, 42) and the CERQ34. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Medical Faculty Mannheim, Heidelberg University. All participants provided written informed consent before entering the study. 





Sample 2: Relatives and healthy controls Seventeen healthy first-degree relatives of BD-I patients and 17 gender-, age- and education-matched healthy controls participated (Table 1). None fulfilled criteria for any mental disorder or took any psychotropic medication. The relatives were not related to those BD patients tested in this study. Five relatives were siblings, 4 were children, and 8 were parents of BD patients. Twelve relatives had one case in the family and 5 relatives had 2 or more cases in the family. 
 
Experimental paradigm and procedure The experimental paradigm (Figure 1A)21 confronted participants with 32 emotional, highly arousing (16 negative, 16 positive) and 16 neutral, low arousing images (from the International Affective Picture System, IAPS46). They were required to simply view the pictures (view condition) or to down-regulate the emotional response by reinterpreting the meaning of the stimuli (reappraisal condition) or by distraction through an arithmetic task (distraction condition). Each picture was presented once in each condition (except for neutral images, which were not presented in the reappraisal condition) yielding 128 pseudo-randomly presented trials. Instructions regarding the condition were displayed after an initial emotion induction phase (1s) as a semi-transparent overlay on the images. The regulation phase (6s) was followed by a rating 





experiment that asked for the applied regulation techniques to ensure correct application of the instructions. To validate the normative IAPS ratings of the pictures all participants rated each image after the experiment in arousal and valence, again using Self-Assessment Manikins. These ratings were largely compatible with the normative data (Supplement S1).  
MRI Data acquisition MRI data were collected on a 3T Siemens Magnetom TIM Trio at the Central Institute of Mental Health, Mannheim. A high-resolution T1-weighted 3D image was acquired (slice thickness=1.1mm, FOV=256x240x176mm, matrix=256x240x160). Functional images were obtained from 40 gradient-echo T2*-weighted slices (slice thickness=2.3 mm). A single shot echo planar sequence with parallel imaging GRAPPA-technique (acceleration factor 2) was used with TR=2700 ms, flip angle=90°, TE=27ms, FOV=220mm2, matrix=96x96, slice gap=0.7mm. 
 
fMRI data analysis Image processing and statistical analyses were done with SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/). Functional images were realigned, slice-time corrected, and spatially normalized using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. For normalization images were resampled every 3mm using sinc interpolation. Images were smoothed using a 9x9x9mm Gaussian kernel.  










cingulate (ACC), and parietal cortex (inferior, superior). Activations were thresholded at an FWE-corrected p<0.05. Additionally, we applied the Bonferroni-Holm method which adjusts the p values that were already corrected for family-wise error rates within each ROI according to the total number of ROIs used in the analyses50, 51 or accordingly for the number of seed regions in the PPI analysis.52 Results that were significant at a whole-brain FWE corrected p<0.05 level are also reported. To allow for correlations of the observed activations with the questionnaire and clinical measures, we extracted individual % signal change from the significant cluster in a 5 mm radius sphere around the respective activation peak (if they fell into the respective anatomical ROI, e.g. the amygdala).   












Habitual emotion regulation strategies (CERQ) We observed significant group differences in maladaptive and adaptive emotion regulation strategies (Supplement S2). BD patients reported more frequent use of rumination, self-blame, and catastrophizing, but less frequent use of positive reappraisal. Relatives also reported less frequent use of positive reappraisal, but there were no differences in the other regulation strategies, including putting into perspective. Comparing BD patients and relatives showed higher scores for patients in rumination, self-blame, and catastrophizing, but no differences in positive reappraisal.  
fMRI data 
Common effects for emotional responding, reappraisal, and distraction To assess whether the response to the emotional pictures per se and the two emotion regulation strategies activated the same networks identified previously,21, 49 we first averaged across all participants. This analysis yielded activation patterns that were largely compatible with our previous data and other reports in the literature (Supplement S3). Amygdala activation (together with ventral temporal and occipital cortex and poster cingulate gyrus/precuneus) was increased in response to emotional stimuli during the view condition. In turn, amygdala activation was reduced in both emotion regulation conditions. The control network for reappraisal included bilateral OFC, dmPFC, dlPFC, and inferior parietal cortices. Distraction also activated dlPFC, dmPFC extending into ACC, insula, and superior parietal cortices. 
 










compared to controls. As in sample 1, controls showed negative connectivity during reappraisal, while relatives showed positive connectivity between these regions. BD patients vs. relatives  There were no differences in activation or connectivity of the amygdala between BD patients and unaffected relatives.  
Correlation analysis When correlating individual reappraisal use with amygdala activity in the reappraisal vs. view condition, we found a significant negative correlation (Figure 2; r=-.37; p<0.01), indicating that participants high in habitual reappraisal use are more successful in down-regulating amygdala activity in the experimental setting. This pattern was consistent when calculating correlations in the two samples separately (Sample 1: r=-.35;<.05, Sample 2: r=-.47; p<0.01). 
We	   found	   no	   significant	   correlations	   of	   amygdala	   activity	   with	   any	   of	   the	  measures of current symptoms including BDI, HAMD, and YMRS (all p>0.10). In the patient group only, we also tested for correlations with clinical characteristics. There were no correlations with number of previous episodes, time since last episode, number 















shown to influence emotion regulation and also reappraisal specifically.57 It is intriguing that the habitual use of reappraisal correlates with the amygdala down-regulation effect during experimental reappraisal, which also corroborates the ecological validity of our experimental procedure.  Surprisingly and in contrast to the neural activation patterns, subjective affect ratings during the experiment were not affected in BD. In contrast, relatives of BD patients showed a smaller reduction in positive affect during reappraisal than controls. This effect is most likely due to the reduced potential of the positive stimuli to induce 
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** p < .
01   
 
 
Table 2: Activation differences between BD patients, relatives, and their respective controls; and PPI results. 
 
H BA MNI coordinates  Cs Z T 
      x y z 
   Rel>Con: reappraisal - view emotional amygdala L  -21 -7 -14 20 3.06 3.32  R  33 5 -20 26 2.87 3.09 ventral ACC L 10 -12 50 -2 108 4.20 4.90 insula L 48 -39 2 -11 69 3.36 3.71  R 48 36 -16 1 161 3.84 4.37 BD>Con: reappraisal - view emotional amygdala L  -15 -4 -17 18 2.99 3.18 amygdala / parahippocampal R   21 5 -26 60 4.31 4.87 
BD>Con: PPI L-amygdala seed orbitofrontal L 47 -42 35 -8 53 4.94 5.79 
BD>Con: PPI R-amygdala seed orbitofrontal L 47 -12 50 -5 23 4.41 5.01 
Rel>Con: PPI L-amygdala seed orbitofrontal L 47 -39 29 -14 60 4.45 5.29  R 47 36 56 -8 15 4.59 5.52 Rel>Con: PPI R-amygdala seed orbitofrontal R 47 39 56 -5 49 5.06 6.33   H = Hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area of the peak activation; CS = Cluster size in number of activated voxels    
Figures  Figure 1 
   
Figure 2 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Supplement S3: Activations in the different conditions across all participants 
 
H BA  MNI coordinates  Cs Z T 
      x y z       
view emotional - neutral amygdala L  -21 -4 -14 26 3.65 3.85  R  21 -1 -14 20 4.65 4.95 temporal/occipital L 19 -42 -76 -2 1874 7.69 9.72  R 19 51 -73 -2  7.39 9.18 posterior cingulate/precuneus L 30 -3 -46 22 270 5.30 5.92  R 23 3 -55 34  5.58 6.29 view emotional - reappraisal amygdala L  -21 -7 -14 30 4.43 4.79  R  21 -4 -17 56 5.25 5.85 occipital L 19 -39 -76 4 237 5.67 6.43  R 19 39 -82 1 511 5.68 6.44 ventral ACC L 11 -9 38 -5 97 5.45 6.13 ventral temporal R 30 12 -49 4 48 4.96 5.46 
reapraisal - view emotional orbitofrontal L 47 -48 32 -8 201 5.92 6.79  R 47 51 35 -11 14 4.74 5.17 dorsomedial prefrontal L 6 -9 8 64 395 6.19 7.20 inferior parietal / angular gyrus L 39 -48 -67 46 471 7.02 8.52  R 39 60 -55 34 286 6.88 8.28 precuneus L 7 -6 -67 40 13 4.84 5.31 dorsolateral prefrontal L 9 -45 14 46 238 6.05 6.98 middle temporal L 21 -63 -37 -2 255 6.28 7.33  R 21 57 -37 -2 71 5.18 5.75 view emotional - distraction amygdala L 28 -24 -4 -23 68 >8.21 10.11  R 20 27 -4 -20 69 7.60 9.56 ventromedial frontal / ACC L 11 -3 35 -17 1393 >8.21 12.44 posterior cingulate L 23 -3 -49 28 176 6.43 7.56 middle temporal L 19 -54 -73 15 449 >8.21 10.23  R 20 54 -7 -20 117 6.57 7.79 ventral temporal / occipital R 19 54 -73 1 3826 >8.21 12.79 
distraction - view emotional superior parietal L 7 -27 -61 43 3273 >8.21 14.20  R 40 42 -46 43  >8.21 12.07 dorsomedial prefrontal / ACC L 32 -6 11 49 4633 >8.21 12.28  R 32 6 20 46  >8.21 10.31 insula L 48 -30 20 4  >8.21 9.45  R 48 35 20 4  >8.21 10.95 dorsolateral prefrontal L 45 -45 29 28  >8.21 9.54  R 46 39 38 22  >8.21 9.64 cerebellum R 37 18 -49 -26 185 6.30 7.36 inferior temporal L 37 -54 -58 -14 87 7.14 8.73  R 20 57 -46 -14 19 5.43 6.09 occipital L 18 -24 -97 -5 191 6.78 8.12   R 17 24 -100 -2 62 5.12 5.68  H = Hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area of the peak activation; CS = Cluster size in number of activated voxels; if no CS is given, the activation peak belongs to the cluster listed directly above 
 Supplement S4: Task difficulty and effort ratings Directly after the experiment, participants rated the difficulty and effort required for each experimental condition, to ensure that different results for reappraisal and distraction were not due to differences in task difficulty. Across BD patients and matched controls, the ratings yielded no significant differences between conditions and no interactions with group (all p>0.65). Due to a technical problem the ratings of some of the control participants matched to the unaffected relatives were not recorded, but comparing relatives to BD patients yielded also no significant differences or interactions (all p>0.70). 

 91 5  Experiments 
5.2  Neural correlates of emotional distractibility in healthy participants, 
euthymic patients with bipolar disorder, unaffected relatives of bipolar patients 
and healthy individuals with hypomanic personality 
 
This section presents two studies investigating the influence of emotion on cognitive 
processing. The first study describes a two-step experimental procedure to show the 
effect of emotionally salient stimuli on a specific cognitive capability, namely mental 
arithmetic processing. This study was done in healthy control participants. The second 
study applied this procedure to euthymic patients with bipolar disorder and to two 
groups of healthy participants at high risk to develop bipolar disorder, unaffected 
relatives of bipolar patients and healthy individuals with hypomanic personality. 
 
 Wessa, M., Heissler, J., Schönfelder, S., Kanske, P. (2013). Goal-directed 
behavior under emotional distraction is preserved by enhanced task-specific 
activation. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8, 305-12. 
 Kanske, P., Heissler, J. ,Schönfelder, S., Forneck, J., Wessa, M. (2013). Neural 
correlates of emotional distractibility in bipolar disorder, unaffected relatives 





Goal-directed behavior under emotional
distraction is preserved by enhanced
task-specific activation
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Despite the distracting effects of emotional stimuli on concurrent task performance, humans are able to uphold goal-directed
behavior. Here, we investigated the hypothesis that this effect is due to the enhanced recruitment of task-specific neural
resources. In a two-step functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we first localized those areas involved in mental arith-
metics by contrasting arithmetic problems with a number detection task. The resulting activation maps were then used as masks
in a second experiment that compared the effects of neutral and emotional distracter images on mental arithmetics. We found
increased response times in the emotional distracter condition, accompanied by enhanced activation in task-specific areas,
including superior parietal cortex, dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. This activation increase correlated with larger
behavioral impairment through emotional distraction. Similar error rates in both conditions indicate that cognitive task perform-
ance is preserved through enhanced recruitment of task-specific neural resources when emotional distracter stimuli are present.
Keywords: affect; emotion; cognition; arithmetic; fMRI
INTRODUCTION
Even in the presence of distracting stimuli, humans are
able to coherently perform cognitive tasks such as working
memory functions or mental arithmetics. Emotional stimuli
are particularly salient distracters. They signal potentially
threatening or rewarding events and are thought to automat-
ically attract attentional resources. A large body of research
studied the question of whether and how emotional stimuli
are automatically detected even under conditions of high
cognitive load (Pessoa et al., 2002; Erk et al., 2007; Van
Dillen et al., 2009). These studies suggest that performing
cognitive tasks reduces detection rates of emotional stimuli
and emotion-related activity, for example in the amygdala.
In contrast, we know less about the effects that emotional
distracters have on cognitive task performance. Evidence
from different cognitive tasks suggests that task perform-
ance is impaired when emotional stimuli are presented as
distracters before (Pereira et al., 2010) or during the task
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001). But these effects are rather small
and rarely affect accuracy of performance. Thus, a critical
question is how task performance is secured in situations of
emotional distraction. One hypothesis is that more neural
resources are devoted to task performance. In line with
this suggestion, a few studies found increased activation
in task-relevant brain regions, potentially indicating com-
pensatory activation to preserve goal-directed behavior
(Blair et al., 2007; Hart et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010).
A number of other studies, however, found a reduction of
task-relevant activations, which was interpreted as emotion
taking the cognitive processing system ‘off-line’ (Dolcos and
McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2008;
Anticevic et al., 2010). This discrepancy has not yet been
solved, but might be due to one shortcoming of the
described studies. They did not directly test if the hyper-
and hypo-activations were really located in brain regions
that are essential and specific for processing the task.
It may thus be that the observed effect was not directly
related to the task, but to another concurrent process.
Therefore, we targeted the question with a two-step fMRI
experiment. We first localized brain regions involved in
mental arithmetics by directly contrasting an arithmetic
task with a number detection task (see, e.g. Rickard et al.,
2000). In line with previous studies, we expected this task to
yield activation in bilateral parietal cortex and potentially
also in dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(Menon et al., 2000b; Ischebeck et al., 2009). We then
used these activation clusters to mask the results of a
second experiment in which participants performed arith-
metic tasks presented on emotional and neutral distracter
images. In contrast to previous studies, this ensures that
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the analyzed effect of emotional distraction on task process-
ing really includes task-specific brain regions. If the hypoth-
esis, that task performance is upheld by the recruitment of
more neural resources is correct, then activation in these
regions should be enhanced under emotional distraction,




Thirty healthy volunteers (17 female, aged 18–27 years, mean
age 21.8! 2.1 years) participated in the study. Twenty-six
participants were right-handed, four participants were
left-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were medically healthy,
reported no history of mental disorders as verified by the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I and -II;
German version: Wittchen et al., 1997), no history of serious
head injury, neurological disorder or dyscalculia. The Ethics
Committee of the University of Heidelberg approved the
study and all participants gave written informed consent
prior to participation.
Experimental paradigm and procedure
Two experimental tasks were presented (Figure 1). The first
was a localizer to identify brain activation specific to the
mental arithmetic operations of addition and subtraction.
Therefore, 20 arithmetic problems (e.g. 8" 3þ 7¼ 12) and
20 rows of numbers (e.g. 4 11 0 7) were presented for 6 s
each. Participants decided whether the presented solution for
the equation was correct or incorrect, and whether a ‘0’ was
part of the rows of numbers or not. As soon as participants
pressed a button, a thin white frame line was presented
around the numbers. All trials were presented in pseudo-
randomized order. The task lasted %8min.
The second task presented arithmetic problems equivalent
to, but different from the localizer task, superimposed on
neutral and emotional pictures. The pictures were also pre-
sented without an arithmetic task and another condition
required participants to reappraise the contents of the
images to reduce the elicited emotion; the results of these
conditions were presented elsewhere (Kanske et al., 2011).
Each trial started with a fixation cross presented with a jitter
of 3000–5025ms and followed by (i) an emotion induction
phase (1000ms), (ii) the distraction (i.e. the presentation of
an arithmetic problem; 6000ms) and (iii) a rating phase
(which is not relevant for the present paper; 4000ms).
During the induction phase, participants passively viewed
pictures to elicit an initial emotional response. The arithmet-
ic problem was then presented for 6000ms as a transparent
overlay on the picture. As soon as participants pressed a
button, a thin white frame line was presented around the
overlay.
The experiment consisted of 128 trials, which were pre-
sented in a pseudo-randomized order and lasted %35min.
Participants received six training trials prior to the experi-
ment, to familiarize them with the procedure.
Stimuli
Pictures were selected from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005). Sets of 16 highly
arousing, negative, 16 neutral, low in arousal and 16 highly
arousing, positive stimuli, were created (see Table 1 for mean
ratings). An ANOVA confirmed the selection, showing sig-
nificant effects of picture category on valence and arousal
ratings [F(2,45)¼ 1332.84, P< 0.001 and F(2, 45)¼ 176.65,
P< 0.001, respectively]. Differences in valence ratings were
observed for each category (all P< 0.001), while arousal rat-
ings did not differ for positive vs negative, but for emotional
vs neutral stimuli (P< 0.001). To assess whether the partici-
pants of the present study evaluated the stimuli similarly to
the IAPS normative sample, we had each participant rate
Fig. 1 Sequence of events in a trial of the localizer (A) and the experimental
task (B). The example pictures resemble those in the experiment, but are not part
of the IAPS.
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each image again after the scanner experiment. To ensure
that these ratings were unaffected by the experimental pro-
cedures, we did not use the rating phase of the main experi-
ment for the valence values, but conducted the rating after
the experiment outside the scanner. The rating was done on
a 9-point scale using the Self-Assessment Manikins (Bradley
and Lang, 1994). Participants pressed one of nine buttons,
each corresponding to one point on the scale (ranging
from low to high arousal, and negative to positive valence).
The results were comparable to the normative IAPS ratings,
but differed in arousal ratings for the positive pictures, which
were rated less arousing than negative pictures (see Table 1;
P< 0.001).
All arithmetic problems were formed with three operands
including a subtraction and an addition (e.g. 4þ 9" 6¼ 7).
Initially, 130 arithmetic problems were tested in an inde-
pendent sample of 10 healthy participants. From these,
20 equations were selected for the localizer task and 48 equa-
tions were selected for the main experiment such that they
were correctly solved by at least 75% of the sample. These
selected equations were randomly assigned to the back-
ground picture condition (negative, neutral, positive) such
that there were no differences in RTs or number of errors
based on the data of the pilot sample (all P> 0.25). For the
number detection task in the localizer task, the set of num-
bers contained as many numbers as the arithmetic problems,
only the operands were missing. Thus, visual input was kept
almost identical.
MRI data acquisition
MRI data were collected on a 3T scanner (Magnetom TIM
Trio, Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) at
the Central Institute of Mental Health, Mannheim.
A high-resolution T1-weighted 3D image was acquired
(slice thickness¼ 1.1mm, FOV¼ 256mm& 256mm&
256mm, matrix¼ 256& 256& 256). Functional images
were obtained from 40 gradient-echo T2*-weighted slices
(slice thickness¼ 2.3mm) per volume. A single-shot
echo-planar sequence with parallel imaging GRAPPA tech-
nique (acceleration factor 2) was used with a TR of 2700ms,
a flip angle of 908, TE¼ 27ms, FOV¼ 220mm& 220mm,
matrix¼ 96& 96 and a slice gap of 0.7mm.
fMRI data analysis
Image processing and statistical analysis was done with
SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/). Functional images
were realigned, slice-time corrected and spatially normalized
using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template.
For normalization, images were resampled every 3mm using
sinc interpolation. Images were smoothed using a 9mm&
9mm& 9mm Gaussian kernel.
Individual participants’ data were analyzed using a
General Linear Model for blood oxygen level-dependant
(BOLD) signal changes due to the experimental conditions.
Movement parameters calculated during realignment were
included as parameters of no interest to control for move-
ment artifacts. Individual statistical parametric maps
were calculated for the contrasts of interest in order to
investigate BOLD signal changes to (i) mental arithmetics
(localizer task: arithmetic problems!number detection)
and (ii) the influence of emotion on mental arithmetics
(main task: arithmetic problems superimposed on emotion-
al!neutral pictures). In a first step, the analyses were done
for positive and negative emotional stimuli separately, which
yielded largely comparable results. Also, directly comparing
the two emotional categories only yielded stronger activation
for negative stimuli in the bilateral ventral temporal cortex
(see Supplement S1 in Supplementary Data), which is
not part of the mental arithmetics network. To enhance stat-
istical power, we thus pooled positive and negative
stimuli, creating one emotional condition for the analyses
reported here.
Second-level random-effects analyses were calculated.
One-sample t-tests were computed on the above mentioned
individual contrast images. Activations were thresholded at a
whole-brain FDR corrected P< 0.05 with an extent threshold
of 20 voxels in order to protect against false-positive activa-
tions. From the activations found in the localizer task, a
mask image was created using the same thresholds. This





Accuracy was higher for the number detection compared to
the arithmetic task [M¼ 96.2%, s.d.¼ 12.0; M¼ 76.8%,
s.d.¼ 18.1; F(1,29)¼ 30.3, P< 0.001]. Reaction times to
number detection were also shorter than to the arithmetic
tasks [see Figure 2D; M¼ 1.2 s, s.d.¼ 0.6; M¼ 3.7 s,
s.d.¼ 0.5; F(1,29)¼ 486.5, P< 0.001].
Main task
As there were no significant differences between reaction
times in positive and negative trials, these were averaged to
an emotional condition [negative: M¼ 3.55 s, s.d.¼ 0.50;
positive: M¼ 3.51 s, s.d.¼ 0.52; F(1,29)¼ 0.2, P> 0.60].
Reaction times were longer for this emotional compared to
Table 1 Mean valence and arousal ratings and s.d.’s (in parentheses) for the
picture selection
Normative IAPS ratings Sample ratings
Valence Arousal Valence Arousal
Negative 1.87 (0.21) 6.28 (0.64) 2.48 (0.49) 6.00 (1.00)
Neutral 4.92 (0.28) 2.98 (0.34) 5.19 (0.42) 1.77 (0.35)
Positive 7.38 (0.39) 6.29 (0.68) 7.21 (0.35) 5.16 (0.60)
Normative IAPS ratings and the ratings of the present sample are displayed.
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neutral distracter trials [see Figure 2; neutral: M¼ 3.38 s,
s.d.¼ 0.45; emotional: M¼ 3.53 s, s.d.¼ 0.46;
F(1,29)¼ 14.1, P< 0.001]. Arithmetic problems (90.8%)
were correctly solved (s.d. 6.2), there were no significant
differences between conditions [F(1,29)¼ 0.6, P> 0.45].
fMRI results
Localizer task
The contrast of arithmetic tasks with the number detection
tasks in the localizer yielded activation in widespread net-
work of brain regions including the parietal cortex, lateral
and medial prefrontal cortex, and the insula (Table 2).
Main task
The activation clusters identified in the localizer task were
used as masks for the contrast of arithmetic problems pre-
sented on emotional and neutral distracters. We observed no
significant activation for the neutral over the emotional dis-
tracter condition (even with a more lenient threshold of
P< 0.001 uncorrected, and also when conducting a
whole-brain analysis). However, the parietal cortex, regions
in the lateral prefrontal cortex and the left insula were acti-
vated more strongly for mental arithmetics in emotional
when compared to neutral distracter trials (Table 2 and
Figure 2).
Fig. 2 Activations for mental arithmetics on emotional vs neutral distracters in viewed from the right (A) and the left side (B) and from above (C). Reaction times in the
experimental task (D) and correlations of the reaction time difference and activation differences between emotional and neutral trials in left (E) and right (F) superior parietal
cortex, superior medial frontal cortex (G), left (H) and right (I) superior frontal, and left (J) and right (K) middle frontal cortex.
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To further assess the relation of the increased task-related
activation under emotional distraction to the behavioral dis-
traction effect, we conducted a correlational analysis. We
extracted the first eigenvariate of the time-course of the ac-
tivations in Table 2 with a spherical 5-mm radius ROI and
correlated it to the RT difference between emotional and
neutral trials (Table 3). This yielded significant correlations
with left and right superior parietal cortex, superior medial
frontal cortex, as well as left and right middle and superior
frontal cortex. The data indicate that larger behavioral inter-
ference was accompanied by increased activation in the re-
spective brain regions. To assess the specificity of these
correlations to task-related processing, we also calculated
correlations with activity in the left and right amygdala,
which we had found to be active when comparing emotional
with neutral images in a simple viewing condition (Kanske
et al., 2011), but which was not part of the network for arith-
metic processing as identified in the localizer task. For this
analysis, we extracted the first eigenvariate for the present
contrast (arithmetic tasks on emotional vs neutral back-
ground images) from 5mm spheres defined by the amygdala
Table 2 Peak activations in the localizer and main task for mental arithmetics and mental arithmetics on emotional vs neutral distracters
H BA MNI coordinates CS Z
x y z
Arithmetic!number detection
Superior frontal L 6/8 "27 0 60 1092 6.40
Middle frontal L 10/45/46 "36 54 15 a 5.79
Superior frontal R 6/8 30 3 57 1164 5.90
Middle frontal R 10/45/46 45 42 27 a 5.51
Medial frontal/anterior cingulated R 6/8/24/32 6 18 51 425 7.24
Insula L 6/8/24/32 "6 15 45 a 6.64
R 48 36 21 "3 265 7.46
L 48 "33 21 "3 230 7.43
Inferior parietal L 40 "42 "39 42 2941 7.63
Superior parietal L 7 "24 "59 39 a 7.30
Inferior parietal R 40 45 "39 45 a 6.64
Superior parietal R 7/40 33 "48 45 a 6.91
Middle occipital L 17/18/19 "33 "84 12 a 7.19
R 17/18/19 30 "96 3 a 6.82
Arithmetic emotional!arithmetic neutral
Superior frontal L 6 "21 "6 72 133 3.19
Middle frontal L 46 "30 "54 24 57 3.54
Superior frontal R 6 21 0 55 104 3.90
Middle frontal R 46 30 51 27 122 3.99
Superior medial frontal L 8/32 "3 18 44 72 2.79
Anterior cingulated R 24/32 6 39 27 63 3.16
L 24/32 "5 33 27 a 3.05
Insula L 48 "27 15 "14 37 3.87
Middle occipital L 17/18/19 "42 "81 12 4396 5.50
R 17/18/19 30 "75 30 a 5.17
Superior parietal R 7/40 24 "60 63 a 3.16
L 7/40 "18 "60 60 a 4.06
aIndicates that this peak is part of the cluster listed earlier.
H¼ Hemisphere; CS¼ Cluster size in number of activated voxels.
Table 3 Correlations of the activations observed in the contrast of ‘arith-
metic emotional!arithmetic neutral’ (Table 2) with the behavioral distrac-
tion effect, i.e. RTs emotional!neutral
H r P
Superior frontal L 0.42 0.010*
R 0.37 0.023*
Middle frontal L 0.39 0.016*
R 0.37 0.023*
Superior medial frontal L 0.47 0.005**
Anterior cingulated R 0.01 0.463
L 0.14 0.217
Insula L 0.25 0.090
Middle occipital L 0.01 0.487
R 0.29 0.061
Superior parietal R 0.41 0.010*
L 0.42 0.013*
Amygdale L 0.19 0.149
R "0.03 0.426
Additionally, the correlation of the RT effect with left and right amygdala activity
extracted from the same contrast, but without the localizer mask, is reported.
H¼ Hemisphere, r¼ Pearson correlation coefficient, *P< 0.05, **P< 0.01.
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activation, we had found when contrasting emotional and
neutral stimuli in a simple viewing condition in which par-
ticipants attended to the images, but performed no parallel
task (see Kanske et al., 2011). Here, we found no significant
correlation (Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The present study gives new insights into the effects of emo-
tional distraction on cognitive task performance. Emotional
background images increased response times, but did not
affect error rates, indicating that emotion did have a distract-
ing effect, but that participants were still able to uphold
goal-directed behavior. This effect was accompanied by
increased activation for mental arithmetics in task-specific
brain regions. This increase was particularly strong in par-
ticipants showing larger behavioral interference. The data
suggest that it is enhanced recruitment of task-specific
neural resources that ensures continued task performance
even when emotional distracters are present.
Thereby, the present results clarify previous data with in-
consistent effects of emotional distraction on cognitive tasks.
While some studies found enhanced activation in dorsal
‘cognitive’ brain regions (Blair et al., 2007; Hart et al.,
2010; Pereira et al., 2010), others reported an activation de-
crease in these areas (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos
et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010).
The present study differs from previous approaches in the
direct localization of task-specific brain regions, before mea-
suring the distraction effects in these areas. As our data show
enhanced activations under emotional distraction, they con-
form to the hypothesis that task-specific activation is
boosted in order to overcome the distraction effect. This
suggests that the activation reduction found in some studies
is not directly task-related, but reflects some other cognitive
process. The exact nature of this process is unclear, however,
one putative role is the inhibition of task-irrelevant infor-
mation and the protection against interference (Shimamura,
2000; Jha et al., 2004). A study by Sommer et al. (2008) hints
at that. The authors used a spatial conflict paradigm in
which the shape of a stimulus determined the response,
while the stimulus location elicited an interfering response
tendency in some trials. Here, emotion caused disturbed
behavioral conflict resolution along with reduced dlPFC
and ACC activation. Future studies should target this ques-
tion, possibly by combining conflict paradigms with the pre-
sent approach.
The results differ markedly from previous reports of facili-
tated cognitive task performance induced by emotional sti-
muli, for example, of attention (Keil et al., 2005) or cognitive
control (Kanske and Kotz, 2011b). This discrepancy is best
explained by the role of the emotional stimuli in the respect-
ive tasks. While they were not behaviorally relevant and pre-
sented in the background of the target stimuli in the present
study, facilitation effects are observed when the task-specific
target stimuli themselves are emotional. Interestingly, this
emotional facilitation is accompanied by increased activation
in brain regions involved in the processing of conflict
(Kanske and Kotz, 2011a), which complements the data by
Sommer et al. (2008) discussed earlier.
An alternative explanation for the present results is that
the observed hyper-activation directly reflects emotional
processing and not the effect of emotion on task-
performance. However, this possibility is highly unlikely.
First, the results were masked with the activation clusters
found for arithmetic processing in the localizer task. This
task did not involve emotional stimuli, the resulting mask
image should therefore not include emotion specific activa-
tions. Second, contrasting emotional with neutral stimuli
without specific task demands activates a more ventral–
limbic network that does not overlap with the task-related
activations reported here (Kanske et al., 2011). Furthermore,
the correlation of the activation increase with the RT inter-
ference effect may also suggest that the observed areas are
directly relevant for task performance. Even though it is
principally possible that increased behavioral interference
is related to enhanced activity in emotion-related brain
regions, the lack of a significant correlation between RTs
and amygdala activity suggests otherwise. The amygdala
was found to be active when contrasting emotional and neu-
tral images in a simple viewing condition without any active
task superimposed (Kanske et al., 2011), but not in the arith-
metic localizer task, which demonstrates its involvement in
emotional, rather than cognitive processing. As the correl-
ations between behavior and brain activity were restricted to
regions activated in the localizer task, this correlation seems
to be specific for task-related activation.
Interestingly, significant correlations were not observed
across all of the observed activations, but only in superior
parietal, superior and middle frontal and superior medial
frontal cortex. These regions are those most consistently
found in studies on arithmetic processing, in particular par-
ietal and middle prefrontal cortex have been described as
hosting representations of quantity and mental calculation
(for a review, see Dehaene et al., 2004). It is, therefore, pos-
sible that while activity in a larger task-related network is
enhanced to overcome emotional distraction effects and
ensure correct task performance, only those regions directly
involved in arithmetic operations show a relation to
increased RTs during distraction. According to Perneger
(1998), we did not correct the correlations for multiple com-
parisons. Testing the whole pattern of correlations between
the RT and fMRI data provides more and very specific in-
formation, for example, by including the amygdala activity,
for which we expected no significant effects (see also Hensch
et al., 2007). To allow an evaluation of the psychological
importance of the results, we report the exact P-values
along with the correlations (as standardized effect sizes) as
recommended by Nakagawa (2004).
One limitation of the present study concerns the question
how specific the neural network that was identified in the
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localizer task is for arithmetic processing. Because of lower
accuracy and longer RTs, task difficulty seems to have been
higher in the arithmetic compared to the number detection
task. It is therefore possible that some of the observed acti-
vations are due to task difficulty and not mental arithmetics.
This argument applies to a number of previous studies on
arithmetic processing that also used number detection as
control conditions (Menon et al., 2000a, 2000b; Rickard
et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the neural network identified
for arithmetic processing across different types of tasks
including a variety of different control conditions is largely
overlapping and corresponds well to the clusters observed in
the present study (Fehr et al., 2007; Grabner et al., 2007;
Zago et al., 2008; Ischebeck et al., 2009). This suggests that
there is some functional specificity for arithmetic processing
in the network. Future studies should validate this point,
potentially using the conjunct activity of different tasks as
mask images. In a similar vein, as the results were masked it
seems odd that we observed activation in the insula, which
has been mainly implicated in emotional processing (Singer
et al., 2009). However, insula activation is also a common
finding in studies of arithmetic processing (Menon et al.,
2000b; Grabner et al., 2007, 2009; Ischebeck et al., 2009)
and was also part of the network identified in the localizer
task. The arithmetic activation seems to be slightly anterior
to the emotional activation (see also Kanske et al., 2011), but
the exact role of the insula in mental arithmetics still needs
to be elucidated.
A second limitation concerns the differentiation of the
emotional distraction effects. We observed no relevant dif-
ferences in behavior and neural activity between positive and
negative images, which could suggest that it is mainly the
increased arousal in the emotional conditions that drives the
distraction effects. This could be tested in future studies by
systematically manipulating valence and arousal values of the
presented stimuli. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the
distraction effects may vary for different emotions such as
anger, fear or joy (for a meta-analysis on commonalities and
differences in the neural underpinnings of different emotions
see Phan et al., 2002), which is also an empirical question for
future studies.
The present data are also relevant for the interpretation
of previous results from patients with mental disorders.
Despite preserved behavioral task performance, patients
with depression or bipolar disorder, for example, show
enhanced task-related activity under emotional distraction
(Wessa et al., 2007; Dichter et al., 2009). Our data support
the authors’ interpretation of these effects as a compensatory
mechanism to deal with greater emotional interference,
which may be caused by hyper-activation in limbic regions
involved in affective processing (Phillips et al., 2008).
To conclude, the present study showed that task perform-
ance under emotional distraction is preserved through
enhanced activation in task-specific brain regions. The use
of a two-step fMRI procedure, which first localized
task-related activations before investigating the effect of
emotion on them, was fruitful and is recommended for
future studies.
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Regions in the bilateral ventral temporal cortex activated for negative compared to positive 
stimuli. The activation peaks were found in the left (x = -27, y = -72, z = -12, CS = 370, Z = 




Neural Correlates of Emotional Distractibility in
Bipolar Disorder Patients, Unaffected Relatives,







and emotion dysregulation are present in
symptomatic and euthymic patients with
bipolar disorder. However, there is little
evidence on how cognitive functioning is
influenced by emotion, what the neural
correlates of emotional distraction effects
are, and whether such deficits are a conse-
quence or a precursor of the disorder. The
authors used functional MRI (fMRI) to
investigate these questions.
Method: fMRIwas used first to localize the
neural network specific to a certain cogni-
tive task (mental arithmetic) and then to
test the effect of emotional distractors on
this network. Euthymic patients with bi-
polar I disorder (N=22), two populations at
high risk for developing the disorder (un-
affected first-degree relatives of individuals
with bipolar disorder [N=17]), and healthy
participants with hypomanic personality
traits [N=22]) were tested, along with three
age-, gender-, andeducation-matchedhealthy
comparison groups (N=22, N=17, N=24,
respectively).
Results: There were no differences in
performance or activation in the task
network for mental arithmetic. However,
while all participants exhibited slower re-
sponses when emotional distractors were
present, this response slowing was greatly
enlarged in bipolar patients. Similarly, task-
related activation was generally increased
under emotional distraction; however, bi-
polar patients exhibited a further increase
in right parietal activation that correlated
positively with the response slowing effect.
Conclusions: The results suggest that emo-
tional dysregulation leads to exacerbated
neuropsychological deficits in bipolar pa-
tients, as evidenced by behavioral slowing
and task-related hyperactivation. The lack of
such a deficit in high-risk populations sug-
gests that it occurs only after disease on-
set, rather than representing a vulnerability
marker.
(Am J Psychiatry 2013; 170:1487–1496)
Bipolar disorder is a chronic, highly debilitating
disease. Only 24% of bipolar patients achieve functional
recovery 1 year after amanic episode (1), a rate that rises to
only 43% after 2 years (2). The level of psychosocial
functioning in bipolar patients is correlated with a number
of neuropsychological deficits in executive function,
attention, and memory (3, 4). These cognitive deficits are
present inmanic and depressive episodes and even persist
into remission (5, 6). It has been hypothesized that the
cognitive deficits in bipolar disorder arise, at least in part,
from a general hyperreactivity of limbic brain structures
and emotional hyperreactivity that interferes with neo-
cortical activity necessary for successful task performance
(7, 8). Indeed, heightened amygdala activation at rest and
during nonemotional and emotion-related tasks has been
seen in symptomatic (9, 10) and euthymic bipolar patients
(11–13).
A few studies have investigated cognitive task perfor-
mance in the presence of emotional distractors. Two
studies using the emotional Stroop task found abnormally
increased frontal and limbic activity in bipolar patients
during color naming of emotional compared with neutral
words (11, 14). However, emotion did not affect color-
naming response latencies, both in patients and in
comparison subjects, suggesting that task processing was
not directly influenced. In a previous study (15), we ap-
plied an emotional go/no-go task, which yielded behav-
ioral distraction effects in the emotional compared with
the neutral condition, but no behavioral alterations in
bipolar disorder, although activation was increased in
frontal and limbic regions. Similar activation increases
without behavioral effects were found in working memory
tasks with sad mood induction (16) and face distractor
stimuli (17). Critically, these studies could not clarify
whether the observed hyperactivations reflect altered
processing of the cognitive tasks (e.g., as a compensatory
effect) or simply aberrant emotional processing. Address-
ing this issue would require independent definition of the
relevant task network before studying the influence of
emotion on this network.
Furthermore, it is unknown whether the potentially
increased emotional distractibility is a consequence of the
disorder or whether it represents a vulnerability marker.
Clinically, this differentiation is critical for refining
Am J Psychiatry 170:12, December 2013 ajp.psychiatryonline.org 1487
etiological models of bipolar disorder and designing either
targeted therapy or preventive interventions.
In the present study, we aimed to investigate emotional
distractibility in patients with bipolar disorder using a two-
step functional MRI (fMRI) procedure. The first experi-
ment allowed for the localization of the neural network
relevant to a cognitive task, here mental arithmetic. To
elucidate the influence of emotion on this network, the
second experiment presented arithmetic tasks on top of
emotional and neutral distractor images. Using this pro-
cedure, we previously found that in healthy subjects,
emotional distraction leads to slower performance and
increased activation in the task-related neural network,
particularly in the parietal cortex (18). The crucial role of
this region in arithmetic processing has been repeatedly
demonstrated (19, 20). Our approach to testing whether
potential deficits represent a vulnerability marker was to
investigate remitted patients with bipolar I disorder and
two groups of participants at heightened risk for de-
veloping bipolar disorder (i.e., unaffected first-degree
relatives of bipolar I patients and healthy participants
with hypomanic personality [defined using the Hypo-
manic Personality Scale (21)]), who have been demon-
strated to have an increased risk of developing bipolar
disorder over time (22). We compared each of these
experimental groups with separate matched comparison
groups and additionally compared the experimental
groups directly with demographic variables as covariates.
If cognitive processing deficits in bipolar disorder are
associated with increased emotional distractibility, we
would expect an exacerbated behavioral slowing effect and
a more pronounced task-related activation increase,
TABLE 1. Demographic and Clinical Characteristics of Patients With Bipolar Disorder, Unaffected Relatives, Healthy






Mean SD Mean SD p
Age (years) 39.4 11.8 40.5 11.8 0.770
Education (years) 11.3 1.6 11.8 1.5 0.293
Intelligence scorea 105.4 12.6 107.7 14.5 0.592
Handedness (laterality quotient score)b 83.8 13.8 85.7 23.1 0.736
Current symptoms
Young Mania Rating Scale score 1.0 1.6 0 0 0.008
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale score 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.029
Beck Depression Inventory score 6.7 6.0 1.2 2.0 ,0.001
Course of illness
Age at onset (years) 25.2 7.7
Age at first hospitalization (years) 27.3 8.2
Number of previous hospitalizations 3.2 2.5
Number of depressive episodes 3.6 2.4
Number of manic episodes 3.0 1.8
Time in remission (months) 54.0 69.0
N % N % p
Gender
Female 14 63.6 12 54.5 0.540
Male 8 36.4 10 45.5
Ever married 12 55.0 13 59.1 0.761






Lithium carbonate 8 36.4
Valproic acid 11 50.0
Lamotrigine 6 27.3
Substance use
Caffeine 14 66.7 17 81.0 0.292
Nicotine 6 28.6 2 9.1 0.101
Alcohol 7 31.8 9 40.9 0.531
a Measured with the Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest-B.
b Measured with the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory.
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particularly in the parietal cortex, which should also be
present in the high-risk groups if these deficits represent
a vulnerability marker of bipolar disorder.
Method
Participants
All participants underwent the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV (23–26), as well as screening for exclusion criteria
(neurological disorders, head trauma with loss of consciousness,
metal implants, tattoos, substance abuse or dependence, and age
,18 or .65). Interviews and observer rating scales for mania
(Young Mania Rating Scale [27]) and depression (Hamilton
Depression Rating Scale [HAM-D] [28]) were conducted by
clinical psychologists, and participants completed the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI [29, 30]). The study was approved
by the research ethics committee of the Heidelberg University
Faculty of Medicine in Mannheim, Germany. All participants
provided written informed consent before entering the study.
Sample 1: bipolar patients and healthy comparison
subjects. Twenty-two euthymic bipolar patients and 22 gender-,
age-, and education-matched healthy comparison subjects with
no history of or current mental disorders participated in the
study. Patients were recruited at the Central Institute of Mental
Health, Mannheim, Germany, and through local psychiatrists,
psychotherapists, and patient support groups. None of the
patients currently met criteria for any DSM-IV disorder other
than bipolar I disorder. A life chart assessing variables related
to illness course was completed for all patients (Table 1).
Euthymia was defined as a HAM-D score ,5 and a Young
Mania Rating Scale score ,7 (31). We asked patients about
their current medication and verified its stability during the
past 6 months. To analyze the psychotropic medication effect,
we calculated the total medication load according to a pub-
lished algorithm (32) reflecting dosage and a variety of different
medications (33). The composite measure was generated by
summing all individual medication codes for each medication
category (mean=2.32, SD=2.08). We then checked for correla-
tions of this index with the effects of interest in bipolar
patients.








Mean SD Mean SD p Mean SD Mean SD p
36.6 16.2 35.9 15.6 0.898 21.0 1.6 22.3 2.9 0.064
12.5 1.2 12.9 0.3 0.175 13 0 13 0
103.1 11.8 109.4 12.8 0.157 97.7 5.2 102.3 12.8 0.127
57.7 64.8 80.1 41.1 0.238 82.7 16.9 84.6 16.5 0.715
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.543 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.904
3.0 3.3 1.8 3.1 0.289 3.5 4.2 1.5 2.7 0.068
N % N % p N % N % p
8 47.1 8 47.1 1.00 13 59.1 14 58.3 0.958
9 52.9 9 52.9 9 40.9 10 41.7
11 64.7 6 35.3 0.169 0 0 0 0
15 88.2 15 88.2 1.00 19 86.4 24 100 0.101
10 62.5 13 81.3 0.433 14 63.6 12 52.2 0.550
2 12.5 1 5.9 0.601 9 40.9 3 12.5 0.031
6 35.3 7 41.2 1.00 20 90.9 10 42.7 ,0.001
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Sample 2: relatives of bipolar patients and healthy com-
parison subjects. Seventeen unaffected relatives of bipolar I
patients and 17 gender-, age-, and education-matched healthy
volunteers participated (Table 1). None fulfilled criteria for any
lifetime or current mental disorders, and none were taking any
psychotropic medications. The relatives were not related to the
bipolar patients tested in this study. Five relatives were siblings,
four were children, and eight were parents of bipolar patients.
Twelve relatives were from simplex families (one case in the
family), and five were from multiplex families (at least two cases
in the family).
Sample 3: individuals with hypomanic personality and
healthy comparison subjects. In previous studies (22, 34),
individuals with hypomanic personality were selected based on
the Hypomanic Personality Scale, on which scoring in the upper
10% was defined as hypomanic personality (resulting in scores
$31). Through online questionnaires and in lectures, 1,567
individuals were screened. Twenty-four individuals with hypo-
manic personality were included, as well as 24 gender-, age-, and
education-matched healthy comparison subjects who did not
score 0.5 standard deviations above the mean of the distribution
(Table 1). For analyses, two participants with hypomanic per-
sonality were excluded because of fMRI motion artifacts. None of
the participants in this sample fulfilled criteria for mental
disorders or reported a positive family history of affective or
psychotic disorders, nor were they taking any psychotropic
medications. In general, participants with hypomanic personality
reported increased caffeine and alcohol consumption; however,
none of the study participants consumed alcohol or caffeine
beginning the evening of the day before scanning.
Experimental Paradigm
The details of the experimental paradigm have been described
elsewhere (18). Briefly, two experimental tasks were presented
(Figure 1). Task 1 was a localizer to identify brain activation
patterns specific to mental arithmetic operations. In this task, 20
arithmetic problems and 20 number rows were presented for
6,000 ms each, and participants decided whether the presented
solution for the equation was correct or whether a “0” was part of
the number row.
Task 2 aimed to test the influence of emotional distraction on
task processing and presented arithmetic problems equivalent to
but different from the problems presented in the localizer task
(35). The arithmetic problems were superimposed on 32 highly
arousing emotional images (16 negative, 16 positive) and 16 low-
arousal neutral images (taken from the International Affective
Picture System [36]). Each trial started with 1) a fixation cross
presented with a jitter of 3,000–5,025 ms, followed by 2) an
emotion induction phase (1,000 ms), 3) the distraction (i.e., the
presentation of an arithmetic problem through a transparent
overlay on the images; 6,000 ms), and 4) a rating phase (4,000 ms),
which was not relevant to this study. Task 2 included 48 men-
tal arithmetic trials. Participants received six training trials
before the experiment to familiarize themselves with the
procedure.
MRI Data Acquisition
MRI data were collected on a Magnetom Tim Trio 3-T scanner
(Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) at the Central
Institute of Mental Health, Mannheim. A high-resolution T1-
weighted three-dimensional image was acquired (slice thickness,
1.1 mm, field of view=25632403176 mm3, matrix=25632403160).
Functional images were obtained from 40 gradient-echo T2*-
weighted slices (slice thickness, 2.3 mm) per volume. We used
a single-shot echo planar sequence with parallel imaging GRAPPA
(generalized autocalibrating partially parallel acquisitions) technique
(with an acceleration factor of 2)(TR=2,700 ms, flip angle=90°,
TE=27 ms, field of view=220 mm2, matrix=96396, slice
gap=0.7 mm).
fMRI Data Analysis
Image processing and statistical analyses were performed with
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Func-
tional images were realigned, slice-time corrected, and spatially
normalized using the Montreal Neurological Institute template.
For normalization, images were resampled every 3 mm using
sinc interpolation. Images were smoothed using a 93939-mm
Gaussian kernel.
FIGURE 1. Sequence of Events in the Trial of a Localizer to
Identify Brain Activation Patterns Specific to Mental
Arithmetic Operations (Task 1) and the Experimental Task
To Test the Effects of Emotional Distraction in Mental
Arithmetic (Task 2)a
a The images shown are examples that resemble those in the
experiment but are not part of the International Affective Picture
System, which was used in this study.
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Individual data were analyzed using a general linear model for
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal changes due to the
experimental conditions. Movement parameters calculated dur-
ing realignment were included as parameters of no interest to
control for movement artifacts. Individual statistical parametric
maps were calculated for the contrasts of interest in order to
investigate BOLD signal changes in response to 1) mental
arithmetic (task 1: arithmetic problems versus number detection)
and 2) the influence of emotion on mental arithmetic (task 2:
arithmetic problems superimposed on emotional versus neutral
images).
Second-level random-effects analyses were conducted. First,
one-sample t tests were calculated for the above-mentioned
individual contrast images across participants in each of the
three samples. Second, to evaluate differences between the bi-
polar patients, the at-risk populations, and their respective
comparison counterparts, two-sample t tests were computed for
all the contrasts. These analyses were not confounded by demo-
graphic differences because the groups were carefully matched.
Third, to explore differences between the experimental groups
directly, we drew a sample from all available healthy comparison
subjects that was matched in size to the bipolar group (N=22)
and matched in demographic variables as closely as possible
to all three experimental groups. We then conducted analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) with group as a between-subjects factor
(the bipolar, relatives, hypomanic personality, and comparison
groups) and age and gender as covariates, since the included
groups differed significantly in demographic variables (see Table
S1 in the data supplement that accompanies the online edition of
this article). Results of these analyses are reported in the data
supplement.
For all analyses, because direct contrasts of these conditions
yielded no differences in the mental arithmetic task networks, we
averaged across negative and positive stimuli and thus enhanced
statistical power (18, 35). Activations were thresholded at a
whole-brain family-wise-error-corrected p value ,0.05, with an
extent threshold of 10 voxels in order to protect against false
positive activations. From the activations found in task 1, a mask
image was created. This mask was then used for task 2, in which
activation was also thresholded with a family-wise-error-corrected
p value ,0.05 and a minimum of 10 voxels.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Reaction times and accuracy were analyzed with SPSS, version
20.0 (IBM, Armonk, N.Y.). Repeated-measures ANOVAs were
calculated with group (bipolar patients compared with healthy
FIGURE 2. Activation Maps for Mental Arithmetic vs. Number Detection and for Mental Arithmetic on Emotional vs. Neutral
Distractor Images
Task 1: arithmetic > number detection Task 2: emotional > neutral distractors
A. Bipolar patients and comparison subjects
B. Relatives and comparison subjects
C. Hypomanic personality participants and comparison subjects
D. Bipolar patients and comparison subjects
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comparison subjects, relatives compared with healthy compar-
ison subjects, and hypomanic personality participants compared
with healthy comparison subjects) as a between-subject factor
and task (arithmetic, number detection), in Task 1, or emotion
(emotional or neutral distractor), in Task 2, as a within-subject
factor. As for the imaging data, additional analyses comparing all
groups directly were carried out and included age and gender as
covariates (see the online data supplement).
Results
Behavioral Data
Task 1. Accuracy was higher in the number detection task
than in the arithmetic task (see Table S3 in the online data
supplement), which was evident in a main effect of task
condition in each sample (sample 1: F=86.7, df=1, 42,
p,0.001; sample 2: F=60.8, df=1, 32, p,0.001; sample 3:
F=67.4, df=1, 42, p,0.001). There were no significant effects
of group or interactions of group and task condition.
Regarding reaction times, there were significant main
effects of task condition in each sample (sample 1:
F=267.4.5, df=1, 41, p,0.001; sample 2: F=168.2, df=1, 32,
p,0.001; sample 3: F=256.4, df=1, 42, p,0.001), with
prolonged reactions in the arithmetic task compared with
the number detection task, but no group effects were
found.
Task 2. For accuracy rates, we observed no significant
main effects for distractor condition (emotional compared
with neutral images) or group, nor a significant interaction
effect (see Table S3 in the data supplement). However,
participants were slower in solving arithmetic problems
presented on emotional compared with neutral images, as
evident in significant main effects of distractor condition
on reaction times (sample 1: F=45.0, df=1, 42, p,0.001;
sample 2: F=6.7, df=1, 32, p,0.05; sample 3: F=20.7, df=1,
42, p,0.001). We observed no significant main effect of
group in any of the samples. While there were no inter-
actions of group with the distractor condition in samples 2
and 3, there was an interaction in sample 1 with bipolar
patients and healthy comparison subjects (F=18.7, df=1,
42, p,0.01). The difference between bipolar patients and
their healthy counterparts was also larger than the dif-
ference between the other two groups and their respective
comparison counterparts (D sample 1 compared with D
sample 2: t=4.9, df=76, p,0.001;D sample 1 comparedwith
D sample 3: t=6.4, df=88, p,0.001).
None of the behavioral effects correlated with medica-
tion load.
fMRI Data
Task 1. To elucidate the neural correlates of mental
arithmetic, we contrasted the arithmetic task with the
number detection task. There were no significant group
differences in any of the samples. Therefore, we averaged
across the groups in each sample (Figure 2A–C; also see
Table S4 in the data supplement), which yielded largely
consistent activation patterns. Activation foci included the
left and right dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal
TABLE 2. Activations During Task 2 for Mental Arithmetic on Emotional vs. Neutral Distractor Images in Patients With Bipolar
Disorder, Unaffected Relatives, Healthy Participants With Hypomanic Personality, and Their Respective Comparison
Counterparts and the Activation Difference Between Bipolar Patients and Comparison Subjects
Contrast and Region Hemisphere Brodmann’s Area MNI Coordinates (x, y, z)a Cluster Sizeb Z T
Bipolar patients plus healthy comparison subjects: emotional > neutral distractors
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex Left 6 –27, –1, 49 160 3.39 3.65
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Right 32 9, 23, 40 155 3.13 3.34
Superior/inferior parietal cortex Left 7 –15, –76, 52 576 3.63 3.96
Right 7 18, –79, 49 398 3.54 3.83
Relatives plus healthy comparison subjects: emotional > neutral distractors
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex Right 48 39, 14, 28 206 3.83 4.33
Right 45 48, 23, 4 58 3.83 4.33
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Right 32 3, 35, 31 281 3.34 3.68
Insula Left 48 –27, 10, –11 74 3.56 3.96
Right 48 33, 14, 7 87 3.54 3.94
Superior/inferior parietal cortex Left 7 –9, –70, 58 476 3.66 4.10
Right 7 12, –61, 61 339 4.01 4.60
Hypomanic personality participants plus healthy comparison subjects: emotional > neutral distractors
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex Right 6 21, 2, 55 50 3.75 4.08
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Left 32 –9, 26, 25 84 3.22 3.44
Insula Left 48 –30, 17, –14 41 4.20 4.68
Right 48 30, 20, –17 19 3.77 4.11
Superior/inferior parietal cortex Left 5 –18, –58, 61 269 4.05 4.48
Right 7 21, –61, 64 191 3.92 4.30
Bipolar patients > healthy comparison subjects: emotional > neutral distractors
Superior/inferior parietal cortex Right 7 30, –64, 64 61 4.01 4.46
a MNI=Montreal Neurological Institute.
b Number of activated voxels.
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cortex, the insula, and the parietal cortex, extending into
the occipital and ventral temporal cortex. Because the
groups did not differ, one mask image for each sample
with these networks was created for the analysis for task 2.
There were no regions with enhanced activation in the
number detection task.
Task 2. To test the influence of emotional distractors on
task processing, we contrasted the arithmetic task trials
presented on emotional images with those presented on
neutral images using the network identified in task 1 as
a mask. For emotional background images, we found
increased activation in the dorsolateral and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex in all three samples
and in the left and right insula in samples 2 and 3 (Table 2,
Figure 2D–F). There were no differences between relatives
or individuals with hypomanic personality and their re-
spective comparison counterparts. However, bipolar patients
exhibited increased activation in the right parietal cortex
compared with healthy comparison subjects (Figure 3).
The difference in the extracted percent signal change
in this region between bipolar patients and healthy
comparison subjects was also larger than that between
the other two groups and their respective comparison
counterparts (D sample 1 compared with D sample 2: t=5.4,
df=76, p,0.001;D sample 1 comparedwithD sample 3: t=4.5,
df=88, p,0.001).
To relate the right parietal activation increase to the
behavioral distraction effect, we correlated the reaction
time increase with the activation increase (i.e., the differ-
ences between emotional and neutral trials). We found
a significant correlation (r=0.45, p,0.01) (Figure 3), which
remained significant when calculating across all partic-
ipants (r=0.32, p,0.005).
There were no regions with enhanced activation in
response to neutral compared with emotional background
images. For the bipolar patients, we also correlated the
observed distraction effect with different clinical variables
(i.e., the medication load, time in remission, age at illness
onset, number of illness episodes, age at first hospitaliza-
tion, and number of previous hospitalizations), but no
significant correlations were observed. Additionally, there
were no significant correlations with scores on the BDI,
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a In panel A, reaction times in task 2 for bipolar patients indicate enlarged distraction effects through emotional background images. In panel
B, activation differences between bipolar patients and healthy comparison subjects (blue) are shown on the main effect of distraction (red [as
displayed in Figure 2D]). Panel C shows the correlation of the reaction time distraction effect and the parietal hyperactivation for mental
arithmetic on emotional background images. Panel D shows the respective percent signal change for bipolar patients and comparison
subjects.
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HAM-D, and Young Mania Rating Scale, with intelligence,
or with years of education (see Table S8 in the data
supplement).
Discussion
The principal finding of this study is that euthymic
bipolar patients experience exacerbated cognitive deficits
under emotional distraction; this deficit is specific to
bipolar patients in contrast to unaffected high-risk in-
dividuals. Bipolar patients exhibited increased response
slowing during the arithmetic task while under emotional
distraction, which was accompanied by a greater activa-
tion increase in a part of the task-related neural network,
the right parietal cortex. That relatives of bipolar patients
and participants with hypomanic personality were in-
distinguishable from their respective comparison counter-
parts suggests that this deficit is a consequence of the
disorder rather than a vulnerability marker.
Neither bipolar patients nor high-risk individuals ex-
hibited alterations in behavior or brain activity during
the nonemotional mental arithmetic task. The identified
neural network underlying mental arithmetic closely con-
forms with previous reports of clusters in the left and right
parietal cortex (19), the dorsolateral and dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (20, 37), and the insula, a common finding in
studies of arithmetic processing (18, 38). The lack of group
differences in behavioral and neural measures of task
performance suggests that there are no general mathe-
matical deficits in remitted bipolar patients and high-risk
individuals. This allowed us to use the resulting activation
patterns for the definition of one arithmetic task-specific
neural network across groups.
When testing for the influence of emotional distractors
on this network, bipolar patients exhibited prolonged
response slowing. Consistent with our previous data from
healthy individuals (18), all participants needed longer to
perform the task while under emotional compared with
neutral distraction, but this effect was largely increased in
the bipolar disorder group. The lack of any effect on error
rates demonstrates that participants were still able to solve
the equations and compensate for the distraction effect.
The fMRI data mirrored this pattern. Task-related activa-
tion, particularly in the left and right parietal cortex, but
also in the dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex,
was increased in all participants under emotional distrac-
tion. Thus, it seems to be the additional recruitment of
task-specific neural resources that enables individuals to
compensate for emotional distraction effects, as has been
previously suggested (18, 39–41). Critically, bipolar pa-
tients exhibited a larger interference effect than healthy
comparison subjects, indicated by further enhanced
activation increase in the right parietal cortex. Together
with the increased response slowing, this suggests that
bipolar patients are more affected by emotional distraction
and need to recruit more task-specific neural resources to
overcome the distraction effects. That is, those with the
greatest distraction-related slowing exhibit the greatest
degree of compensation to maintain accuracy in the face
of slow performance. These results corroborate previous
reports of increased activation in bipolar patients under
emotional distraction in the absence of behavioral deficits
(11, 14–16). The two-step fMRI procedure applied in our
study, however, allows a clear interpretation of the acti-
vation increase as task specific, which is further supported
by the correlation of increased response times with parietal
hyperactivation.
Neither of the studied high-risk populations exhibited
the increased emotional distraction effect observed in
bipolar patients, although in previous studies, abnormal
emotional processing (e.g., in responding to emotional
faces) and emotion regulation have been observed in un-
affected relatives (42–44) and in individuals with hypo-
manic personality (45–47). This selective impairment in
remitted chronic bipolar patients suggests that increased
emotional distractibility is a consequence of bipolar dis-
order that develops after the experience of at least one
illness episode. Emotional stimuli are particularly salient
distractors but seem to have an increased potential to
impair cognition in bipolar disorder, for which an emo-
tional hyperreactivity is well described. The persistent
neuropsychological deficits after bipolar disorder onset
are evidence of vulnerable cognitive processing. Our re-
sults suggest that this vulnerable system cannot manage
emotional distraction as well as before illness onset. In-
terestingly, there was no correlation with current symp-
toms or clinical characteristics, such as the number of
previous episodes, which may suggest that the deficit
occurs after the first illness episode and remains stable
thereafter. Future studies should investigate whether
emotional distractibility is increased during acute episodes,
whether it shows some valence specificity, and whether it
increases with the number of experienced episodes. These
studies should also compare first-onset and chronic bi-
polar patients.
Clinically, our findings are highly relevant with regard to
patients’ functional recovery. Because emotional distrac-
tion leads to neuropsychological dysfunction, which in
turn predicts functional recovery (3, 4), interventions
could include training of selective attention and emotion
regulation, since this may be able to enhance sociofunc-
tional integration in euthymic bipolar patients. Establishing
such an intervention for improving neuropsychological
performance in bipolar patients seems particularly impor-
tant because these patients may attach emotional meaning
even to nonemotional stimuli and tasks (48–50).
There are several limitations to this study. A large
proportion of the tested patients continued to receive
psychotropic medication. While it has been noted that this
may increase generalizability (33), it may also confound
the results. We tested for an influence of medication by
correlating the effects with a composite medication load
1494 ajp.psychiatryonline.org Am J Psychiatry 170:12, December 2013
EMOTIONAL DISTRACTIBILITY IN BIPOLAR DISORDER
score, which has previously been suggested and success-
fully applied (33, 51–53). However, future studies should
include samples large enough to allow contrasting of drug
subgroups and testing for effects in nonmedicated
patients. It may also be possible that our sample sizes
were not large enough to detect small differences; this is
particularly relevant for the comparison of relatives and
participants with hypomanic personality with their re-
spective comparison counterparts. However, here the
analysis was not only based on null effects in this com-
parison, but also on observed differences when compar-
ing bipolar patients with any of the other groups (see the
online data supplement). Because approximately one-half
of the relatives were .30 years old, one might argue that
they do not represent a group at high risk but rather pos-
sess some resilience factor. However, we found no dif-
ferences when directly comparing younger and older
relatives (see the data supplement), which corroborates
the conclusion that the deficit develops only after the ex-
perience of an illness episode.
Conclusions
In summary, our results indicate increased emotional
distractibility as a consequence of bipolar disorder. Hy-
peractivation in task-relevant neural regions is related
to these behavioral deficits. The findings support a role
of disturbed emotion-cognition interactions during the
course of bipolar disorder that could critically hinder
functional recovery and thus should be a specific target of
treatment.
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Accuracy was higher in the number detection condition compared to the arithmetical task (supplement 
Table S3), which was evident in a main effect of task condition across all groups (F(1,77)=12.4, p<.001). 
Regarding reaction times, there were significant main effects of task condition across all groups 
(F(1,77)=53.3, p<.001), with prolonged reactions in the arithmetic compared to the number detection 
task. We found no group effects or interactions with group (all p>.10). 
 
Task 2 
Comparing the three experimental groups and healthy controls, a significant main effect of distractor 
condition on reaction times (F(1,77)=40.6, p<.001) was observed, indicating that participants were 
slower in solving arithmetical problems presented on emotional compared to neutral background 
images (supplement Table S3). 
Additionally, there was an interaction effect of group and distractor condition (F(1,77)=7.4, p<.01) which 
indicated an increased effect of emotional distractors in bipolar patients compared to healthy controls 
and to the other experimental groups (Relatives, Hypomanic personality; all p<.05), while there were no 




The three experimental groups and healthy controls were not significantly different from one another 
with respect to the contrast of arithmetical task with the number detection task. Therefore, for further 
'DWDVXSSOHPHQWIRU.DQVNHHWDOGRLDSSLDMS
analyses of Task 2, we averaged across all groups to yield one mask image with task-specific activations 
(supplement Table S5). 
  
Task 2 
The analysis across all groups corroborated the results of separate analyses comparing each of the 
experimental groups (bipolar patients, relatives, hypomanic personality) to a matched healthy control 
group, showing a significant cluster in a right parietal region for the group by condition interaction 
(supplement Table S5 and Figure S6). Analysis of the extracted % signal change also yielded a significant 
interaction of emotional distractor condition and group (F(3,77) = 3.5, p < .05) as well as a condition 
main effect (F(1,77)=4.3, p<.05). Interaction contrasts showed that the effect of emotional distractors 
was larger in bipolar patients compared to all other groups (all p<.05), while there were no further 
differences between these groups (all p>.35).  
 
'DWDVXSSOHPHQWIRU.DQVNHHWDOGRLDSSLDMS
Table S3: Reaction times and accuracy in Task 1 and Task 2 for bipolar patients, unaffected relatives of 
bipolar patients, individuals with hypomanic personality, and their respective controls, as well as the 22 
selected control participants. 
 
 Task 1 Task 2 
  % correct Reaction time  % correct 
Reaction 
time 
Bipolar  detection 94.6 (11.2) 1.38 (0.36) neutral 80.1 (16.8) 3.6 (0.6) 
patients arithmetic 73.9 (15.8) 3.89 (1.04) emotional 80.7 (14.2) 4.0 (0.6) 
Controls detection 96.4 (4.9) 1.25 (0.31) neutral 90.2 (10.0) 3.5 (0.5) 
  arithmetic 77.7 (13.7) 3.86 (0.48) emotional 88.2 (8.6) 3.6 (0.5) 
Relatives detection 97.6 (3.1) 1.38 (0.46) neutral 85.7 (12.5) 3.5 (0.6) 
 arithmetic 78.2 (12.4) 3.89 (0.47) emotional 85.8 (11.0) 3.6 (0.5) 
Controls detection 95.3 (15.7) 1.03 (1.48) neutral 89.0 (9.3) 3.5 (0.5) 
  arithmetic 77.9 (14.0) 3.77 (0.47) emotional 89.0 (7.1) 3.6 (0.5) 
Hypomanic detection 99.1 (2.0) 1.10 (0.19) neutral 89.2 (13.2) 3.2 (0.5) 
Personality arithmetic 80.5 (13.3) 3.35 (1.21) emotional 87.8 (11.2) 3.4 (0.6) 
Controls detection 98.3 (3.5) 0.87 (0.97) neutral 91.8 (8.6) 3.4 (0.4) 
 arithmetic 76.0 (19.2) 3.63 (0.44) emotional 90.8 (5.9) 3.5 (0.4) 
Controls detection 98.5 (2.7) 1.18 (0.28) neutral 90.8 (8.4) 3.5 (0.4) 





Table S4: Activations in Task 1 for mental arithmetic vs. number detection for bipolar patients, 
unaffected relatives of bipolar patients, individuals with hypomanic personality, and their respective 
controls. 
 
 H BA MNI coordinates Cs CI Z 
   x y z    
Bipolar patients + Controls: arithmetic > number detection 
dorsolateral prefrontal L 44 -42 5 28  a 7.44 
 R 6 30 -1 52  a 6.57 
dorsomedial prefrontal L 6 -6 11 52 2423 a >8.21 
 R 32 9 23 34  a 6.14 
Insula L 48 -33 20 -2  a 7.48 
 R 48 33 23 -2 316 c 7.48 
superior/inferior parietal L 7 -24 -64 40 4710 d >8.21 
 R 7 21 -70 49  d 7.40 
occipital/ventral temporal L 19 -45 -70 -8  d 7.18 
 R 19 -42 -82 4  d 6.56 
Relatives + Controls: arithmetic > number detection 
dorsolateral prefrontal L 6 -27 -1 52  a 5.47 
 R 6 30 2 55 182 b 6.78 
dorsomedial prefrontal L 32 -3 11 49  c 5.85 
 R 32 6 17 46 503 c 7.38 
Insula L 48 -33 20 1 1242 a 7.19 
 R 48 36 23 1 629 d >8.21 
superior/inferior parietal L 7 -24 -61 43 3467 e 7.58 
 R 40 35 -46 43  e 7.10 
occipital/ventral temporal L 19 -45 -76 -2  e 5.73 
 R 19 30 -76 7 179 f 5.67 
Hypomanic personality + Controls: arithmetic > number detection 
dorsolateral prefrontal L 6 -48 2 45  a 5.89 
 R 6 30 2 61 239 b 7.49 
dorsomedial prefrontal R 32 6 17 49 2483 c >8.21 
insula L 48 -30 20 -2  c >8.21 
 R 48 36 23 -5 650 d >8.21 
superior/inferior parietal L 7 -24 -70 41 5122 a >8.21 
 R 40 39 -43 43  a >8.21 
occipital/ventral temporal L 19 -42 -79 4  a 5.85 
  R 19 27 -79 7  a 5.05 
 
H = Hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area; CS = Cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI = cluster index 
(all peaks of an activation cluster are identified by the same letter; the cluster peaks are displayed in 
bold letters) 
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Table S5: Activations in Task 1 for mental arithmetic vs. number detection and Task 2 for mental 
arithmetic on emotional vs. neutral distractor images for bipolar patients, unaffected relatives of bipolar 
patients, individuals with hypomanic personality, and the 22 selected control participants. 
 
 H BA MNI coordinates Cs CI Z 
   x y z    
arithmetic > number detection 
dorsolateral prefrontal L 44 -42 5 28  a >8.21 
 R 44 45 5 31  a 7.49 
dorsomedial prefrontal L 32 -3 11 52  a >8.21 
 R 32 6 17 49  a >8.21 
insula L 48 -33 20 -2  a >8.21 
 R 48 36 20 -2 
1638
6 a >8.21 
superior/inferior parietal L 7 -24 -64 40  a >8.21 
 R 7 27 -61 46  a >8.21 
occipital/ventral temporal L 19 -47 -70 -11  a >8.21 
 R 19 48 -70 -14  a 6.51 
emotional > neutral distractors 
dorsolateral prefrontal R 46 39 38 31 43 a 5.07 
 L 45 -42 29 28 58 b 5.19 
dorsomedial prefrontal R 32 3 17 49 435 c 7.61 
insula L 48 -30 23 1 203 d 6.79 
 R 48 33 20 4 219 e 6.89 
superior/inferior parietal L 7 -24 -64 43 4953 f 7.77 
 R 7 27 -61 49  f 7.35 
Interaction group  x condition 
superior/inferior parietal R 7 27 -58 49 324 a 5.83 
 
H = Hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area; CS = Cluster size in number of activated voxels; CI = cluster index 











Figure S6: Activations in the right parietal cortex for the interaction of group and distractor condition (A) 
as well as the respective difference in % signal change for mental arithmetic on emotional vs. neutral 







Supplementary Analysis S7 
 
To probe the influence of age on the effect in the unaffected first-degree relatives of bipolar patients, 
we conducted a series of analyses. We first split the group of relatives in those above and below 30 
years of age. This yielded two relatively equally sized groups of N = 9 (< 30) and N = 8 (> 30). We then 
directly contrasted the two age groups, which did not yield any significant differences (even when 
lowering the threshold to an uncorrected p < .001).  
We then compared each of the two age groups to their respective healthy control participants. If the 
effect reflects a resilience characteristic, it should only be observed in the comparison of the older 
relatives to their controls, not in the younger group that is still at risk. This was, however, not the case. 
As the power of this small sample is limited, we also compared the size of the effect to that in bipolar 
patients. The effect size of these comparisons (young  relatives  ƞ2=.070;  old  relatives  ƞ2=.050) calculated 
on the extracted % signal change was less than half the size of that found in bipolar patients and their 
controls  (ƞ2=.157). 
We also correlated the parietal activation increase for emotional over neutral background images with 
age in the group of relatives, but observed no significant correlation (p > .20). Furthermore, we included 
age as a covariate in the analysis of Sample 2, which did not yield different results. 
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Table S8: Correlation of the reaction time and right parietal activation distraction effect with clinical and 
other characteristics in bipolar patients. 
 
 
Reaction time  
(emo - neu) 
  
r parietal activation 





medication load .047 .835 
  
-.002 .994 
time in remission .291 .189 
  
.057 .802 
age at disease onset .346 .115 
  
-.327 .138 
# of illness episodes .104 .646 
  
.089 .692 
age at first hospitalization .319 .170 
  
-.299 .201 
# of previous hospitalizations -.241 .293 
  
.191 .406 
BDI -.011 .962 
  
.110 .624 
HAMD -.249 .276 
  
-.249 .277 
YMRS .183 .428 
  
-.156 .500 
intelligence -.124 .591 
  
.083 .720 






 123 5  Experiments 
5.3  Electroencephalographic correlates of biased information processing 
 
This section describes a study establishing a paradigm to implicitly assess biased 
information processing. Healthy participants were tested and the effects were 
associated with inter-individual variations in depression related traits. 
 
 Schick, A., Wessa, M., Vollmayr, B., Kuehner, C., Kanske, P. (2013). Indirect 
assessment of an interpretation bias in humans: Neurophysiological and 
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Affective state can influence cognition leading to biased information processing,
interpretation, attention, and memory. Such bias has been reported to be essential for
the onset and maintenance of different psychopathologies, particularly affective disorders.
However, empirical evidence has been very heterogeneous and little is known about
the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying cognitive bias and its time-course. We
therefore investigated the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli as indicators of biased
information processing with an ambiguous cue-conditioning paradigm. In an acquisition
phase, participants learned to discriminate two tones of different frequency, which
acquired emotional and motivational value due to subsequent feedback (monetary
gain or avoidance of monetary loss). In the test phase, three additional tones of
intermediate frequencies were presented, whose interpretation as positive (approach
of reward) or negative (avoidance of punishment), indicated by a button press, was
used as an indicator of the bias. Twenty healthy volunteers participated in this paradigm
while a 64-channel electroencephalogram was recorded. Participants also completed
questionnaires assessing individual differences in depression and rumination. Overall,
we found a small positive bias, which correlated negatively with reflective pondering, a
type of rumination. As expected, reaction times were increased for intermediate tones.
ERP amplitudes between 300 and 700ms post-stimulus differed depending on the
interpretation of the intermediate tones. A negative compared to a positive interpretation
led to an amplitude increase over frontal electrodes. Our study provides evidence
that in humans, as in animal research, the ambiguous cue-conditioning paradigm is a
valid procedure for indirectly assessing ambiguous cue interpretation and a potential
interpretation bias, which is sensitive to individual differences in affect-related traits.
Keywords: ERP, N200, LPP, cognitive bias, rumination, reflective pondering
INTRODUCTION
Affective states, including depression, can strongly affect cognitive
processes, such as attention, memory, appraisal, and decision-
making (Mathews and Macleod, 1994; Beck, 2008; Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010; Disner et al., 2011). It has been proposed that
a negatively biased interpretation of ambiguous situations results
from facilitated attentional processes through emotions (affective
priming theories; Bower, 1981; Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen
et al., 1987). This theoretical consideration originates from the
semantic network theory, which assumes that associated mem-
ories are more easily accessible through a process of “spreading
activation” (Anderson and Bower, 1973). In that respect, cogni-
tive theories of depression posit that negative schemata, which
are dysfunctional mental representations about the self, trigger
a mood congruent interpretation of a distinct situation as good
or bad, which itself has consequences on the emotional state of
an individual (Beck, 1976). An enduring vicious circle of nega-
tive interpretation bias and negative emotional states might then
lead to the development of psychopathological conditions, such as
affective disorders (Mathews and Macleod, 2005). Indeed, some
empirical evidence for negative attention, memory, and inter-
pretation bias related to depression has been provided; however,
the results are mixed, probably due to specifics in the selection
of stimulus material and assessment of the bias. While studies
using questionnaires with ambiguous stories were able to detect
a negative interpretation bias in depression (Butler and Mathews,
1983; Berna et al., 2011), other studies that used measures like
response latency or startle reflex were only in part successful.
Lawson and Macleod (1999) studied the naming latency of words
in positive or negative valence presented after an affective prime
sentence and found no relation to scores in the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1996). In contrast, participants with
a higher BDI score showed larger startle reflex amplitudes elicited
by ambiguous merge words compared to neutral stimuli (Lawson
et al., 2002). This is in line with the hypotheses of a negative
interpretation bias in depression as the startle reflex amplitude is
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known to be increased after negative stimuli (Bradley et al., 1990;
Lang et al., 1990).
Apart from clinical depression, individual coping style has
been proposed to influence the interpretation of a situation as
positive or negative. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995)
have shown that rumination, a coping style that refers to focusing
one’s attention and thoughts on negative aspects of a situation
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), leads to more negative interpre-
tations of hypothetical situations. Using more explicit measures
of cognitive bias, Kuehner and Huffziger (2012) showed that
an induced ruminative self-focus after negative mood induction
significantly increased dysfunctional depressiogenic attitudes in
healthy individuals.
The heterogeneity of results in clinical as well as analogous
samples (e.g., healthy individuals with elevated induced or nat-
urally occurring negative mood), might, at least in part, result
from methodological difficulties with experimental tasks that
were used to assess biased information processing (see above).
In the present study, we therefore adopted an ambiguous cue-
conditioning paradigm from animal research that indirectly
assesses biased information processing. In an acquisition phase,
participants first learn to discriminate two tones of different fre-
quency, which are followed by either a positive or a negative
consequence. This part of the paradigm is similar to affective
(or evaluative) conditioning which has been shown to be effec-
tive in various fields of research (De Houwer et al., 2001). Using
a learning procedure similar to affective conditioning and pair-
ing stimuli with reinforcers has repeatedly led to valence transfer
as reported in the visual (Stolarova et al., 2006; Schacht et al.,
2012) and auditory domain (Laufer and Paz, 2012). In a second
phase of the paradigmparticipants are confronted with additional
tones of intermediate frequency that are not reinforced. The
response to these ambiguous tones is used as an indicator of an
interpretation bias.
This experimental setup has several advantages. First, the audi-
tory cues are indeed neutral in the beginning of the experimental
procedure and have no negative or positive connotation. Also,
as the intermediate tones are never followed by feedback, they
are truly ambiguous which is essential for a cognitive bias to
affect decision-making. This is in contrast to a study by Anderson
et al. (2012), who applied a similar paradigm to assess emo-
tional biases. In this study, however, the intermediate tones were
also reinforced, which renders them non-ambiguous and, there-
fore, did not allow for the detection of an inherent interpretation
bias. Second, this experimental setup was initially developed in
rodents (e.g., Harding et al., 2004; Enkel et al., 2010). Its adapta-
tion to human research paves the way for translational research
that offers new possibilities for identifying neural and molecular
mechanisms underlying biased information processing as well as
the potential of developing new treatment strategies. Using such
an ambiguous cue-conditioning paradigm, Enkel et al. (2010)
successfully distinguished between congenitally non-helpless and
helpless rats, which served as an animal model of depression.
Moreover, Richter et al. (2012) showed that the negative bias
of helpless rats was decreased after enrichment supporting the
idea of using such bias as a measurement sensitive to depression
treatment.
To also elucidate the neural time-course underlying biased
information processing, we assessed event-related brain poten-
tials (ERPs) of the EEG. Promising potentials include the N2
component, peaking around 200ms post-stimulus over fronto-
central electrode sites, which is associated with cognitive control
and response conflict (Folstein and Van Petten, 2008). In the
present study, ambiguous stimuli make demands on cognitive
control processes (e.g., in cancelling a prepared response) and
induce response conflict due to perceptual similarity and unclear
response demands. N2 amplitude increases have been reported
for increasing perceptual similarity (Folstein and Van Petten,
2004) and for increasing difficulty to discriminate ambiguous
stimuli (Szmalec et al., 2008).
In addition, a positive deflection of the ERP starting around
300ms post-stimulus has been consistently related to emotion
and arousal (see Olofsson et al., 2008). As discussed by Kissler
et al. (2009), this potential has been variously termed P3, late
positive potential (LPP), or late positive complex (LPC). For
the present study, we will use the term LPP for this positivity.
There is evidence showing it to be increased for emotional stim-
uli (Foti et al., 2009; Hajcak et al., 2010; Kaestner and Polich,
2011) even when controlling for arousal (e.g., Rozenkrants and
Polich, 2008; Kaestner and Polich, 2011; Feng et al., 2012) and it
is also related to subjective intensity ratings of emotion (Cuthbert
et al., 2000). Interestingly, it has also been reported to differentiate
between negatively and positively conditioned stimuli (Schacht
et al., 2012).
Late positive ERP components with a maximum over frontal
electrode sites have also been associated with executive processes
involved in categorization (Folstein and Van Petten, 2011) and
there is evidence for an interaction between categorization and
emotional valence modulating the LPP. In categorization tasks,
negative stimuli have been found to elicit larger LPPs than either
positive or neutral stimuli (Kanske and Kotz, 2007). Here again,
the interpretation of the ambiguous tones may be reflected in the
LPP amplitude. Therefore, in the present study, the LPP may be
increased for reference tones because of their association with
reward and punishment and could also reflect the differential
processing of positively and negatively interpreted ambiguous
tones.
In sum, the main goal of the present study was to test the
described ambiguous cue-conditioning paradigm in humans.
Therefore, we aimed at (1) establishing that the intermediate
tones are perceived as ambiguous by comparing reference and
intermediate tones, and (2) elucidating the processing of nega-
tively and positively interpreted ambiguous stimuli. As pointed
out above, interpretation of ambiguous stimuli is influenced by
affective states and cognitive styles. We therefore assessed cur-
rent affect, depression, and rumination. We hypothesized that
ambiguity of the intermediate tones would be reflected in uncer-
tain response choices, increased response times, and increased
amplitudes of the N2 due to difficult discriminability and unclear
response demands resulting in response conflict. We also expected
LPP amplitudes to be increased for the non-ambiguous refer-
ence tones because of their greater behavioral relevance and
associated affective salience. We further hypothesized the specific
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli to be reflected in differential
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ERP responses, specifically LPP amplitudes, which might show
increases for negatively interpreted tones.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were recruited via advertisements at the universities
of Mannheim and Heidelberg. They received course credits
and obtained the monetary gain from the ambiguous cue-
conditioning task according to their task performance (see below
for details). In total, 20 participants (10 women) with a mean
age of 24.2 years (SD = 9.1) took part in the experiment. All
had normal or corrected to normal vision and normal hear-
ing. One participant reported to be left-handed. Since we had
no lateralization hypotheses and as the results did not change,
when excluding this participant, we report data with this par-
ticipant included. None of the participants reported a history of
head injuries, tinnitus, or mental disorders. After being informed
about the experiment the participants gave written informed con-
sent. The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee of
Heidelberg University and was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
MATERIALS
Stimuli consisted of five sinusoidal tones with a fundamental fre-
quency between 1000 and 1164Hz. They were selected so that all
tones had a distance of 0.25 Bark (f1 = 1000Hz, f2 = 1038Hz,
f3 = 1078Hz, f4 = 1120Hz, f5 = 1164Hz). The total duration of
the tones was 250ms with a linear ramp of 20ms. For feedback a
yellow smiley or a red frowney were presented (see Figure 1).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Participants were tested in an electrically shielded room in a sin-
gle experimental session. They were seated in front of a monitor
screen (1m distance). To adjust the loudness of the tones to the
individual hearing level, participants were presented a sinusoidal
tone of 1000Hz, which decreased in loudness, and pressed a but-
ton as long as they heard the tone. This procedure was repeated 10
times. The intensity of the test tones was then scaled according to
the individual hearing level (Moore, 2003). The experimental task
was to discriminate two reference tones (tone 1 and 5) by pressing
one of two buttons with their right index or middle finger, respec-
tively. One of the reference tones is referred to as “positive tone”
(PT) as it acquired positive valence over the course of the exper-
iment through positive feedback (smiley) and monetary gain
(15 cents) after a correct button press. If participants responded
incorrectly to this tone, they were informed that they had “missed
the chance to win” money. In this case, a picture of a crossed smi-
ley was shown. The other reference tone is referred to as “negative
tone” (NT), as participants lost 15 cents when they pressed the
incorrect button and negative feedback (frowney) was presented.
By pressing the correct button to the NT, participants could pre-
vent money loss and were presented with a crossed frowney and
the information that loss of money had been avoided. If partici-
pants did not press any button within a response window of 1 s,
they either lost money when the NT was presented or missed the
chance to win money when the PT was presented. Each trial was
comprised of a tone lasting 250ms, a response window of 750ms,
FIGURE 1 | Ambiguous cue-conditioning paradigm. PT, positive tone;
NPT, near-positive tone; MT, middle tone; NNT, near-negative tone; NT,
negative tone. Participants were instructed to press a button after each
tone to obtain reward or avoid loss of reward (0.15 €). After the button
press participants received a feedback. In case of a correct identification of
the positive tone, they saw a smiley indicating a monetary gain. For a
wrong button press or no response, they saw a crossed smiley indicating
that they had missed the chance to earn money. A correct identification of
the negative tone was followed by a picture of a crossed frowney indicating
that they had successfully avoided loosing money; for a wrong button
press, participants lost money and saw a frowney. No feedback was
presented after intermediate tones (NPT, MT, NNT) and after 4% of the
reference tones (PT, NT). The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was jittered between
1800 and 2200ms.
the following feedback lasting 1 s and, finally, a jittered inter-trial
interval of 2 s on average (randomly selected between 1800 and
2200ms) (see Figure 1). Participants were randomly assigned to
one of four counterbalanced conditions with respect to the fin-
ger used for button presses and the fundamental frequency of
PT and NT.
During a brief learning and a training session, participants
learned to discriminate PT and NTs. First, both tones were pre-
sented five times each and participants were told how to respond
(learning session). Second, discrimination of reference tones was
practiced with 40 randomized trials (training session). In the
experimental test phase, three additional tones were presented
(66 times each) in addition to the two reference tones (PT, NT;
282 times each). The three additional tones were intermediate in
frequency (see section Materials) and labeled near-positive tone
(NPT), middle tone (MT), and near-negative tone (NNT). The
three intermediate tones were not followed by any feedback to
render them fully ambiguous. All tones were presented in pseudo-
randomized order. Furthermore, during the test phase 24 (4%) of
the reference tones (12 PT, 12 NT) were also presented without
feedback to cover the presence of intermediate tones. Thus, a total
of 222 tones were presented without feedback, another 540 trials
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(270 PT, 270 NT) were presented with positive or negative feed-
back. All tones without feedback were less frequent than reference
tones with feedback to cover their presence and to keep the partic-
ipants motivated. Participants were instructed to respond to each
tone by pressing one of the two buttons and they were informed
that not every trial would have a feedback. The test phase was
divided into six blocks of 127 trials, each lasting about 8min. At
the end of each block participants had a break of 2min in which
they were informed about the total amount of money won up to
that point.
QUESTIONNAIRES
Several questionnaires were used to explore inter-individual dif-
ferences in emotional state and trait variables. We measured cur-
rent depression with the German version of the Beck Depression
Inventory II (Beck et al., 1996; Hautzinger et al., 2006), a 21 item
self-report questionnaire. To investigate strategies for coping with
depressive symptoms participants completed a German version
of the Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991), which tests for two subcomponents of rumination: “reflec-
tive pondering” and “brooding” (10 items; Gonzalez et al., 2003;
Kuehner and Huffziger, 2012). Furthermore, participants com-
pleted the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (20 Items; Watson
et al., 1988) immediately before the ambiguous cue-conditioning
task.
EEG RECORDING
During the ambiguous cue-conditioning task, a continuous
64 channel EEG was recorded using Ag/AgCl-electrodes posi-
tioned according to the international 10/20 system. The signals
were amplified by Neuroscan Synamp amplifiers (Compumedics,
Charlotte, NC, USA), digitized at a rate of 500Hz and recorded
by Neuroscan Scan 4 Acquire software (Compumedics, Charlotte,
NC, USA). The right mastoid was used as on-line reference and
an electrode positioned on the sternum was used as ground elec-
trode. Another electrode was placed on the left mastoid (for
offline re-referencing). Horizontal eye movements were recorded
from two electrodes placed lateral to both eyes, while two elec-
trodes placed above and below the right eye registered vertical
eye movements. Impedances of all electrodes were kept below
15 kOhm.
DATA ANALYSIS
For the EEG data analyses, Brain Vision Analyzer software (Brain
Products GmbH, Munich) was used. The pre-processing of the
EEG data included re-referencing to the mean of the mastoids
and down-sampling to 200Hz. Then, the data were filtered (0.1–
30Hz) to remove high- and low-frequency waves and the data
were visually inspected to check for artifacts. To correct for eye
movement artifacts, we performed an independent component
analysis (Comon, 1994). In a next step, segments of 1200ms start-
ing 200ms pre-stimulus and ending 1000ms after stimulus onset
were created. Using the semiautomatic artifact rejection tool, seg-
ments were excluded if theminimum andmaximum amplitude in
a segment differed by more than 300µV. To obtain event-related
potentials (ERPs), the segments were averaged relative to a 200ms
pre-stimulus baseline.
For the statistical analyses of behavioral, questionnaire, and
ERP data, SPSS Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) was
used. To test for effects of ambiguity we compared behavioral
and ERP responses to the reference and to the intermediate tones.
Because of the very low number of incorrect responses to the ref-
erence tones, only the correct response trials were included for
analyses of reaction time and ERP data. To analyze the partici-
pants’ response choice, a difference score between the frequencies
of the two response options (positive, negative) was calculated,
reflecting the degree of uncertainty in associating a tone with
a response. This difference score was then compared between
reference and intermediate tones.
To test for effects of interpretation biases, we analyzed the
responses to the three intermediate tones since the participants’
response reflects the categorization of the ambiguous tones as
either predicting reward or punishment. Here, we calculated
3× 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors tone (NNT,
MT, NPT) and response (positive, negative). Also, to obtain an
overall measure of the cognitive bias, which can be correlated
with questionnaire scores, we calculated a bias score defined as
the mean of all responses to the three intermediate tones. A
response to avoid punishment (negative response) was calcu-
lated as−1 while a response to obtain reward (positive response)
counted +1. A positive bias score indicates more positive than
negative responses, while a negative bias score indicates more
negative than positive responses to the ambiguous tones. An
independent sample t-test was computed to test for gender dif-
ferences in the bias score. To test if the bias changed during the
test phase, a One-Way ANOVA with the factor block (1–6) was
calculated.
In this study, ERP analyses focused on N2 and LPP. Based
on the literature (Folstein and Van Petten, 2008) we extracted
the mean activity in the time window from 180 to 240ms post-
stimulus for analyzing the conflict-related N2 component. For
LPP analyses, we first calculated an omnibus ANOVA of the
mean activity with the factors tone (NNT, NPT, MT), response
(positive, negative), and electrode for consecutive time windows
of 100ms up to 1000ms. These analyses showed a significant
response by electrode interaction in the time window from 300
to 700ms. For the analyses of the ambiguity effect we chose a
shorter time window from 0 to 500ms for the omnibus ANOVA
with the factor ambiguity (reference tones, intermediate tones)
and electrode since analyses of the later time windows would be
confounded by feedback-related activity that occurred on aver-
age 540ms post-stimulus (as a feedback was only presented after
reference tones, not after the intermediate tones). Based on the
results obtained here we focused further analyses on the time win-
dow from 300 to 500ms. We then exported mean activity in the
time range 300–500ms (early LPP) and 300–700ms (late LPP)
and performed analyses per electrode. Based on these analyses we
defined two regions of interest (frontal: F1, Fz, F2, FC1, FCz, and
FC2; posterior: P1, Pz, P2, PO3, POz, and PO4) that we included
in further analyses.
To link behavioral data with ERP results and question-
naire data, we computed bivariate Spearman correlations. For
all analyses significant thresholds of p < 0.05 were used and
significant main effects and interactions were followed up
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with Bonferroni corrected post-hoc paired comparisons or con-





Participants were well able to discriminate the two reference tones
as indicated by 86.9% (SD = 20) correct responses in the train-
ing session. In the following test phase, the percentage of correct
responses to the reference tones was similarly high (mean percent-
age of correct responses: 87.0%; SD = 7), despite the presentation
of additional intermediate tones (see Figure 2A).
To test for the effects of ambiguity on response choice, we
compared responses to the reference and to the intermediate
tones. Specifically, we compared the absolute difference between
the percentage of positive and negative button presses. For the
reference tones, this yielded a mean difference score of 81.73%
(SD = 11.56). For the intermediate tones the index was 45.68%
(SD = 13.70), indicating a more undetermined response pattern.
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factor ambiguity (refer-
ence tones, intermediate tones) was significant [F(1) = 143.73;
p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.88].
To check for effects of interpretation biases, we compared the
number of negative and positive responses to the three inter-
mediate tones. A repeated measures ANOVA with tones (NNT,
MT, NPT) and responses (negative, positive) yielded a signifi-
cant effect of tone [F(1.07) = 12.13; p < 0.01; partial η2 = 0.39],
which points to differences between NNT and MT (p < 0.001),
as well as NPT and MT (p < 0.001) as indicated by pairwise
comparisons. A significant tone by response interaction [F(1) =
189.72; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.91] was driven by a higher per-
centage of positive responses to NPT and a higher percentage
of negative responses to NNT [F(1) = 355.40; p < 0.001; partial
η2 = 0.95].
Reaction time
Figure 2B displays the reaction time data for all tone and response
combinations. To test for the effect of ambiguity on reaction
times, we again compared reference and intermediate tones. This
effect was significant indicating that participants responded faster
to the reference compared to the intermediate tones [F(1) =
27.64; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.59].
To test for the effect of interpretation biases, the three inter-
mediate tones were compared with repeated measures ANOVA
with the factors tone (NPT, MT, NNT) and response (positive,
negative). This analysis showed a significant tone by response
interaction [F(2) = 18.45; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.49]. Post-hoc
contrasts showed that this interaction was due to faster responses
to obtain reward than to avoid punishment after NPT [F(1) =
19.44; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.51] and faster responses to avoid
punishment than to obtain reward after NNT [F(1) = 11.85; p <
0.005; partial η2 = 0.38]. Positive and negative responses to MT
were equally fast (p > 0.90).
Individual differences in bias score
In the current sample the bias score was slightly positive with
a mean of 3.95 (SD = 44.8) but not significantly different from
0 [t(19) = 3.94; p = 0.70]. To test if the bias changed through-
out the experiment, we calculated a One-Way ANOVA with the
factor block, which was not significant indicating constant inter-
pretation of the intermediate tones across the six experimental
blocks (p > 0.5). We also observed no gender differences (p >
0.5). Furthermore, there was no significant correlation of cog-
nitive bias with current mood (PANAS) and depression (BDI;
all p > 0.5). We did, however, observe a significant correlation
between the bias score and the reflective pondering subscale of the
RSQ, indicating that participants with a higher score in reflective
pondering displayed a more negative bias (ρ = −0.50; p = 0.025;
see Figure 3) while the brooding subscale did not correlate with
the bias score (p > 0.5).
FIGURE 2 | (A) Percentage of chosen responses (and SD) to avoid punishment (negative response) and obtain reward (positive response) for each of the five
tones. (B) Mean reaction times (and SD) to the five tones.
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ERP RESULTS
Across conditions the following ERP components were detected:
a negative deflection peaking around 200ms after tone onset (N2)
and a positive deflection starting around 300ms after tone onset
(LPP).
In order to define the latency range of these components we
calculated several omnibus ANOVAs per electrode. Besides the
FIGURE 3 | Correlation of the cognitive bias score with the reflective
pondering subscale of the Response Style Questionnaire (p < 0.05;
ρ = −0.501).
effect for electrode in each time window, we obtained a significant
effect for ambiguity from 400 to 500ms [F(60) = 10.24; p < 0.01;
partial η2 = 0.39] and significant interactions for ambiguity and
electrode [300–400ms: F(60) = 1.83; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.1;
400–500ms: F(60) = 2.56; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.14]. Further
analyses focused on the time window from 300 to 500ms.
For the interpretation bias effect omnibus ANOVAs revealed
main effects for electrode in each time window and in addi-
tion effects for response in the time window from 300 to 400ms
[F(1) = 4.4; p < 0.05; partial η2 = 0.22] and from 600 to 700ms
[F(1) = 11.76; p < 0.01; partial η2 = 0.4]. Further, the analy-
ses showed a significant response by electrode interaction in the
time windows from 300 to 400ms [F(60) = 2.6; p < 0.001; partial
η2 = 0.14], from 400 to 500ms [F(60) = 2.0; p < 0.001; partial
η2 = 0.11], from 500 to 600ms [F(60) = 1.9; p < 0.001; partial
η2 = 0.11] and from 600 to 700ms [F(60) = 1.68; p < 0.001; par-
tial η2 = 0.1]. Thus, analyses focused on the time window from
300 to 700ms.
Ambiguity effect
To test for the effects of ambiguity, we calculated an ANOVA
with the factors ambiguity (reference tones, intermediate tones)
and region (anterior, posterior). For the early LPP time window
(300–500ms), we identified significant main effects of ambigu-
ity [F(1) = 6.0; p < 0.05; partial η2 = 0.27] and region [F(1) =
54.75; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.78]. As shown in Figure 4, early
LPP amplitudes were larger for reference compared to ambigu-
ous tones and over posterior compared to anterior electrodes. The
interaction of ambiguity and region was not significant (p > 0.1).
For the N2, only a significant effect of region [F(1) = 79.45; p <
0.001; partial η2 = 0.82] with larger N2 amplitudes over frontal
FIGURE 4 | Ambiguity effect: ERPs after reference tones (black) and
intermediate tones (green). (A) Event-related activity averaged over
frontal electrodes (F1, Fz, F2, FC1, FCz, FC2). (B) Event-related activity
averaged over posterior electrodes (P1, Pz, P2, PO3, POz, PO4). (C)
Maps display the activity difference of the reference tones and correct
responses minus ambiguous tones and all responses in µV in the time
windows 180–240ms (N2), 300–500ms (early LPP) and 501–700ms (late
LPP) post-stimulus.
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compared to posterior electrodes was found. Further main effects
or interactions were not significant (all p > 0.5, see Figure 4).
Interpretation bias effect
To test for indicators of different processing of positively or
negatively interpreted stimuli, we compared intermediate tones
with positive and negative responses. Therefore, we conducted
repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors tone (NPT, MT,
NNT), response (positive, negative), and region (frontal, poste-
rior). For the LPP in the time window 300–700ms post-stimulus
there were significant effects of response [F(1) = 4.55; p < 0.05;
partial η2 = 0.22] with larger amplitudes after negative responses
and a main effect of region with larger amplitudes over poste-
rior electrode sides [F(1) = 65.08; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.80].
Besides, there was a significant response by region interaction
[F(1) = 11.21; p < 0.01; partial η2 = 0.41]. Over frontal elec-
trodes, amplitudes were increased after negatively, as opposed
to positively, categorized intermediate tones [F(1) = 11.11; p <
0.01; partial η2 = 0.41], while there were no effects over posterior
electrode sites (all p > 0.5; see Figure 5). For the N2, a significant
effect of region [F(1) = 63.29; p < 0.001; partial η2 = 0.78] with
larger N2 amplitudes over frontal compared to posterior elec-
trodes was found. Further main effects or interactions were not
significant in this time range (all p > 0.5, see Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
The current study employed an ambiguous cue-conditioning
paradigm for the indirect assessment of an affect-related inter-
pretation bias and investigated the related neurophysiological
correlates with EEG. In contrast to instrumental conditioning
procedures, this paradigm comprised a second stage introduc-
ing additional stimuli intermediate in frequency to the learned
ones. Ambiguity of these intermediate tones could be established
with participants responding slower and with less certainty when
confronted with the intermediate tones. In the current sample of
healthy individuals, a small positive cognitive bias was observed
which was associated with inter-individual differences in rumina-
tive coping style, i.e., reflective pondering. Higher scores in reflec-
tive pondering were related to a more negative bias. Also, the data
yield insight into the time-course of ambiguous stimulus inter-
pretation showing decreases in LPP amplitudes after ambiguous
tone presentation, but no N2 effect. Moreover, we observed dif-
ferences in ERP amplitudes depending on the interpretation of
the ambiguous stimuli: frontal LPP amplitudes were increased for
negatively compared to positively interpreted intermediate tones.
AMBIGUITY EFFECT
For the validity of the present paradigm it is essential that
the intermediate tones are perceived as ambiguous with regard
to what potential outcome they predict. Evidence for this is
the increased response uncertainty that participants showed by
selecting positive and negative responses equally often after the
intermediate tones, while the responses to the reference tones
were either clearly positive or negative. Additionally, response
times were longer for intermediate tones also indicating increased
response uncertainty (Szmalec et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2012).
The collected ERP data can shed light on the time-course of
processing ambiguity in the intermediate tones. In contrast to
our hypotheses, we observed no effect of ambiguity on the N2.
As ambiguity has been conceptualized as representing a form of
cognitive conflict (Szmalec et al., 2008), we would have expected
to see increased N2 amplitudes for ambiguous vs. reference tones,
analogous to incongruent vs. congruent stimuli in conflict tasks
like the flanker or Stroop (van Veen and Carter, 2002). A critical
FIGURE 5 | Interpretation bias effect: ERP amplitudes for positive (blue)
and negative responses (red) to the intermediate tones. (A) Frontal region
of interest. (B) Posterior region of interest. (C) Activity difference of
ambiguous tones and positive responses minus ambiguous tones and
negative responses in µV in the time windows 180–240ms (N2), 300–500ms
(early LPP) and 501–700ms (late LPP) post-stimulus onset.
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difference from previous reports of N2 increases for ambiguous
stimuli (Szmalec et al., 2008) is the affective context in the present
study. Szmalec et al. (2008) also had participants differentiate
two tones of variably perceptual similarity, but responses were
not associated with reward or punishment. Positive and negative
emotional stimuli, however, have been shown to modulate pro-
cessing of cognitive conflict and the related N2 amplitude (Kanske
and Kotz, 2010, 2011). In particular, the N2 is enlarged for stimuli
of greater emotionality, reflecting increased recruitment of cogni-
tive control processes (for an overview see Kanske, 2012). In the
present study, it could be argued that the reference tones possess
more emotional salience due to their association with potential
monetary gain or loss, thus recruiting more cognitive control
resources. This may have raised N2 amplitudes to the level of the
ambiguous tones. The pattern of LPP amplitude changes corrob-
orates this explanation. We observed increased LPP amplitudes
for the reference compared to the intermediate tones, which sug-
gests that the reference tones were perceived as more salient. The
LPP has been consistently found to be increased for emotional
and arousing stimuli of different modalities (Cuthbert et al., 2000;
Schupp et al., 2003; Foti et al., 2009; Schacht and Sommer, 2009;
Hajcak et al., 2010). In addition, P3 which peaks in a similar time
range has been associated with task relevance (for a review see
Kok, 2001). In the present study, task relevance is arguably higher
for the reference tones, as they are followed bymonetary gains and
losses, while the responses to the intermediate tones are without
consequences.
In sum, the ERP data suggest that the reference tones in
the present task were of higher salience than the intermediate
tones, reflected in increased LPP amplitudes, which may have
overridden an ambiguity effect in the N2 time window.
Since participants were presented with a visual feedback after
the reference tones (which occurred on average 540ms after stim-
ulus onset), but not after the intermediate tones, the ERP cannot
be meaningfully interpreted in the late LPP time window. The late
positive deflection which is increased for reference compared to
intermediate tones from 540ms post-stimulus onwards is most
likely due to this visual stimulation.
INTERPRETATION BIAS EFFECT
A second question we addressed concerned the differences in
processing between positive and negative interpretations of the
ambiguous intermediate tones. The absence of a strong overall
bias means that about half of the intermediate tones were inter-
preted negatively and positively. This pattern varied, however, as
NPT and NNTs were interpreted more often as positive and neg-
ative, respectively. Interpretations in the opposite direction (e.g.,
a negative response to a NPT) were also slowed down. The major
question here was whether the decision to respond to a tone pos-
itively or negatively is associated with differential processing of
the tones. The effect of tone interpretation on LPP amplitudes
suggests that this is the case. The amplitudes were increased for
tones that were subsequently responded to with a negative com-
pared to a positive button press. This direction of the effect falls
in line with several previous studies that showed enlarged posi-
tivities for different types of emotional stimuli (Kanske and Kotz,
2007; Rozenkrants and Polich, 2008; Kaestner and Polich, 2011;
Feng et al., 2012). The present data, however, add to this evi-
dence that the top-down interpretation of the affective value of a
certain stimulus yields similar brain responses as when the affec-
tive value is inherent in the stimulus. Previously, Schacht et al.
(2012) found increased LPP amplitudes for stimuli with learned
positive valence. The authors suggest that this finding might be
due to better learning for the positive compared to negative rein-
forcers. The present results show an effect on LPP amplitude due
to the interpretation and association of the intermediate tones
with a certain valence. The fact that we find enlarged LPP ampli-
tudes for negatively interpreted tones might be explained by task
differences. In our study, participants received feedback on their
response and thus learned a tone—response association leading
to one positive and one NT. In contrast, Schacht et al. (2012) used
picture sets of different valence (as rated a priori) and partici-
pants had to classify the pictures in positive, neutral, or negative
without feedback. Beyond that, the focus of our analyses was
on intermediate tones that were not reinforced in the acquisi-
tion phase. Here, we find processing differences apparent already
from around 300ms post-stimulus in the LPP. Even though the
more anterior distribution of this component is not typical, some
variability in the topography of valence effects in the P3 time
window has been reported (Rozenkrants and Polich, 2008; Feng
et al., 2012). Principal components analyses of valence-related
ERP effects corroborate this, showing a number of late positivities
that might only partially share neural generators because of dif-
ferent scalp distribution (Foti et al., 2009). The exact role of these
differentiable components still needs to be specified, however.
INTERPRETATION BIAS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO AFFECT-RELATED
VARIABLES
We suggested that valence is ascribed to the intermediate tones
on the basis of an individual interpretation preference that biases
cognitive processing. However, here we observed no significant
correlations between current positive or negative mood or depres-
sion and interpretation bias, although this has previously been
reported (Eysenck et al., 1991; Mogg et al., 2006; Anderson et al.,
2012). The lack of a relationship between current mood and
depressive symptoms with the interpretation bias in the present
study might result from a very limited variance in these affect-
related variables in young healthy individuals (e.g., BDI ranging
from 0 to 8 on a scale with a maximum score of 63, see Table 1).
Nevertheless, we did observe a significant negative correlation
between the bias score and reflective pondering, a subcompo-
nent of rumination. This might indicate that individuals with a
stronger ruminative coping style show a more negative bias and
vice versa. Joormann et al. (2006) have also studied the relation
between cognitive bias and rumination. Here, an attentional bias
toward sad faces correlated significantly with brooding, a sec-
ond subcomponent of rumination as measured with the RSQ,
but not with reflective pondering. From this finding, the authors
concluded that there might be functional as well as dysfunc-
tional components of rumination. However, in depressed patients
both rumination subscales (brooding and reflective pondering)
were increased compared to healthy controls (Joormann et al.,
2006). There are several explanations for the finding of a relation-
ship between reflective pondering and a negative interpretation
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Table 1 | Questionnaire data.
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
BDI 0 8 2.85 2.46
RSQ_R 0 12 5.80 3.40
RSQ_B 1 8 4.45 2.46
PA 18 39 28.65 6.72
NA 10 18 11.00 1.89
Range, mean, and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ scores in the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), Reflective pondering subscale (RSQ_R), and
Brooding subscale (RSQ_B) of the Response Style Questionnaire, and posi-
tive (PA) and negative affect (NA) assessed before the measurement with the
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS).
bias, while no such relationship was found between brooding
and biased information processing. First, questionnaire data
show that the variance for brooding was much smaller than for
reflective pondering, limiting the potential to find a correlation.
Second, whereas in clinical depression reflective pondering might
represent the more adaptive ruminative coping style (in com-
parison to brooding), it still indicates a ruminative coping style
that is maladaptive when compared to more adaptive cognitive
coping strategies, such as positive reappraisal, positive refocus-
ing, or focusing on planning. Our result of a negative correlation
between reflective pondering and the interpretation bias is in
line with previous studies relating cognitive bias and rumination
(Gotlib and Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011) and encour-
ages further research with clinical samples using the described
paradigm as it suggests that a maladaptive, depressive cognitive
style is related to negative interpretation bias.
That, on a group level, we did not observe a significant inter-
pretation bias may be plausible, given the fact that we investigated
a group of healthy individuals that rather tend to show a positive
bias (Deldin et al., 2001). Further, it is supposed that cognitive
biases result from depressiogenic schemata and that they are not
active until triggered by a negative event or a negative mood state
(Scher et al., 2005). Thus, negative mood or thought induction
may be necessary to elicit a negative cognitive bias in control
participants. With the induction of self-focused thoughts which
are similar to ruminative thinking, Hertel and El-Messidi (2006)
observed more negative interpretations of ambiguous homo-
graphs in dysphoric students. Future research could combine
mood induction procedures with the present paradigm to test for
changes in the measured bias.
LIMITATIONS
Although the present study provides a validation of an animal
experimental setup that allows the indirect assessment of an inter-
pretation bias and gives new insights into the time-course of
ambiguous cue processing, a number of limitations have to be
pointed out. First, we did not assess other, more explicit measures
of cognitive bias in addition to the ambiguous cue-conditioning
task, which could have added some external validity to the present
results. Second, we did not collect valence rating for the tones
after the conditioning paradigm, which could have corroborated
their acquired valence status. In a later yet unpublished study
we included valence ratings. In this study participants ascribed
more positive valence to the PT than to the NT and the inter-
mediate tones. The NT did not differ in valence which might
be due to the fact that only false responses to the NT had neg-
ative consequences. A direct loss after the NT would be a stronger
negative feedback and more comparable to the punishing effect
of an electric shock in the study by Enkel et al. (2010). Apart
from the valence transfer to the intermediate tones their cate-
gorization might also be influenced by the sensory resemblance
of the NPT to the PT and the NNT to the NT. Sensory simi-
larity might facilitate the affective interpretation of these tones
or affective interpretation might partly be a consequence of the
sensory similarity. If sensory similarity was the only basis for
decision-making then the responses would be identical to the
ones after the corresponding reference tones. The present results
indicate that responses to these tones are biased by both the fre-
quency information of the tones and top-down interpretations.
In case of the MT sensory resemblance plays no role since these
tones resemble neither the PT nor the NT. Responses to these
tones might therefore underlie a cognitive bias more strongly. In
addition, the intermediate tones might differ in their degree of
ambiguity. Although the lack of feedback after all three interme-
diate tones leads to uncertainty as seen by an increase in reaction
time, the sensory resemblance of NPT and NNT might facil-
itate response selection. Thus, MT represents the highest level
of ambiguity. In the present study the number of MT was too
small for statistical analyses but further studies could increase the
number by only presenting MT and no NNT or NPT. Another
limitation of the paradigm might be that it lacks a neutral condi-
tion. Presenting another tone which is either followed by neutral
feedback or where the participant does not need to respond
would further corroborate the affective conditioning procedure.
Finally, as the present study was designed to validate the employed
experimental task and to delineate the neurophysiological mech-
anisms of ambiguous cue processing and biased interpretation
of ambiguous cues, we were not able to detect a relation of the
interpretation bias with depression measures. As this was proba-
bly due to the small variance in depression scores in the present
sample, future studies should test clinical samples with the pro-
cedure. Although the correlational findings of the present study
suggest an association between interpretation bias and rumina-
tion, our sample size was very small. Besides, we did not cor-
rect for multiple comparisons underlining the rather exploratory
nature of our findings although it is under debate if Bonferroni
corrections are appropriate (Perneger, 1998). To corroborate
our findings mood or rumination inductions (e.g., Huffziger
and Kuehner, 2009) would be necessary. But, we also have to
point out that the literature on cognitive biases in depression is
inconsistent (for reviews see Dalgleish and Watts, 1990; Gotlib
and Joormann, 2010). Especially studies using implicit mea-
sures of cognitive bias fail to detect a negative interpretation bias
(Lawson and Macleod, 1999) even after negative mood induction
(Bisson and Sears, 2007).
CONCLUSION
The present study aimed at establishing an ambiguous cue-
conditioning paradigm in humans. Such an approach has the
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advantage that it assesses the interpretation bias indirectly, which
yields it unaffected by demand effects or a priori connotations
of the applied stimulus material (as is the case, for example, in
words; Lawson and Macleod, 1999; or homophones; Mogg et al.,
2006). Furthermore, it offers the possibility of testing for positive
and negative biases by assigning affective significance (positive
and negative, respectively) to two initially neutral tones through
classical conditioning. After such an acquisition phase, the test
phase introduced tones of intermediate frequency that served
as a measure of interpretation bias since the response to these
tones indicated the participants’ expectation of a rewarding or
potentially punishing event.
The results of the present study provide evidence that
ambiguous cue processing and resulting interpretation bias is
assessable by using the proposed ambiguous cue-conditioning
task that has previously been established in animals. On a
behavioral level, ambiguous stimuli led to uncertainty in their
response options and longer reaction times. On a neurophys-
iological level, we observed no N2 differences, but increased
LPP amplitudes for reference stimuli compared to ambiguous
stimuli, suggesting greater task-relevance and emotional salience
for the reward- and punishment-related stimuli. Interpretation
of the ambiguous stimuli had an effect on LPP over frontal
electrodes with increased amplitudes for a negative compared
to a positive interpretation. This indicates early and pro-
longed differences in the activation of top-down interpretation
mechanisms.
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6  General discussion 
 
6.1  Summary 
Six studies were conducted to characterize the neural correlates of emotional 
processing in affective disorders. The first set of studies tested emotion regulation 
capabilities by engaging participants in two different strategies to influence an 
emotional response, reappraisal and distraction. The second set of studies looked at 
the influence that emotion has on cognitive processing by testing performance of a 
mental arithmetic task while emotional stimuli were presented as distracters. The last 
study looked at biased information processing with a paradigm that confronted 
participants with ambiguous situations, thereby allowing for the measurement of more 
positive or negative interpretation of these situations. 
Study 1: How to regulate emotion? Neural networks for reappraisal and distraction. 
The first study established a paradigm for investigating the neural networks 
underlying two different emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal and distraction. 
This was done in healthy individuals. The results show that the paradigm successfully 
induced emotion in the subjective emotion ratings that participants gave, but also in 
increased activity in the amygdala for emotional compared to neutral stimuli. 
Participants reported less emotion when applying either one of the two emotion 
regulation strategies, which was mirrored by reduced amygdala activity for reappraisal 
and, even stronger, for distraction. The neural network involved in the downregulation 
of amygdala activity during reappraisal and distraction included dorsolateral 
prefrontal, parietal and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices for both strategies. Activity in 
the orbitofrontal cortex was specific for the reappraisal condition, while distraction 
yielded stronger and extended activity of parietal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex, including anterior cingulate cortex. This was verified by the specific 
connectivity patterns of the amygdala during reappraisal and distraction. 
Study 2: Neural correlates of emotion regulation deficits in remitted depression: The 
influence of regulation strategy, habitual regulation use and emotional valence. The 
second study applied the paradigm introduced in Study 1 to currently remitted patients 
with unipolar depression. There were no differences between the patients and their 
healthy control participants in the subjective ratings of emotional states. However, the 
patients showed a deficit in downregulating activity in the amygdala when using the 
reappraisal strategy, but not when applying the distraction strategy. Activity in the 
regulating control networks was increased for both regulation strategies, potentially 
indexing a compensatory effect. Interestingly, patients also reported less frequent use 
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of reappraisal in their everyday life as measured with a questionnaire. These 
questionnaire reports of habitual reappraisal correlated with the downregulation of 
amygdala activity when reappraising. 
Study 3: Impaired regulation of emotion: Evidence for a vulnerability marker of 
bipolar disorder. The third study applied the paradigm introduced in Study 1 to 
euthymic patients with bipolar disorder and unaffected relatives of patients with 
bipolar disorder. The results show no differences in the subjective emotion ratings 
between bipolar patients and their controls, but slightly more negative ratings for 
positive emotional stimuli in unaffected relatives of bipolar disorder patients. Patients 
and relatives also showed deficient down-regulation of the amygdala when using the 
reappraisal strategy, but not when applying distraction. Connectivity between the 
amygdala and orbitofrontal control regions was also altered during reappraisal in 
patients and controls. The deficits were mirrored in self-reported decreased habitual 
use of reappraisal as measured with a questionnaire. Similarly to Study 2, these self-
reports correlated with the downregulation of amygdala activity when reappraising. 
Study 4: Goal-directed behavior under emotional distraction is preserved by 
enhanced task-specific activation. The fourth study tested the effects of emotional 
distraction on a mental arithmetic task in healthy individuals. Behaviorally, a slowing 
in response times was observed, while accuracy of the responses was not impaired. 
With regard to the neural correlates, the functional localizer task that contrasted 
mental arithmetic processing with number detection identified a network that was 
congruent with previously described brain correlates of arithmetic tasks, critically 
including a widespread cluster in parietal cortex. Activity in this network was 
significantly increased under emotional distraction. This increase in activity correlated 
with the behavioral slowing effect. 
Study 5: Neural correlates of emotional distractibility in bipolar disorder, unaffected 
relatives and individuals with hypomanic personality. Study 5 applied the same 
experimental procedure as Study 4, but tested euthymic patients with bipolar disorder, 
unaffected relatives of patients with bipolar disorder, individuals scoring high in a 
questionnaire on hypomanic personality and healthy control groups matched to each 
of the groups of interest. There were no behavioral differences between the groups in 
performance of the functional localizer arithmetic task. However, under emotional 
distraction, all groups showed behavioral slowing, which was significantly increased 
in bipolar patients. There were no differences in accuracy of performance. The groups 
did not differ with regard to the neural network activated for mental arithmetic in the 
functional localizer task. As in study 4, this network consisted of a number of regions, 
critically involving the parietal cortex bilaterally. Activity in this network was 
increased under emotional distraction for all groups. Only bipolar patients showed an 
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enlarged increase in right parietal activity. This activation increase correlated again 
with the behavioral slowing effect. 
Study 6: Indirect assessment of an interpretation bias in humans: Neurophysiological 
and behavioral correlates. The sixth study tested a paradigm to probe biased 
information processing in ambiguous situations. The results show that the first training 
session was able to associate two different reference tones with negative and positive 
outcomes, as participants learned to press the respective buttons to obtain the positive 
or avoid the negative outcome. Responses to additional intermediate and, therefore, 
ambiguous tones were significantly slower. Also, the responses were less clear with 
regard to the potential outcome. While the tones that were close in frequency to the 
previously introduced reference tones were still relatively more frequently followed 
by the most fitting response, the middle tone was approximately equally often 
responded to with positive and negative button presses. However, the ratio of positive 
and negative responses to the ambiguous tones, which gives an index of the size of the 
bias, correlated with the rumination subscale reflective pondering. The ERP results 
showed larger late positive potentials to the reference compared to the ambiguous 
tones. Furthermore, the late positive potential was also enlarged for negatively 
compared to positively interpreted ambiguous tones.  
 
6.2  Implications 
Chapter 3 raised five questions that the presented studies aimed to address. The 
present section revisits each of these questions and evaluates the impact that the 
results of the studies have on addressing them.  
The first question targeted voluntary emotion regulation and its neural underpinnings 
in remitted patients with bipolar disorder and depression. In order to address this 
question we first validated a paradigm in healthy individuals that allows the direct 
comparison of two emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal and distraction. As the 
research on specific emotion regulation greatly has greatly increased over the last 
years, improving our understanding of their differences and commonalities became 
more and more important. Our study adds to this by showing that both, reappraisal and 
distraction, are efficient in down-regulating emotion and concurrent amygdala activity 
and are implemented through overlapping, but partially distinct control networks, 
which also showed specific connectivity patterns to the amygdala during application 
of the strategies (Kanske et al., 2011). In addition to the first previous study on a 
comparison of strategies (McRae et al., 2009), our study shows that the effects 
generalize to different types of distraction, working memory and mental arithmetic 
tasks (Van Dillen et al., 2009) and to emotions of different valence, positive and 
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negative. An important difference is also the specific experimental design regarding 
the emotion induction, which occurred only after participants were instructed to 
regulate any occurring emotion (McRae et al., 2009). Since in our study, the emotion 
regulation instruction was displayed after the emotional stimulus was presented, it 
addresses the question whether ongoing emotional responses can still be regulated, 
which may be particularly critical for clinical populations that also show difficulties in 
early identification of emotions (Mikhailova, Vladimirova, Iznak, Tsusulkovskaya, & 
Sushko, 1996). The data differentiate reappraisal and distraction in the amount of 
amygdala down-regulation, which was stronger during distraction and some regions 
that were specific to each strategy. For reappraisal this was mainly the orbitofrontal 
cortex, which is consistent with other studies on cognitive change of emotion (Eippert 
et al., 2007) and is in line with its involvement in affective reversal learning tasks 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003) as reappraisal can be described as a self-induced change 
in emotional responding during constant, unchanged stimulation. Distraction in 
contrast yielded stronger activation of the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex. As distraction is a strategy of attentional control, this nicely fits with 
the involvement of these  regions in executive attentional control as measured with 
different types of conflict tasks (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Fan, Flombaum, 
McCandliss, Thomas, & Posner, 2003). In both, euthymic bipolar and remitted 
depressed patients, we found that amygdala down-regulation was not as efficient as in 
the matched healthy control participants when reappraisal was applied, but not during 
distraction (Kanske et al., 2012), which fits to the stronger and more extended 
distraction effects in healthy controls. For therapeutic interventions this may indicate 
that effective distraction can be used as a resource, while reappraisal should be viewed 
as a special treatment target. The particular relevance is underlined by the correlation 
of the amygdala regulation deficit with habitual reappraisal as measured in self-reports. 
A difference between unipolar depression and bipolar disorder lies in the specificity of 
the regulation deficit to negative emotion in depression, while there were no 
differences between negative and positive emotional stimuli in bipolar disorder, which 
fits, of course, to the bipolarity of manic and depressive episodes. The pattern of 
limbic hyperactivation and altered activity in or connectivity with regions in the 
regulating control network is in line with the suggestion of impaired prefrontal control 
over emotion generating regions like the amygdala in affective disorder (Phillips, 
Ladouceur, et al., 2008). However, it critically specifies the conditions of this 
impairment. We observed altered amygdala activity in patients and relatives only in 
the reappraisal condition, not during simple viewing of emotional stimuli. This 
contrasts other reports of increased amygdala responses to emotion stimuli 
(Delvecchio et al., 2012; Houenou et al., 2011). However, there are also reports of 
lacking amygdala group differences, or even blunted amygdala responding to 
emotional stimuli (Chen et al., 2011; Diener et al., 2012). As these studies did not 
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explicitly instruct participants how to treat arising emotions it is possible that patients 
and controls applied regulation differently, potentially in line with their habitual use of 
emotion regulation (Aldao et al., 2010; Green et al., 2011). By explicitly instructing 
the use of certain regulation strategies, the present study allowed studying the specific 
effects of strategies, which could offer an explanation for the discrepant previous 
results. With regard to unipolar depression, the presented evidence also adds to the 
literature that the deficit in amygdala regulation is specific to the reappraisal strategy, 
persists into remission, is related to the reduced habitual use of reappraisal and is 
specific to negative emotion. In bipolar disorder, the data conforms with two very 
recent studies on voluntary emotion regulation in bipolar disorder (Morris, Sparks, 
Mitchell, Weickert, & Green, 2012; Townsend et al., 2013). It also adds to this 
literature by showing specificity to the reappraisal strategy, persistence into euthymia, 
the relation to habitual reappraisal use and the lack of differences between positive 
and negative emotional stimuli. The fact that the deficits in both groups were observed 
even though none of the patients were still symptomatic, suggests that the deficits are 
not bound to current illness episodes, but posses trait characteristics.  
The second question more directly asked about this point whether deficits observed in 
diagnosed patients with bipolar disorder are a trait- or vulnerability marker of the 
illness. Therefore, unaffected first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder 
were tested with the same experimental setup. In comparison to their matched controls, 
relatives showed the same deficit as bipolar patients in down-regulation of the 
amygdala through reappraisal, but normal regulation effects when using distraction. 
Also, direct comparison of the bipolar patient group to the unaffected relatives showed 
no differences. The presence of these deficits in healthy individuals with increased 
risk to develop bipolar disorder in the future suggests that they do represent a 
vulnerability marker for bipolar disorder. As the relatives are not affected by previous 
manic or depressive episodes, the data indicate that the deficit is not a consequence of 
but a predisposition for the development of the illness. This is in line with other 
findings of altered emotional and motivational processing and related ventral-limbic 
activity in unaffected relatives of patients with bipolar disorder (Linke et al., 2012; 
Surguladze et al., 2010) and extends these to the regulation of emotion, which has 
previously only been investigated on a self-report questionnaire level (Green et al., 
2011). The fact that the same effects were found in patients and relatives adds to their 
credibility, as the relatives are unmedicated and the observed impairments seem, 
therefore, not to be an artifact of medication in bipolar disorder patients. 
In contrast to the regulatory influence that cognition can have on emotional processing, 
the third question targeted the distraction effects that emotion can exert on cognitive 
processes and specifically asked if euthymic bipolar disorder patients show increased 
emotional distractibility when performing a cognitive task and if such distraction 
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effects are accompanied by changes in the neural correlates of processing the task at 
hand. We initially validated a testing procedure in healthy participants that localized 
the neural network involved in a specific cognitive task, mental arithmetic, in a first 
step and the studied the influence of emotion on this network by presenting mental 
arithmetic tasks on emotional distracter images in a second step. The identified 
network included superior parietal as well as dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex, which is in line with previous mental arithmetic studies (Dehaene, Molko, 
Cohen, & Wilson, 2004) and the observed behavioral slowing under emotional 
distraction correlated with increased activity in these regions (Wessa et al., 2013). 
These data speak to the debate whether emotional distraction yields increased (Blair et 
al., 2007; Hart et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010) or decreased activity (Anticevic et al., 
2010; Dolcos et al., 2006; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2008) in 
‘cognitive’   brain regions, in particular since none of the previous studies used 
independent functional localizers for the respective task-related neural network. The 
reduced activity found in some studies may, therefore, reflect a different process, 
potentially the inhibition of task-irrelevant information and the protection against 
interference (Jha, Fabian, & Aguirre, 2004; Shimamura, 2000). When testing this 
procedure in euthymic patients with bipolar disorder, we again found increased 
activity in the task-related network, but the patients showed a significantly greater 
activity increase in the right parietal cortex than the healthy control participants 
(Kanske et al., 2013). This activation increase also correlated with the enlarged 
behavioral distraction effect in the patients. The major relevance of this result lies in 
linking cognitive deficits in bipolar disorder with emotional dysregulation (Henin et 
al., 2009; Strakowski et al., 2005). Hyperactivation under emotional distraction has 
been observed previously, but these studies left it open if the activity increase relates 
to behavioral deficits as no behavioral impairments were found and as no independent 
task network identification was undertaken (Bertocci et al., 2012; Deckersbach et al., 
2008; Lagopoulos & Malhi, 2007; Malhi et al., 2005; Wessa et al., 2007). As with the 
emotion regulation deficits discussed above, these alterations were found in currently 
euthymic bipolar patients, which raises the question if they also represent vulnerability 
marker characteristics and can already be observed before the actual onset of the 
disorder. 
The fourth question addressed this point and asked if exacerbated cognitive deficits 
under emotional distraction in bipolar disorder are a vulnerability marker or only 
occur as a consequence of the illness. To this end, the same design as above was tested 
in two populations at increased risk to develop bipolar disorder, unaffected first-
degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder and healthy individuals with 
hypomanic personality as defined through self-reports in a questionnaire. None of the 
two groups showed any differences when compared to carefully matched control 
groups of healthy participants without the risk factors (Kanske et al., 2013). Also 
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when compared to the group of bipolar patients, the two at-risk populations showed 
the same differences to the patients as the controls. That relatives of bipolar patients 
and participants with hypomanic personality were indistinguishable from their 
respective comparison counterparts suggests that this deficit is a consequence of the 
disorder rather than a vulnerability marker. In our study the size of the distraction 
effect in bipolar patients did not correlate with clinical characteristics such as the 
number of previous episodes, which indicates that the deficit is present after the 
experience of at least one illness episode. The described deficit is clinically very 
important, because cognitive dysfunction, which is, at least partially, caused by 
increased emotional distractibility, predicts functional recovery (Martinez-Aran, Vieta, 
Colom, et al., 2004; Martinez-Aran, Vieta, Reinares, et al., 2004). If 
psychotherapeutic interventions address the exacerbated emotional distractibility, the 
very low rates of functional recovery in the first two years after an illness episode may 
be increased (Keck et al., 1998; Tohen et al., 2003). 
The fifth question also addressed the influence of emotion on cognitive processing and 
asked if biased cognitive information processing through emotion can be measured 
indirectly with a paradigm adapted from animal research and if a negative bias is 
associated with depression related traits. To this end, different tones were associated 
with positive and negative outcome and the interpretation of ambiguous intermediate 
tones was taken as an index of biased information processing. In the test sample of 
healthy individuals, we observed an overall slight positive bias (Cummins & Nistico, 
2002) that correlated negatively with interindividual differences in ruminative coping 
style, specifically in reflective pondering (Schick et al., 2013), a trait that is associated 
with clinical depression (Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006). Participants higher in 
rumination showed a more negative bias, which is in line with some previous evidence 
relating rumination to biased processing (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Koster, 
DeLissnyder, Derakshan, & DeRaedt, 2011). The data also add to the literature on 
biased processing in depression, which mainly applied more direct bias measures and 
reported partly inconsistent results with an increased (Berna et al., 2011; Lawson et al., 
2002) or decreased negative bias in depression (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999). As we 
also observed a differentiated ERP time-course for physically identical, but differently 
interpreted ambiguous tones, the paradigm adapted from animal research seems to be 
also applicable for measuring biased cognitive processing in humans. A further 
advantage of the design is that it can assess a positive and negative bias alike and is, 
thus, principally applicable to characterize both, depression and mania in bipolar 
disorder.  
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6.3  Critique and conclusions 
The present studies have some limitations that give rise to further research question to 
be addressed in future investigations. This section will briefly review some of these 
questions and also draw some final conclusions.  
A general problem of all the presented studies including clinical groups is that the 
patients kept receiving antidepressant or mood-stabilizing medication to prevent 
withdrawal or the emergence of symptoms. This, of course, does not allow testing the 
pure diease effects, but confounds them with the medication taken. We tried to test the 
influence of the medication by including a composite measure of medication load 
(Sackeim, 2001), which has been recommended and used previously (Almeida et al., 
2009; Phillips, Travis, Fagiolini, & Kupfer, 2008). Furthermore, with regard to the 
emotion regulation deficits, they were not only observed in the patient group, but also 
in the unaffected first-degree relatives of bipolar disorder and healthy individuals with 
hypomanic personality, which suggests that medication played no role. Nevertheless, 
future studies should include bigger samples to be able to tease the specific effects of 
different medications apart.   
In all of the described patients studies, currently remitted or euthymic patients were 
tested. While testing these groups has the advantage that conclusions about the trait 
characteristics of certain deficits can be drawn, it would also be interesting to test 
currently symptomatic patients. It is plausible to expect quantitatively stronger 
impairments in emotion regulation, emotional distractibility and a stronger bias on 
cognitive processing, but there may also be further qualititative differences. For 
bipolar patients one of the hypotheses could be that the effects become more valence 
dependent. In the present studies no differences between positive and negative 
emotional processing were observed, but currently manic or depressed patients might 
show such differentiation (Murphy et al., 1999). Also, it could be expected that effects 
show in subjective emotion ratings, in addition to the neural responses. 
A third general issue is that it would be important to probe the specificity of the 
observed effects to unipolar depression and bipolar disorder. Emotion regulation 
deficits, for example, have been found in very different mental disorders including 
borderline personality disorder (Schulze et al., 2011), general anxiety disorder 
(Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006), social anxiety (Goldin & 
Gross, 2010), phobia (Hermann et al., 2009) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(Walcott & Landau, 2004). It is therefore also discussed as a trans-diagnostic issue 
(Aldao et al., 2010; Berking et al., 2008) also for the development of psychopathology 
in childhood and adolescence (Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 1995). 
Psychotherapeutic interventions start to adopt emotion regulation modules across 
disorders (Kovacs et al., 2006; Mennin, 2004; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002). To 
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probe differences and commonalities across different disorders, future studies should 
directly compare different matched patient populations. 
In the described experiments, the main outcome measures were self-reports and 
behavioral responses, as well as fMRI and ERP measures. Emotions, however, elicit a 
whole cascade of further, mainly bodily, responses that were not tested here (Bradley 
& Lang, 2000). Physiological measures of emotion responsivity such as electrodermal 
responses or heart rate have been shown to highly correlate with the subjective 
evaluation of an emotional state (Cuthbert, Bradley, & Lang, 1996) and also with the 
down-regulation of anxiety (Kalisch et al., 2005), but not necessarily to the regulation 
of emotion per se (Eippert et al., 2007). Whether peripheral physiological measures 
are sensitive to the different regulation strategies tested in the studies here, which 
mechanisms of emotion regulation are reflected by the physiological indicators and if 
alterations in patients with affective disorders can be differentiated remains unclear 
and should be investigated in future studies. Such measures could help to characterize 
the emotional responses more comprehensively. Specifically with regard to the 
reappraisal strategy it has been shown that it may also be critical to control for eye 
movements as some participants deploy their attention differently across a given 
emotional picture stimulus when reappraising (van Reekum et al., 2007). Eye 
movements only explain part of the observed variance, but might nevertheless also 
differ between patients and controls in the present studies. 
To conclude, the presented studies set out to explore emotion-cognition interactions, 
their neural correlates and putative alterations in affective disorders. To study the 
influence of cognition on emotional processing, an emotion regulation paradigm was 
applied that demonstrated how regulation deficits in patients with unipolar depression 
and bipolar disorder are present in the control of amygdala activity, which related to 
habitual emotion regulation use as measured with self-reports. The regulation deficits 
seem to be a vulnerability marker for bipolar disorder as they already show in healthy 
individuals at increased risk to develop bipolar disorder. Conversely, the influence of 
emotion on cognitive processing was tested with an emotional distraction paradigm 
that showed increased distraction and accompanying task-related hyperactivation in 
patients with bipolar disorder, but not in individuals at increased risk to develop the 
disorder, which suggests that it is rather a consequence than a precursor of bipolar 
disorder. Emotion can also bias cognitive processing as seen in the last study, which 
demonstrated that such biased processing can be assessed indirectly and that it relates 
to depression associated rumination traits. The presented evidence shows specific 
targets for psychotherapeutic treatment that may reduce relapse rates and facilitate 
psychosocial functional recovery. 
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